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Introduction
In times of economic difficulty competition policy must continue to make its influence
felt alongside all the other Community policies. Its function is to preserve a situation
in which the structural changes that are needed can take place. Although competition
policy can make only an indirect contribution to solving the economic difficulties now
besetting the Community-and then only if it achieves its objectives-there can be
no solution without it. The Commission has tried to ensure that competition policy
satisfies the demands made of it-in the measures it has taken as regards both State
aids and the business conduct of firms.
The Commission considers that the proliferation of State aids as a means of mitigating
economic difficulties and their social consequences carries with it the risk of preserving
industrial structures that have failed to adapt to circumstances. Restrictive agreements
offer no real solution to the crisis either. The Commission is paying particular atten-
tio to the increasing popularity of joint ventures: they may in certain circumstances
help industrial rationalization, but they can be a mere fagade for anticompetitive
agreements too. It is also clear that a more systematic control of large-scale mergers
is essential if harmful developments in the structure of industry are to be prevented.
The Commission has, in addition, set itself the task of following closely the effect of
the growing tendency of Member States to intervene in their economies through the
agency of public enterprises.
In the matter of State aids in 1975, as expected, the Commission had to deal with
significantly more cases of assistance granted by Member States to offset the industrial
and social effects of the serious economic crisis which the Community is experiencing.
It has kept a close watch on the situation to ensure that the effect of the assistance
was not simply to transfer from one Member State to another the difficulties it was
intended to resolve or alleviate, and that it actively helped to solve structural problems
rather than merely masking them.
Two factors have had to be borne in mind. First, a return to protectionist policies,
however indirect, on the part of Member States cannot provide an effective solution
to the crisis. Second, a return to normal necessarily involves a structural adaptation
of the machinery of production in the Community to major changes in internal
demand and in the international division of labour.
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The Commission has worked out new principles for coordinating regional aids
throughout the Community, which take account of the economic and social require-
ments of each region. In implementing these principles, under the powers conferred
by the Treaty in respect of State aids, the Commission will ensure that competition
is not unduly distorted and consequently that national aids are commensurate with
the seriousness of the regional problems to be solved. In this way it will help to make
national regional policies more effective, particularly as regards the future of Com-
munity regions facing the gravest difficulties.
As regards restrictiue agreements and abuse of dominant positions, the Commission
has taken action against attempts to divide the market, to prevent price decreases or
to aggravate the rigidity of certain markets.
Apart from decisions taken on certain of the traditional anticompetitive practices
prohibited by Article 85, the Commission has intervened on a whole range of sales
strategies which, when operated by a dominant firm, tend to constitue an abuse
within the meaning of Article 86. It attacked a dominant firm's discriminatory
pricing policy not as a price control agency, but simply to enforce the clear prohibi-
tion on such practices contained in Article 86. In point of fact, the Commission
did not impose a specific price reduction but merely gave an indication enabling the
firm to decide an acceptable price level.
Similarly, the Commission has stated the limits within which it will tolerate selectiue
distribution systems. The importance of the only decision issued on this subject in 1975
lies in the fact that it provides the consumer electronics industry with points of refer-
ence to bring their distribution systems into line with Article 85. The Commission had
previously made similar decisions in relation to automobiles and perfumes.
The Commission has continued to clarify its policy on patent licensing ogreements,
which can be a classic means of separating markets. Now that seven decisions have been
issued, it is possible to contemplate the preparation of a regulation exempting certain
categories of patent licensing agreement, which should benefit small- and medium-
sized firms in particular.
In parallel with its enforcement of the prohibition on restrictive practices, the Com-
mission has made use of its powers under the provisions exempting international
cooperation between firms to authorize a coordination of investment in the highly
specific area of nuclear reprocessing and long-term specialization in the manufacture
of penicillin. In the latter case, the authorization was given only after the firms had
agreed to abandon their plan to form joint subsidiaries. In view of the nature of the
relevant market, the Commission considered this step necessary to ensure that the
two firms remained independent of each other in the market.
In 1975 there were fourteen decisions under Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty
and twenty-two decisions under Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty. In the EEC
coMP. REP.1975
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field, therefore, approximately one hundred decisions have been issued since the
Treaty's competition rules began to be enforced. Apart from restoring competition
to a number of markets in the community, the commission's gradually developing
case law has clarified the significance ofthe rules laid down by the Treaties. In 1975,
as in previous years, a large number of cases were settled without a formal decision
being made. Although this procedure is less well known and has less legal value than
a formal decision, its importance should not be underestimated, as it enables some
cases to be settled with a minimum of administrative intervention.
In 1975, for instance, it was used to separate the joint interests of two major conti-
nental glass manufacturers as regards safety glass for motor vehicles and to bring the
marketing in the Community of Brazilian coffee into line with the rules of competition.
When the oil crisis arose in the autumn of 1973, the Commission publicly warned the
oil companies to refrain from indulging in restrictive or abusive practices. The Com-
mission has now nearly completed its examination of a complaint concerning a
refusal to supply in a case which may well constitute abuse of a dominant position.
The report on the behaviour of the oil companies in the Community during the crisis
period sets out the results of the Commission's inquiries under Articles 85 and 86.
The Commission has decided that there must be further investigation of the terms
of sale of aviation jet fuel (kerosene) to the airlines and of naphtha to the chemical
industry, the use of certain arrangements for publishing oil prices by the oil companies
and public supply contracts with electricity companies.
The Commission has begun work on proposals to the Council for special regulations
applying the rules of competition to sea and air transport, which will take account of
the need for uniform application of these rules and at the same time of the specific
features of these modes of transport. The Court of Justice has held that the general
rules of the EEC Treaty apply to sea and air transport, so the rules of competition
applying to firms under Articles 85 to 90 also apply.
Work on the research programme on concentration continued in 1975, and results
have now been published in nearly a hundred studies on individual industries or
markets. These reports have highlighted the need both for periodic updating and for
further consideration of certain points which would help to explain how competition
actually functions in the main product markets. This research is especially valuable
in the current inflationary situation in that inflation is particularly rife in concentrated
industries in the Member States.
Given the importance to the Community of the rapid introduction of a more sys-
tematic means of controlling large-scale mergers, which would help to maintain
effective competition, the Commission has asked the Council to intensify its work
on the proposed merger control regulation,
coMP. REP. 1975
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Chapter I
Main developments in the
Community's policies
Sl 
- 
lmpact of competition policy on prices
and market structures
1. The main features of the economic situation in the Community during the
period covered by this Report were a persisting inflationary trend and a drop in
economic growth. If this situation were to continue it could have a damaging effect
on the intensity of competition in the Community. In times of economic stagnation,
weak, uncompetitive enterprises inevitably go out of business, driven out by a process
of natural selection which is desirable only up to a certain extent. Where economic
difficulties persist, there is a danger that structural changes would be undesirable
for competition, because they intensify concentration and economic power.
2. If the decentralized structure of the market economy is to be safeguarded,
competition policy must play a key role in the general field of Community policy.
It must ensure that damage to the existing degree of competition is kept to a minimum.
lts main function is to maintain and to promote competition so that competition can
do its job of guiding and stimulating the economy. In this way it can help bring about
the structural changes which the Community needs.
3. As regards competition policy's potential as a means of fighting inflation, the
Commission has already stated its views a number of times.l It has no doubt that
competition policy is an essential part of the armoury to be deployed against inflation,
but there are limits to its effectiyeness. For instance, measures to halt the abuse of
dominant positions cannot be converted into systematic monitoring of prices. In
proceedings against abuse consisting ofcharging excessively high prices, it is difficult
to tell whether in any given case an abusive price has been set for there is no objective
way of establishing exactly what price covers costs plus a reasonable profit margin.
t ri.r-t n"pott on Competition Policy, point 16.
Third Report on Competition Policy, points 17 to 19.
Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points I to 10.
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Likewise, the various views of what constitutes a comparable market may be used to
establish that unfair prices are being charged only if the various cost factors are
capable of precise quantification.
4. However, if it is successful, an active competition policy against price-fixing
and market-sharing agreements, restrictions of competition and conduct of any kind
which jeopardizes the unity of the common market and leads to market fragmenta-
tion, or any other practices which enhance economic power, will have the effect
of moderating the level of prices.
This can be illustrated by the example of gramophone record prices in Germany.
The view taken by the Court of Justice and the Commission that the national character
of copyrights and similar industrial or commercial property rights must not be allowed
to impede the free movement of goods within the Community certainly played a
part in the reduction of about l5oh in the price of gramophone records in Germany,
representing a benefit to the consumer of DM 150 million or so a year.
J. However, the question arises whether the process of concentration has not
already gone so far in the Community that major areas of the economy are substan-
tially shielded from market forces and therefore beyond the reach of competition
policy. All the available information shows that more and more business activity is
accounted for by fewer and fewer enterprises. These are mainly multinationals, but
there are also purely national firms which are in a position to decide product ranges
and determine prices without much regard for market forces.
6. The Community rules of competition in their present form certainly enable the
Commission to take action where dominant firms abuse their power. And there is
market dominance where the firms in a given industry are in a position of joint
dominance in relation to their customers.l Moreover. whatever the market share of
the firms involved, the Commission can take action against concerted practices,
and any type of practical cooperation may be prohibited even if it is not the subject
of an actual plan.2
7. Nevertheless, experience has shown that the Commission is rarely in a position
to avert structural changes which, by increasing the economic power of major firms,
weaken the play of market forces. An effective Community competition policy
aiming to prevent harmful structural changes is out of the question unless systematic
merger control is introduced along the lines proposed by the Commission to the
Council, making it possible to prohibit the creation of a dominant position.
t S."T.pott on the Behaviour of the Oil Companies, point 9.2 Judgrnent of the Court of Justice in t}re Sugar case, see point 22,
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92 
- 
The proposed merger control regulation
8. In 1975 the Council Working Party on Economic Questions continued its
consideration of the proposed regulation at four meetings on 18 Februaty,25 Jtne,
23 September and l0 and 1l November. The first stage of the work, which was
completed by mid-year, was devoted to discussion of general aspects and was to some
extent held back until the outcome of the June referendum in the United Kingdom
was known. In July the Commission asked the Council to give the proposal priority'
Council discussions are at present concentrating on the definition of the scope of
the regulation and the criteria for action set out in Article 1. On the question of
decision-making power, the Commission reasserts that, as regards individual cases,
the institutional equilibrium established by the Treaty must not be upset by the
future regulation.
g3 
- 
The conclusions of the Report on the Behaviour of
the Oil Companies
g. The inquiry announced by the Commission on 2l December lgT3t covered
the period from October 1973 to March 1974--the period marked by the oil crisis
stemming from the armed conflict which broke out in the Middle East on 6 October
1973. The inquiry's findings and conclusions as to the behaviour of oil companies
during this period2 do not necessarily apply to the situation which obtained before
or after the crisis.
The purpose of the inquiry was to examine the behaviour of oil companies in the
Community and assess it with regard to the rules on competition set out in the Treaty
of Rome. The Commission's investigative powers extend to all member countries,
but the inquiry also produced important information relevant to matters outside
the Community, notably the formation of crude oil prices in producer countries and
also the transfer prices charged by oil companies in respect of crude oil sold to their
refineries and refined products sold to their distributing subsidiaries.
The sudden pressure on the market for oil products, its impact on the price of these
products and the uncertainty as to the gravity and duration of the crisis rapidly
produced within the Community a supply situation in respect of oil products which
obliged the Commission to ensure, by the means of direct action available to it,
that the situation was not being exploited by the oil companies in violation of the
Treaty's rules on competition.
t Sr. Tht.d Report on Competition Policy, point 14.2 Commission Report on the Behaviour of the Oil Companies in the Community over the period
from October 1973 to March 1974; Brussels, 14 December 1975.
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The Commission's apprehension was justified because of the specific structure of the
market in oil products, which is controlled by a small number of large international
companies distributing a limited number of homogeneous products obtained from the
same raw material to which they have privileged access. In proportions which may
vary, all these companies purchase their oil from the same sources, often from enter-
prises in which they have a joint interest, at prices which are broadly similar for a
given supply point. They load the oil at the same ports and ship it to the same destina-
tions, where they manufacture the same products under the same conditions-
sometimes even at the same refineries.
Whether in the case of actual joint ventures, exchanges of refining capacities or
transfers of products, the large companies are linked by an extensive network of
relationships which, even if there are good historical and economic reasons for them,
constitute none the less a factor in strengthening their solidarity and consolidating
their position.
The Commission will remain alert to the possibility that, by forging more and more
of these links, the companies might create together a situation which would limit the
scope for effective competition.
Alongside these large international companies, there are a smaller number of
integrated companies, also with refineries in the Community, which, to a varying
extent, depending on their requirements, have access to supplies of crude oil, but at
generally higher prices.
Finally, as regards the supply of oil products, there are the independent wholesalers,
who in normal circumstances are able to plan an active and effective role in that they
are in a position to obtain supplies from the cheapest sources and to ask lower prices,
thereby introducing a significant element of competition.
During the crisis, not only did the large oil companies continue to enjoy access to
sources of supply on better terms than their competitors but their market position
was reinforced by the relative scarcity of supply and even more by the fear of real
shortage. This situation harboured increased risks of restrictive practices involving
supplies or prices, notably market sharing, abusive price policies or the elimination of
less well-placed competitors or independent dealers. These were, incidentally, risks
which the authorities in Member States were concerned to limit by measures appro-
priate to the national markets.
Once the threat of a shortage appeared, the conditions of supply were seriously
affected not only by the onset of the crisis but also by the attitude adopted by govern-
ments towards this threat.
In most member countries the refining capacities cover requirements. The authorities
in those countries took steps to control price increases and to restrict exports of
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refined products. However, for reasons stemming both from its economic tenets and
from an appreciable shortfall in refining capacities in Germany, the Government of
that country chose to rely to a large extent on the free interplay of market mechanisms
to make up by imports the shortfall in national refining capacity.
The varied policy approaches adopted within the Community by the several Member
States and the differing national measures implementing these policies affected the
oil companies and explain certain facets of their behaviour in member countries.
Assessment in the light of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty
The Commission examined whether the changes in the respective positions of the
parties economically involved did not, during the crisis, lead to restrictive or unfair
practices by companies as regards supplies and prices or towards independent dealers
and users.
Assessment of the facts was often made difficult because the authorities in most
Member States pursued a short-term oil policy which meant that they had to involve
the oil companies-either themselves or through their trade associations-in deter-
mining or implementing national objectives. This concertation between companies
obviously resulted in practices which, altlough they had the blessing of the Member
States, could not avoid having some impact on competition and were therefore apt
to fall within the relevant rules of the Treaty.
Subject to any conclusions to the contrary which the Commission may reach when it
has completed the action it intends to take,l the findings of the inquiry were as
follows.
l. The dominant position of the oil companies
The whole of the Report shows that the structure of supply was not fundamentally
different during the oil crisis from what it had been previously but-bearing in mind
the relative scarcity of oil products-inasmuch as certain oil companies had at their
disposal the bulk of the crude oil produced, and transported and refined it, the pos-
ition of the independents and even of some of the less powerful inte$ated companies
was undermined. Nevertheless, at the same time, refiners in general saw their position
strengthened to such an extent that, collectively, they acquired a dominant position
on tle oil market.
_-r See paragraph 5, p. 21.
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In view of the scarcity of oil products and since dealers and consumers were, as a
result, unable to rely on other supplies even in their own countries, each of the
companies with refining capacities in a given country thus became the sole and
imposed supplier of all dealers and consumers who were its traditional customers'
In ttre context of their joint dominance, each of the refining companies was therefore
in a monopolistic posiiion towards its customers. A dominant position was created
for the supplier in respect of these traditional customers, owing to the collective
dominant posltio.t of all refiners on the entire national market. Such a situation
existed in all Member States except Germany.
The definition of what constituted a company's traditional customers gives rise, of
course, to some difficulty. In the context of actual problems raised by the crisis, the
Commission has taken the view that a company should have considered as a traditional
customer any buyer who, in the twelve months prior to the crisis, had in some Way or
another been its customer.
It was on this basis that the Commission made its assessment of the companies'
behaviour in this field.
2. The supply of oil products
The information gathered on the overall supply of crude oil to all refineries in the
common market showed that the contraction in supplies was the result of production
cuts ordered by the producing countries and of their embargo directed at the Nether-
lands and Denmark.
The Commission's investigations did not reveal the existence of any practices for-
bidden under Articles 85 and 86 in the arrangements for supplying the Community
with crude oil. All the oil companies experienced difficulties in their own supply
systems in the oil-producing countries. Some of them, with a lower proportion of
concession oil at their disposal, experienced greater difficulties than others in supplying
their refineries.
The integrated companies which had no crude oil resources of their own' or whose
,.*oo."., were so inadequate that they had concluded supply contracts for crude oil
with the large international companies, continued to be supplied on the basis of
contracts.
By the same token, the Commission was unable to establish that there had been
urry ug.."-.nt between oil companies in Europe, within the meaning of Article 85,
to restiict deliveries of refined products. This does not contradict the fact that, locally,
dealers or users had to face major supply problems during the most acute phase of
the crisis-problems which were caused mainly by a steep rise in demand on the part
of anxious customers and by interruptions in the rhythm of deliveries by the refineries
and wholesalers. The national authorities did all they could to remedy this.
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3. Prices
The transfer prices charged by the large oil companies, whether for crude oil or for
refined products, relate to transactions between firms in the same group; that is to
say, they are internal prices determined from tax, financial and economic considera-
tions peculiar to the enterprise itself. Where such transactions are purely internal in
their effect, they are not caught by the rules on competition'
However, the Commission could not rule out the possibility that certain internal
practices in respect of transfer pricing might be indicative of an agreement or a
concerted practice between the oil companies if they revealed coordinated behaviour'
Nor could the Commission rule out the possibility that a policy of high or diversified
transfer prices, applied to subsidiaries in countries where the authorities do not
intervene in the market, might constitue an element of abuse through its effects on
selling prices where the company in question was in a dominant position.
As a check on their behaviour among themselves, the oil companies' respective
transfer prices, for both crude oil and refined products, were compared. This showed
that all the oil companies had followed their own line and that the transfer prices of
crude oil in particular, though differing very little from each other, nevertheless did
reflect the differences between the supply situations of the various companies. They
also reflected the differences between the price policies pursued by the companies,
some of which charge the same transfer prices to all their refining subsidiaries through-
out the Community, while others vary them to take account of conditions on national
markets.
In view of the highly diversified supply arrangements in Germany and the market
economy which prevails there, no oil company was able to abuse its position through
the transfer prices it applied in transactions with its German subsidiaries.
An analysis of the various systems and levels of transfer prices did not reveal any
concerted practices among the oil companies.
In respect of the selling price to consumers, the fact that most Member States set
maximum prices made concerted practices between the oil companies impossible in
these countries, once the prices had been fixed. It might have been thought that in
Germany the oil companies would have come to an arrangement among themselves
to increase their profits on the German market. Yet the trend taken by consumer
prices on that market was the work of all those involved in making up that portion of
Germany's oil requirements not covered by refineries located in that country, in
particular importing dealers, who, faced with the threat of shortage and in the absence
of prices fixed by the Government, accepted the level set by international demand.
Of course, the prices asked by importers and by the subsidiaries of the large oil
companies in Germany were all gravitating towards this level. In a market where there
is litfle variation between products and where prices move very swiftly, consumer
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prices may temporarily assume a variety of levels from one company or region to
another, but different price levels for the same product cannot be expected to obtain
permanently throughout the market.
In any event, the Commission discovered no agreements between companies in
connection with this aspect.
It is the Commission's view, however, that as certain systems of disseminating
international prices, such as Platt's Oilgram, may have an effect on price levels in
Germany or on any other free market, it must give attention to the operation and
effects of these systems and, in particular, check whether the information system used
by Platt's Oilgram 1 might not result in prices being published which do not corres-
spond to the whole of the actual quotations.
An attempt may be made to estimate the excess price paid by Germany between
October 1973 and Apil 1974 as compared with countries where the authorities set
maximum prices. The Commission estimates that for those six months the excess
price might have been in the region of $ I 000 million for a consumption of 64 million
tonnes ofoil products, i.e. an average ofabout $15 per tonne. This may seem a large
sum, but this additional expenditure on Germany's part is more than offset by the
advantages which Germany has traditionally derived from its position as an importer
of refined products bought at cheaper prices on the world market, the periods of
depression on that market having in the past been considerably longer than the
periods of pressure.
4. Independent dealers and users
During the crisis the independent companies experienced such difficulties that,
in some cases, their very existence was threatened. This was particularly true where
the level of maximum prices prevented the independents from buying freely and
squeezed their margins to excess.
Many small and medium-sized firms engaged solely in distribution tried either to
cover themselves against a recurrence of the same difficulties or to sell out.
The second alternative led to the buying-up of a certain number of medium-sized
businesses by the big companies. Other firms concluded long-term supply contracts
with the refiners, which gave them a large degree of security but deprived them at the
same time of genuinely free access to the market.
Nevertheless, the total of such transactions was small in relation to the total of
dealers in oil products in the common market, estimated at around 60 000 whole-
salers and retailers.
t eol-,il"*Otion of the working of this system, see the Report of the Commission on the Behaviour
of the Oil Companies in the Community during the period from October 1973 to March 1974.
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The crisis thus brought about structural changes in the oil business which are reflected,
not in a noticeable reduction in the number of firms, but in the existence of new
relationships between the oil companies and a certain number of wholesalers. Never-
theless, the Commission discovered nothing in this development indicating abuse by
the oil companies of their joint dominance.
On the otherhand, theCommission did examinecases of presumed abuse of single-firm
dominance by certain companies in respect of independent dealers who are their
customers.
The commission takes the view that, during the crisis, all the large oil companies
individually were in a dominant position, at least in respect of their traditional
customers, who had no access to suppliers other than those with whom they had done
business. A refusal to sell to such customers can constitute an abuse forbidden by
Article 85 since it may affect trade between Member States, which is certainly the
case when a sizable purchaser/dealer is in danger of being squeezed out of the market,
a development which would mean appreciable change in the pattern of supply of oil
products in a substantial part of the common market.
The question might even be asked whether, in a crisis in which State intervention
in particular produces a degree of fragmentation of the market, companies enjoyingjoint dominance should not be obliged, according to their share of the market con-
cerned, to supply in reasonable quantities and at reasonable prices buyers who,
before this fragmentation of the market, obtained their supplies from other sources.
Such an obligation should have the effect of maintaining tie competitive marketing
structure which existed before the crisis.
5. Further inuestigations decided by the Commission
Following a complaint of refusal to sell, the Commission is continuing its examina-
tion of a case which may involve an abuse of a dominant position under Article 86
of the Treaty of Rome.
The Commission ascertained, in respect of certain products, the existence of specific
market situations and price differences which justify closer investigation.
This applies to kerosene and naphtha, on the markets for which there are both
oligopolies and oligopsonies.
The Commission has decided to carry out inquiries in the following sectors under
Council Regulation No 17:(i) jet fuel (kerosene), with the airlines;(ir) naphtha, with the chemical industry;(iir) the use by oil companies of references to Platt's Oilgram quotations;(rv) public supply contracts with electricity companies.
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Patent licensing agreements
10. The Commission adopted a number of new decisions on patent licensing
agreements during 1975.1 Each case raised points not made in earlier decisions of
the Commission and they have given rise to a certain amount of controversy about
the Commission's attitude towards patent licensing in the Community.
One comment has been that the Commission regards some clauses in patent licences
asper se infringements of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty. This is not so. The facts
of each case have to be examined before it can be decided whether Article 85(1)
has been infringed. The terms of the Article must be satisfied in each case' These in
turn require the consideration of such features as the economic power of the parties,
the nature of the market or business in which they are engaged, their share of the mar-
ket, the number of competitors and the significance of the licensed invention or
knowhow.
The recent decisions do not mark a new departure in the Commission's policy'
which continues to stem from the Treaty of Rome. The Treaty does not oppose the
existence of industrial property rights, but if they are used in a manner which infringes
Article 85(1), the Commission will take appropriate action. The use of industrial
property rights for the purpose of restrictive business practices does not alter the
ctraiacter oi the itrfritrgement and cannot render such practices any less liable to attack
from the Commission.2
11. The Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, signed
in Luxembourg on 15 December 1975,3 contains rules on patent licences. Article 43(l)
reads: 'A Community patent may be licensed in whole or in part for the whole or
part of the territories in which it is effective. A licence may be exclusive or non-
exclusive'. Article 43(2) continues: 'The rights conferred by the Community patent
may be invoked against a licensee who contravenes any restriction in his licence
which is covered by paragraPh l'.
In the course of the deliberations on the Convention, the Commission stated that
the grant of an exclusive licence may fall within the scope of Article 85 of the
Trea-ty, so that its legality would have to be assessed in the light of Article 85(3).
The Commission was not able to give its approval to Article 43(2), since these
provisions allow infringement proceedings to be brought against a licensee who
supplies patented goods to customers outside his allotted territory but within the
common market. The Commission's view is that the existence of the patent in no
case gives the holder the right to shield one licensee against competition from another.
r See point 69 et seq.2 See ilso Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points 19 to 32.3 oJ L l7 of 26.1.1976, p. l.
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A clause in a contract prohibiting a licensee from supplying the territory of another
licensee may be taken to be within the prohibition in Article 85(1), and qualify for
exemption only if the tests of Article 85(3) are satisfied, and then only for a limited
period.
The Commission has recently expressed its view in its decision of 2 December 1975,
in AOIP u Beyrard.l It will be for the Court of Justice of the European Communities
to resolve this difficulty in the final instance.
55 
- 
Selective distribution
12. The Commission's practice on selective distribution has now developed far
enough for a number of general principles to be laid down. Consideration of significant
individual cases in various industries where selective distribution is commonly
practised has clarified the following general guidelines:
(l) To ensure that his goods are sold in a satisfactory manner, a manufacturer
may choose his dealers by setting objective qualitative requirements which
must be met by the dealer as regards his own and his staff's qualifications
and training and the nature of his premises if he is to be supplied with goods for
resale. Even though supplies may be withheld from dealers who do not meet
these requirements, a system along these lines is not caught by the prohibition
in Article 85(1), provided that the same objective requirements are imposed on
all potential purchasers and are applied without discriminatio n (Kodak).z
(2) In addition to ensuring that distribution arrangements are appropriate to the
nature of the product, a manufacturer may impose qualitative criteria for the
appointment of dealers. He may also bind dealers to accept certain sales promo-
tional obligations, while undertaking, and requiring his dealers to undertake,
not to supply approved dealers. This restricts the business freedom of the
manufacturer and his appointed dealers, and accordingly restricts competition
for the purposes of Article 85(l) where the result of the selection is to exclude a
large number of dealers, who meet the qualitative requirements but are unable
or unwilling to enter into these additional obligations (SABA).3
(3) Competition is restricted even more severely where the actual number of
appointed dealers is limited by the manufacturer, either on general considera-
tions (Omega)a or case by case (BMW)5 on grounds of business policy. This even
has the effect of excluding firms capable of selling the product in a manner
satisfying the manufacturer's standards and willing to enter into the additional
obligations.
t s"" p"itt, 63 to 65.2 OJ L 147 of 7 .7.1970, p. 24.3 Point 54.4 OJ L 242 of 5.11.1970, p. 22; First Report on Competition Policy, point 86.5 oJ L 29 of 3.2.1975, p. 1; Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 86.
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13. As a rule, the Commission will intervene in situations of the kind outlined in
Q) and (3), above especially in cases in which there are parallel sales systems in a
number of Member States, uniess the restrictions are clearly not substantial or where
the structure of the relevant product market is such that intervention appears unwar-
ranted on public interest grounds (Dior and Lancime).L
Exemptions under Article 85(3) in respect of quantitative selection can be granted
only in exceptional cases. The question in issue is whether the relevant product is
of such a kind (by reason of its technical complexity, need for high-quality after-sales
service, or inherent risks) that there must be close cooperation between manufacturer
and dealer, of an order which no other distribution system could adequately secure.
A more lenient approach can be considered for exemption of distribution systems
where selection is based on qualitative criteria combined with supplementary obliga-
tions. But even here Article 85(3) can be applied only if it is absolutely clear that the
objectives ofthe system could not be attained through normal specialist trade arrange-
ments (F ac hhande I s b indun g).
In general terms the BMW and SABA decisions can be regarded as an indication of
the maximum limits for which exemption could be given in the two industries con-
cerned. More restrictive arrangements will not normally be acceptable, even for
luxury goods or branded prestige goods and even if considerations of quantity or
low output are invoked.
SO 
- 
Application of the rules of competition to sea
and air transport
14. The Commission expects to put to the Council a proposal for a regulation
which will apply the rules of competition to air transport. This need is underlined
by a statement of the law by the Court of Justice, which, giving judgment on 4 April
1974 in Case 167173 (Commission a French Republic),2 held that, although under
Article 84(2) sea and air transport were not covered by the provisions relating to
tle common transport policy until such time as the Council decided to irrclude them
nevertheless they were, on the same basis as other modes of transport, subject to the
general provisions of the Treaty. Accordingly, Articles 85 to 90, which lay down the
rules of competition applicable to enterprises, are applicable to sea and air transport
without a decision by the Council under Article 84(2) being necessary.
Article 87 states that it is for the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission
after consulting the European Parliament, to adopt regulations to give effect to the
r Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 93.2 119741 ECR 371.
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principles set out in Articles 85 and 86. Sea and air transport are the only areas of the
economy where no provisions to this effect have yet been introduced, so Articles 88
and 89 still apply to these areas.
These two articles contain typical transitional provisions. Under Article 88, the
relevant authorities in Member States are to rule on the admissibility of agreements,
decisions and concerted practices and on abuses ofdominant positions in accordance
with the law of their country and with the provisions of Article 85, in particular
paragraph 3, and the provisions of Article 86.
On the other hand, Article 89 states that it is the Commission's function to investigate
suspected infringements of the principles laid down in Articles 85 and 86. If necessary,
it must record actual infringements in a formal decision and propose appropriate
measures to bring them to an end. Finally, the courts may, on application by any
of the parties involved or by other persons, rule on the compatibility of an agreement
or practice with the Community rules on competition; this follows from the direct
applicability of Articles 85 and 86.
However, the law as it now stands does not allow for the consistent application of
the rules of competition to sea and air transport in a manner reflecting the special
features ofthese industries. Furthermore, the fact that there are no precise provisions
for the application of Articles 85 and 86 to them makes for uncertainty in the law,
and this is to the disadvantage of shippers, airlines and users. These are important
reasons for issuing regulations under Article 87.
15. The Commission has already begun to examine, in close cooperation with the
competent authorities of Member States, the most important technical and economic
features of the air transport industry. Once the results of this examination have been
assessed, the Commission will be better placed to decide how to solve the main
problems arising in the preparation of its regulation. The thorniest of these are the
scope of the regulation, the relationship between the prohibition on restrictive prac-
tices and exemptions from the prohibition, and the working-out of procedural rules.
The Commission's staff have also begun to study market conditions in sea transport.
Because of the special nature of the problems in this industry, a separate proposal
will have to be considerd.
57 
- 
Restrictive practices in international trade
16. In this field the Commission has played an active part in the OECD Committee
of Experts on Restrictive Business Practice and in preparatory work for the fourth
session of UNCTAD, with particular regard to restrictive practices which may
affect the trade and development of developing countries.
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17. The OECD is continuing with the application of the recommendations dated
10 October 1967 and 3 July 1973 I concerning international cooperation on restrictive
business practices affecting international trade. Work is also progressing on restrictive
practices related to trademarks and the conduct of multinational firms. As regards
the multinationals, guidelines are being worked out to help them comply with the
basic objectives of host countries. The matters covered will include abuses of dominant
positions, export restrictions and discriminatory pricing.
18. In UNCTAD, the Commission is mainly involved in the Committee on Manu-
factures and the Committee on the Transfer of Technology. Both committees are
working on the identification of restrictive practices which are likely to affect inter-
national trade, particularly the developing countries' trade. They are also attempting
to establish procedures for consultation and exchange of information between
competition authorities, and to draw guidelines on the transfer of technology. This
work could have major consequences both in legislation by developing countries
which do not yet'have competition laws, and in the development of international
cooperation on the elimination of restrictive practices from international trade.
98 
- 
Cases decided by the Court of Justice
International sugar agreement
19. A Commission Decision of 2 January 1973 found that, since the common
organization of the market in sugar took effect in 1968, the biggest sugar manufac-
turers in the Community had been infringing Article 85(1) and 86 of the EEC Treaty.
Fines totalling 9 million u.a. were imposed on the firms.2
The firms-there were sixteen of them-appealed to the Court of Justice. The Court
gave judgment on 16 December 1975, joining the cases for purposes of the judgment
(Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and ll4l73).
20. Essentially, the judgment upheld the Commission's findings as regards the
firms' infringement of the rules of competition, notably through market sharing.
An exception was made for the Italian market. Disagreeing with the Commission,
the Court concluded that the measures taken by the Italian Government to control
sugar imports-formation of the Cassa conguaglio zucchero, the imposition of a
levy (souraprezzo) and the tendering procedure for imports-placed business under
such a tight rein that there was no longer any scope for independent action. The
Court therefore decided that concerted action by the Italian, French, Belgian and
German firms, in question could not be regarded as infringing Article 85(1). It
t S"" TtrirO neport on Competition Policy, points 39 and 40.2 OJ L 140 of 26.5.1973, p. l7; Second Report on Competition Policy, point 28.
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should be noted here, incidentally, that in 1975 the Commission initiated proceedings
against the Italian Government under Article 169 for these measures.
As regards a number of other alleged infringements' the Court concluded that the
Commission had not proved its case. Nevertheless, the judgment as a whole confirmed
the Commission's findings and conclusions.
21. However, the court made a sharp cut in the fines imposed by the commission,
bringing them down to I 590 000 u.a. in all. It did this because' in assessing the
gravity"of the infringements, the Commission had not paid sufficient attention to
ine fact that competition between firms was already restricted by the common
organization of the sugar market, under which national production quotas are
fixed.
22. In this judgment, the court had occasion to rule on a number of questions of
principle which are of definite importance to the development of Community competi-
tion law.
It began by considering the elements of a concerted practice, elaborating upon its
definition of the conceplin ttt.luOg*ents it delivered on 14 July 1973 inthe Dyestuffs
cases.l The Court deines 'concerted practice' as a form of coordination between
firms whereby, without going so far as to conclude a formal agreement, they know-
ingly eliminaie the risks 
-of 
cJmpetition by cooperating to ensure that normal market
"oiiitiorr, 
(given the nature of th" goodt, the size and number of firms concerned
and the size and nature of the relevant market) no longer obtain' cooperation of
this type constitutes a concerted practice, particularly whgn lt enables the firms
conceined to crystaltze positions they have secured to the detriment of free move-
ment of goods in the common market and freedom of consumers to choose their
suppliers.
Here, the Court expressly dismissed the notion that concerted action requires some
kind of plan to be prepaied: the criteria for cooperation set out. in the judgment are
to be understood in the light of the requirement-inherent in the EEC Treaty rules
on competition-that each trader must independently decide the policy he proposes
to follows on the common market. Above all, although this requirement does not
deny traders the right to adapt intelligently to the way their competitors are behaving
o. 
"uo 
be expectedlo behave, it does absolutely rule out any direct-or indirect contact
between traders where the object or effect is either to influence the market conduct
of an existing or potential competitor or to reveal to him market policy decisions or
intentions.
Finally, it was held that for the identification of a concerted practice the factors
mentioned by the Commission must not be taken in isolation but must be considered
t tlr?rl EcR 619 et seq.)see also Second Report on competition Policy, points 2l and 22'
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together, with due regard for the nature of the relevant market. The Court thus
approved the legal approach adopted by the Commission in seeking to establish the
existence of a concerted practice, relying on a series of indicators such as deliveries
from manufacturer to manufacturer and pressures exerted on dealers or refusal
to supply. It stated, for instance, that 'if an economic operator accepts the complaints
made to him by another operator in connection with the competition to which the
products manufactured by the former operator expose the latter, the conduct of
the operators concerned amounts to a concerted practice,.
In this connection the Court considered the evidential value of documents submitted
by the Commission for the purpose of proving the existence of theoffendingconcerted
practice. It held that there is nothing to prevent the Commission or the Court from
accepting correspondence between outsiders as evidence of a firm's behaviour,
provided that the correspondence contains a reliable description of the behaviour
in question and that this is reconcilable with the actual market behaviour of all the
firms involved since, if this is so, the correspondence offers a set of consistent indica-
tions borne out in essence by the actual facts.
23. The Court then went on to find for the first time that, where there are tendering
procedures to determine the refunds on export to non-member countries and Com-
munity firms act in concert in proposing figures for the refunds and for quantities-
in other words, engage in concerted action relating to products to be exported from
the common market-competition is restricted witlin the common market and trade
between Member States may be affected for the purpose of Article g5(l). If there
were no such concerted actionn some firms would have been awarded smaller lots
than those actually awarded to them and would thus have been given an incentive
to sell more sugar in other Member states; this could not only change the pattern
of trade within the Community but also intensify competition within the common
market.
24. Finally, for the purpose of Article 86, the Court concluded that abuse is shown
where any firm exploits its dominant position to force dealers to channel their exports
to specific consignees or areas and to oblige their customers to accept these reitric-
tions, thus limiting the dealers' (and indirectly their customers') markets; this is
expressly prohibited in Article 86(b).
It was also confirmed that fidelity rebates granted by a firm dominating a substantial
part of the common market may constitue abuse of its dominant position because
they are liable to discourage its customers from obtaining supplies from other pro-
ducers, especially in other Member states, for fear of losing a financial advantage.
Furthermore, if the effect of the rebate is that different net prices are charged to two
firms buying the same quantity of sugar from the same dominant firm, one of tlem
purchased from another supplier as well, this constitutes abuse under Article 86(c).
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General Motors Continental
25. Giving judgment on 13 November in Case 26175 (General Motors Continental NV
a Commission), the Court annulled the Commission's Decision of 19 December 1974,r
holding that the Commission's action was not justified given the particular time and
circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, it confirmed the principle that Article 86
may apply to any person holding an exclusive legal right for the performance of a
statutory duty delegated by the State. The delegated duty in question was the issue
of certificates of conformity for vehicles required by Belgian law, a duty reserved in
respect of each make of vehicle to the manufacturer or his sole agent. The Court held
that 'this legal monopoly, combined with the freedom of the manufacturer or sole
authorized agent to fix the price for its service, leads to the creation of a dominant
position within the meaning of Article 86...'.
The Court further observed that the possibility could not be ruled out that the holder
of an exclusive right might abuse the market when fixing his price. 'Such an abuse
might lie, inter alia, in the imposition of a price which is excessive in relation to the
economic value of the service provided, and which has the effect of curbing parallel
imports by neutralizing the possibly more favourable level of prices applying in
other sales areas in the Community, or by leading to unfair trade in the sense of
Article 86(2)(a).'
The Commission considers this judgment to be important to the development of
competition policy in a number of respects. It confirms that once export prohibi-
tions have been deleted from distribution agreements, parallel imports of motor
vehicles must not be hampered by other measures taken by the firms concerned which
have similar effects. It has been established that where holders of an exclusive right
have been given an area of discretion by public authorities, they are still bound by
the prohibitions of Article 86. Finally, the judgment provides apractical illustration
of the applicability of Article 86 to abnormal price levels.
Papiers peints de Belgique
26. By a judgment given on 26 November in Case 73ft4 (Groupement des fabricants
de papiers peints de Belgique a Commission),the Court annulled Article 4 of the Com-
mission Decision of 23 July 1974 relating to a proceeding under Article 85.2 As the
applicants, members of the Groupement des fabricants de papiers de Belgique, had
decided not to appeal the prospective effects of the Decision, the Court considered
only their application for annulment of that part of the Decision which imposed
fines.
Article 4 was annulled because tLe reasoning of the Decision as regards the effect
t Ol f- ZS 
"f 3 .2.1g75,p. 14; Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point ll0.2 OJ L 237 of 29.8,1974; Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 65.
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on trade between Member States was inadequate. The Court stated that when the
Commission 'adopted a decision which went appreciably further than its earlier
decisions, it ought to have supplied a more detailed statement of the grounds on
which it was based'. In this case the Decision did not explain 'how the fact that
10% of Belgian imports, representing 5oh of the total Belgian market, sold by the
Groupement subject to its prices and conditions is, in the absence of exclusive
arrangements between the members of the Groupement and foreign manufacturers,
liable to affect trade between Member States'. Nevertheless, the Court confirmed the
Commission Decision in that'the control of the market exercised by the Groupement,
characterized by its pricing and rebates policy, and supported by penalties in order
to ensure strict compliance with the General Conditions of Sale, was intended to and
did in fact restrict or distort competition in Belgium and, consequently, within the
common market'. The Court also considered that the prohibition on publishing
rebates was no less contrary to Article 85(1) than resale price maintenance.
Finally, the Court confirmed an earlier ruling 1 to the effect that an agreement extend-
ing to the whole territory of a Member State was likely, by its very nature, to have the
effect of consolidating national barriers and thus to prevent the economic inter-
penetration required by the Treaty and to afford protection to national producers.
27. An important consequence of this judgment is that a more detailed explanation
of the Commission's reasoning will be required where there is any broadening of
the concept of effects on trade between Member States in cases involving national
agreements. It will have to be shown from all the facts to what and in what manner
the national market is protected by the various measures taken under such agreements.
Frubo
28. In a judgment given on 15 May 1975 in Case 71fi4 (Frubo u Commission),2
the Court of Justice dismissed an application against the Commission Decision of
25 July 1974 which had established the restrictive character of a provision of an
agreement between two Dutch associations of citrus-fruit importers and wholesalers
prohibiting wholesalers who obtained supplies from Rotterdam auction sales from
themselves importing citrus fruit direct from non-member countries.3
The judgment gives important indications to the Commission for its interpretation
of Council Regulation No 26 applying certain rules of competition to trade in agri-
cultural products.a The applicants contended that the Commission should have
issued a preliminary and separate decision on the applicability of this Regulation.
t J"dg-.tlt 
"f the Court of Justice of 17 October 1972 in Case 8172 
(Vereenieing oan Cementhande-
laren ts Commission): 11974 ECR 977.2 119751 ECR 563.3 OJ L 237 of 29.8.1974, p. 16; Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 71.4 OJ 30 of 20.4.1962, p.993.
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The Court dismissed this argument. Article 2(2) of Regulation No 26 prescribed a
formal decision only where the Commission found that an agreement qualified for
exemption under Article I of the Regulation. To require a formal decision in other
cases, where Article 85 is applicable, 'would oblige the Commission to fulfil unneces-
sary formalities'.
The judgment also considers the concept of the effect on trade between Member
States. The Court stated that the offending provision, 'because it restricts the freedom
of members to import direct into the Netherlands, ... is liable to interfere with the
natural movement of trade and thus to affect trade between member countries'.
The Court also considered the requirement of Article 85(3)(a)-under which, in
order to qualify for exemption, a restrictive agreement must not impose on the
undertakings concerned 'restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment
of its objectives'. It placed the burden of proof entirely upon the applicants, who,
according to the Court, had submitted arguments capable of demonstrating that the
agreement reinforced the advantages of concentrating supply and demand but had
not shown that such concentration was an indispensable condition for the proper
working ofthe system established by the agreement and consequently for the advan-
tages accruing therefrom.
Kali und Salz
29. In a judgment given on 14 May 1975 in Joined Cases 19 and 20174 (Kali und
Salz AG and Kali-Chemie AG u Commission),r the Court annulled the Commission
Decision of 21 Decembet 1973 in which the Commission had found that the agree-
ment of 6 July 1970 between Kali und Salz (K + S) and Kali-Chemie (KC) concerning
the sale by K+S of straight potash fertilizers manufactured by KC.2
The Court essentially considered that the Commission had shown 'insufficient
reasons ... for the Decision ..., &t least as regards the rejection of the applica-
tion for exemption'. The Commission Decision stated that, by concentratingpractically
the whole supply of straight potash fertilizer in Germany, the agreement gave the
parties the power to eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part of the
products concerned. The Court considered that it had not been sufficiently demon-
strated that the two types of fertilizer-straight and compound potash-constituted
separate markets, nor that it was practicable for KC to distribute both straight and
compound potash together. The Court drew attention to the fact that the part of
KC's production supplied to K+S was diminishing steadily and that demand for
straight potash fertilizers was declining in favour of compound fertilizers so that it
would be increasingly difficult for KC to establish its own distribution system.
i trs?51 ECR ass.2 OJ L 19 of 23.1.1974, p. 22; Third Report on Competition Policy, point 49.
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Van Vliet v Dalle Crotle
30. On 1 October, in Case 25175 (Van Vliet Kwasten- en Ladderfabriek NV u Fratelli
dalle Crode),l the Court gave a preliminary ruling on two questions of interpretation
of Article 85 of the Treaty and of Article 3 of Commission Regulation No 67167|EEC
on the application of Article 85(3) to categories of exclusive dealing agreements.
These questions were concerned with the fact that exclusive dealing agreements
must not impede parallel imports, i.e. direct imports by dealers from other Member
States by means other than those provided by the principal for the territory. The
Court stated that a prohibition on exports to the dealer's allotted territory applied
solely by the manufacturer in his own Member State disqualified an exclusive dealing
agreement with an importer in another Member State from block exemption even
ifparallel imports into that Member State from Member States other than that of the
manufacturer were not affected by the agreement.
The Commission has thus received clear confirmation of the legal basis of its action
to ensure that exclusive dealing agreements in trade between Member States do not
restrict the possibility of obtaining supplies of the goods in question and do not
insulate markets. Such agreements must not therefore obstruct parallel imports made
direct from the manufacturer's State, which would otherwise be a most probable
pattern of trade.
I [1975] ECR 1103.
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Article 85 applied to restrictive practices
Price-fixing and market-sharing agrcements
Agreement between producers of primary aluminium
31. In its Decision on the IFTRA rules for manufacturers of glass containersl
the Commission had already made known its reservations on the adoption of private
codes of conduct by particular industries designed to discourage competitors from
taking any commercial initiative which might'inconvenience' the other firms involved
but which in the view of the Commission constituted normal methods of competition.
Finding against an agreement of this type for the second time, the Commission
decided2 that the agreement entitled 'IFTRA Rules for Producers of Virgin Alumi-
nium' constituted an infringement of Article 85. The agreement was concluded in
1972, at a time when the economic situation in the industry was said by the parties
concerned to have led certain among them to engage in unfair practices. The parties
alleged that after 1972 market conditions had improved so much for aluminium
producers that they had not felt the need to enforce the IFTRA rules. Nevertheless the
agreement was kept as a 'safety net' to insure against any commercially aggressive
action provoked by a recession in the primary aluminium market, and only abandoned
in February 1975 after intervention by the Commission. The Commission proceeded
to adopt a decision under Article 85 because of the seriousness of the restrictions of
competition and tle importance of the industry involved and because the agreement
could not fail seriously to aggravate the rigidity already present in the aluminium
market.
iilo.-irrio" Decision of 15.5.1974: oJ L 160 of 17.6.1974,p. l; Fourth Report on Competition
Policy, point 62.2 Commission Decision of 15.7.1975: OJ L 228 of 29.8.1975, p. 3.
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The agreement was signed by Alusuisse Deutschland GmbH, Gebriider Giulini
GmbH, Kaiser-Preussag Aluminiurn GmbH, Metallgesellschaft AG, Vereinigte
Aluminium-Werke AG, P6chiney-Ugine Kuhlmann SA, Holland Aluminium NV
and the British Aluminium Company Ltd-all established within the EEC and
accounting with their subsidiaries and the EEC based subsidiaries of the other signa-
tories for around 85% of the productive capacity of primary aluminium in the EEC.
The agreement was also signed by major producers in Austria, Norway, Spain,
Sweden and Switzerland.
Under the agreernent the parties agreed to adhere to 'fair trade practice rules'
administered by an agency in Liechtenstein known as the International Fair Trade
Practice Rules Administration (IFTRA). The rules were presented in the guise of
principles of fair trading but in fact they restricted price competition.r
In particular, the parties undertook to refrain from dumping and adopted private
rules to this end. By these rules it was sought to discourage price competition in
export sales. In accordance with its policy on voluntary import restraint agreements,2
the Commission stated that it could not be left to firms or private agencies to decide
what constituted dumping and whether it should be penalized.
Certain clauses which purported to protect customers against price discrimination
had the necessary effect of making price structures more rigid and of leading com-
petitors to exchange information on prices. Finally, the rules contained recommen-
dations on the calculation ofcosts, the fixing ofprices and the grant ofrebates, their
aim being to align the market conduct of the parties.
The rules as a whole enabled the parties, by means of contractual penalties imposed
by IFTRA, to take joint action to prevent normal methods of competition, such as
price cutting.
Franco-Taiwanese preserved mushroom agreement
32. The Commission ordered five of the most important French mushroom packers
(SA Blanchaud, Groupement d'int6r€t 6conomique Euroconserves, Groupement
d'int6r6t 6conomique Champifrance, SA Faval, Soci6t6 d'int6r6t collectif agricole
Champex-Centre) and the Taiwan Mushroom Packers United Export Corporation
(TMPUEC), which represents all mushroom exporters in Taiwan, to terminate the
agreement which they had concluded in Taipei on 8 January 1973.3
I As in the IFTRA glass containers case, the Commission Decision dealt only with those parts of
the IFTRA rules which discouraged competition between the parties or gave them the means of
taking collective action against normal competitive practices; it did not address itselfto the ques-
tion whether firms might agree among themselves to comply with theexistinglawof faircompetition.2 Commission Notice on the import into the Community of Japanese goods covered by the Treaty
of Rome: OJ C 111 of 21,10.1972, p. 13; Second Report on Competition Policy, point 17.I Commission Decision of 8.1.1975: OJ L 29 of 3.2,1975, p, 26.
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The main purpose of the agreement was to partition the German market between
French and Taiwanese packers, the principal world producers. The German market
is the world's most important consumer market. The parties had agreed on annual
export quotas and on a common pricing policy, so as to eliminate any real competition
between them.
In view of the gravity of the infringement of the rules of competition involved in this
sharing of markets and fixing of prices to the detriment of German consumers, the
Commission fined the French producers.
The Commission considered that TMPUEC was less seriously culpable in that, when
negotiating with the French producers, it may have been unaware of the principles
to which the Commission had recently drawn attention in its Notice in the Official
Journall on the compatibility of such agreements with the rules of the Treaty.
In ruling against the Franco-Taiwanese agreement, the eflect of which was to limit
penetration of the common market by Taiwanese packers, the Commission intended
to emphasize that private associations of producers must not assume the right to
restrict or regulate imports into the Community by means of agreements between
undertakings which distort competition within the common market.
This was the Commission's second ruling against an agreement of this type. In 1974
it had already adopted a similar decision prohibiting the Franco-Japanese agreement
on price increases ior Japanese ball-bearings imported into France.2
Sa/es organizations
Marketing policy of the Instituto Brasileiro do Caf6
33. In the course of its action to prevent discriminatory conditions of supply and
price reinforced by restrictions on the freedom of intermediaries which tend to insulate
markets,3 the Commission caused the Instituto Brasileiro do Caf6 (IBC) to change its
marketing policy in the common market.a IBC controls virtually all Brazil's coffee
production; its sales policy in the Community is administered mainly from its Milan
office. In its investigation of a complaint made in 1973, the Commission ascertained
that in several respects IBC's sales policy did not conform to the rules of competition.
G-rn-ioloo Notice on the import into the Community of Japanese goods covered by the Treaty
of Rome: oJ c 1l I of 21,1o.1972, p. 13 ; Second Report on competition Policy, point 17.2 Commission Decision of 2g.ll.l9i4t OJ L 343 of 21.12.1974, p. 19; Fourth Report on Competi'
tion Policy, point 74'3 Second Report on Competition Policy, point 41.
a Bull. EC l2-l975,poitt2128.
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The Commission was able to establish that, by the expedient of the general terms
prescribed for sales from its warehouse in Trieste, one of its largest warehouses
abroad, IBC prohibited the export from Italy and France ofgreen cofee and confined
the sale of roasted coffee for direct consumption to those countries. In addition, the
preferential sales agreements which IBC had concluded with numerous coffee-roasting
firms in the Community discriminated between competitors and, in some respects,
restricted trade.
At the Commissionns request, IBC has granted access to the Trieste warehouse to all
traders in the EEC, who will henceforth benefit from the special terms hitherto reser-
ved for the Italian and French markets, and has terminated the preferential agree-
ments.
IBC's new marketing policy in the EEC permits greater competition to the benefit of
consumers throughout the Community. The economic importance of these modifica-
tions is evidenced by the fact that Brazil is by far the largest coffee producer in the
world and that the Community, as the secondJargest world importer of this widely
consumed product, imports from Brazil some 30oZ of its total consumption of coffee.
Joint interest in automobile safety glass
34, Anxious to terminate relations between firms where these conflict with the rules
of competitiono and particularly where they occur in a highly concentrated market,
the Commission has continued the action it had undertaken earlier in the glass indus-
try.l Ithas agreed to a scheme adopted by the Saint-Gobain/Pont-d-Mousson (SGPM)
and BSN/Gervais-Danone groups (by far the largest glass manufacturers in conti-
nental Europe) under which they agreed to divest themselves of their joint interests
in the manufacture and sale in France and Germany of safety glass for automobile.2
This industry had been the object of attention by the Commission because it appeared
to be sheltered from competition and trade between Member States. Close links
existed between SGPM and BSN-evidenced either by agreements (in the German
market, Sekurit Glas Union, fully owned by SGPM, sold glass manufactured by
Flachglas AG/Delog/Detag,68Yo of whose capital was owned by BSN) or the creation
of joint subsidiaries (in France, Securiglas, 64Y" of its capital being held by SGPM
and,36oh by BSN).
In response to Commission representations the two groups prepared a scheme of
divestiture by stages which they formally undertook to put into effect under Com-
t l.*"th R.p"rt on Competirion Policy, point 79.z Bull. EC 718-1975,point2124.
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mission supervision. On the completion of this scheme sales in the two markets will
be effected separately.
The commission expects by these means to prevent the products of competing firmsbeing supplied through a. common organization which eliminates any compitition
with respect to such supplies.
Linoleum export agreement
3-5. Following representations by the Commission,l four large European floor cover-
rlg 
_manufacturers (Nairn'Floors Ltd and Barry staines (salesy Lta io the uK,Forbo AG in Switzerland, and DLW Aktiengesellschaft in brermany) terminated alinoleum export agreement (Linoleum Manufaiturers' Export Convention) without aformal decision being necessary.
The firms involved based their conduct on the principles set out in the .Linoleum
Manufacturers' Export Convention Trade Practices'. Uniform prices and discounts
were fixed at regular intervals, while terms of payment and standard thicknesses were
harmonized.
Although the Convention operated primarily in non-member countries, the agreement
also concerned Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark and Ireland. France, Gr-any,
Italy, the Netherlands and the united Kingdom were expressly excluded. The parties
to the agreement market the bulk of their production in their respective home mirkets,in which Linoleumfabriek BV, Krommenie-accounts for 95oi of the Dutch markei
and 80% of the Belgian and Luxembourg markets; DLW is the only linoleum manu-
facturer in the Federal Republic of Germany and has a market share of some 90ol0.In the UK, Nairn Floors accounts for nearly 670/o of the market, +!e remainder being
accounted for by Barry Staines (Sales) Ltd.
By providing for uniform prices and discounts, the Convention restricted competition
in violation of Article 85.
The restrictions were felt not only in the Member States direcfly covered by the agree-
ment but also, in view of the market shares of the parties in their home marLts,
the whole of the common market. The export agreement was ttrerefore likely to
encourage restrictive practices even in tlose markets expressly excluded frorn the
operation of the 'Trade Practices'.
I Bull. EC 4-1975, point 2110.
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Agreements concerning purchases and sales
Belgian agreement on inilustrial timber
36. The Commission's action against the Belgian agreement on,industrial timber
was inspired by its concern to pieserve effective competition in the supply of raw
materiais. ln t970, for instance, it had already issued a prohibition under Article 65
of the ECSC Treaty, accompanied by fines, in respect of agreements and concerted
practices on the Geiman scrap metal market, where iron and steel producers had fixed
uniform maximum buYing Prices.l
37. when the commission took action in this new case under Article 85 0f the EEC
Treaty, the agreements concluded by the Belgian trade association of users of indus-
trial iimber, or *ni"n virtually all Belgium's board manufacturers were members,
were terminated without a formal decision having to be issued.2
under the agreements the parties undertook not to buy timber at prices above the
maxima set by the associat]on each year for each production area, to refrain from
$anting fidelity rebates, to compile " litt of suppliers, to 
exchange the information
ieeaedlor preparing harmonized buying programmes and to use a standard form of
contract for their Purchases.
The parties claimed that the agreements were intended to prevent disruptions of the
-urk"t for industrial timber lrom adversely affecting the execution of agreements
between forestry owners and users. They were also intended to prevent excessive spe-
culation in this market which might so damage the competitive position of Belgian
users as to expose them to absorption by foreign companies'
The Commission felt unable to authorize the agreements since they restricted com-
petition between the members of the association not only in their purchases but also,
L."uo." of probable effects on commercial policy, in their sales. The agreements
affected Belgium and the contiguous areas of other Member states in which timber
is produced.
Agreements restricting proiluction anil sale of fruit
38. Following action by the Commission, restrictions on production and outlets
imposed by agreements between French producers of fresh and canned fruit and
fruit cocttails and the European subsidiaries of a major American food company
have been abandoned.
t Ftttt R"p"tt on Competition Policy, point 10'2 Bull. EC l0 1975' Point 21M.
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Certain provisions of these agreements were in breach of Article 85. In particular,
the parties had agreed to restrict production by undertaking not to increase the areas
ofland given over to the growing ofpeaches for canning. Furthermore, the freedom
of the French producers to decide where to sell their produce was restricted to the
extent that they were required to transfer a certain percentage of their fresh fruit
production to the other party and were prevented from selling their fruit to other
firms processing similar fruits.l
Although the agreements did help to improve distribution by giving the French
producers access to the American company's international distribution network,
an exemption could not be given because the agreements also imposed restrictions
which were not indispensable for attaining such an improvement of distribution.
In reply to a statement of objections from the Commission, the parties decided to
terminate their agreements, so that the fruit producers concerned are now free to
adapt to market conditions in planning production and sales policies.
I nf orm ati o n a gre e m e nts
Non-ferrous semimanufactures
39. Following Commission intervention, the German companies Kabel- und Metall-
werke Gutehoffnungshiitte AG and wieland werke AG and the French company
Tr6fim6taux SA terminated their information agreement covering semimanufactures
ofcopper and its alloys, and substitute and processed products (with the exception of
cables).2
The agreement was to have been implemented in two stages and, in the final stage,
provided for close cooperation on matters connected with production, marketing
and general business strategy. At the initial stage there were to be mutual assistance
and the regular exchange of information on research and development, production,
sales promotion, raw material supplies, commercial management and data processing
and general business strategy. Although there were isolated instances of deliveries
between the firms in order to fill out their ranges of products, cooperation was essen-
tially limited to the exchange of information.
t l" lr:/, 
" 
C.mmission investigation culminated in the termination of a supply agreement betwcen
the world's largest manufacturer of mattress ticking and an engineeringhnn pioducing modern
automatic looms used for its manufacture. For a three-year period the supplieihad agreid not to
sell looms to any competitor of the customer without the customer's conslnt (BdL EC l}-lg7?.,
Part 2, Chapter I, point l8).2 BuIl. EC 2-1975,point2107.
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In considering the case the Commission came to the conclusion that the firms con-
cerned *.t" 
"n 
oligopoly with regard to a number of the products covered by the
agreements, so that the extent of the obligation to exchange information contained in
ttr. ittitiut stage of the agreement might have led the parties to act in a manner incom-
patible with Article 85(l). The Commission further considered that to exempt the
igreement under Article 85(3) would enable the firms to extend their cooperation to
aieas where it would be impossible for the Commission either to foresee or to regulate
t}te resultant effects on competition.
In view of the statement of objections and of intervening changes in the general
economic situation, the firms abandoned their cooperation agreement and their appli-
cation for exemption. The parties intend to seek new forms of cooperation which
will be compatible with the rules of competition in the EEC Treaty. The Commission
will therefore follow developments and keep this market under surveillance.
Ships'cables
40. Similarly in the course of proceedings brought by the Commission, the Associa-
tion of Ships; Cable Manufacturers, with headquarters in Wassenaar, Netherlands,
embracing ieventeen firms together accounting for some 80% of Community produc-
tion of ships' cables, ceased to recommend prices and to compile delivery schedules.l
These practices, which were part of an information exchange system organized by the
Association, substantially restricted competition in the common market. In a number
of countries domestic cable manufacturers had uniformly raised prices and foreign
manufacturers had refrained from making competitive offers.
The activities of the Association are now confined to a number of technical fields
such as standardization, the introduction of new types of steel and the maintenance
of contacts with classification societies and shipowners.
41. Commission action on these agreements follows the measures taken in tlre
Dutch Sporting Cartidges Agreement case,2 in which a collective obligation to notify
prices set up an open price system contrary to Article 85. The Commission's action is
also in accordance with a ruling by the Court of Justice on the recommendation of
resale prices in its judgment cincerning the Dutch Cement Dealers' Association.3
t B"lt. Ec }i 975, point 2107.2 Third Report on Competition Policy' point 55.3 Second Report on Competition Policy, point 23.
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National market protection agreements
Dutch agreement concerning perfume, toiletry articles and cosmetics
42. As part of its action against national agreements which insulate home markets,l
the Commission adopted a Decision prohibiting those provisions which restricted
competition in the conditions of sale for the Dutch market of perfumes, toiletry
articles and cosmetics established by Bomee-Stichting, a trade association.2
Most Dutch manufacturers and sole distributors are members of this association
and sell their products through some eighty wholesalers and several thousand retailers
who have accepted the sales conditions fixed by the association. All major brands of
world repute are represented, and their aggregate share ofthe market is considerable:
approximately 90% for perfumes,'70oh for cosmetics and 4OYo for toiletries. Half of
the products involved are imported into the Netherlands from other Member States.
In response to representations by the Commission and by the Dutch authorities 
-
under Dutch legislation on resale price maintenance agreements 
- 
Bomee-Stichting
gradually relaxed its original distribution and sales conditions. In particular, the
general sales conditions were modified to allow wholesalers and retailers to obtain
supplies direct from other Member States and to facilitate resale outside the Nether-
lands. However, the collective system of reciprocal exclusive sale and purchasing com-
mitments which the association maintained in the Netherlands still formed a closed
and rigid ring guaranteeing the member's market positions and denying free access
by other dealers to the distribution system.
The Commission therefore required Bomee-Stichting to delete the restrictive provi-
sions which it was still enforcing on the sale in the Netherlands of products imported
by its members, since these provisions raised barriers to entry to the Dutch market
for manufacturers and dealers in other Member States.
Dutch agreement concenring stoves and heaters
43. The Commission also adopted a Decision requiring Haarden- en Kachelhandel,
an association of most Dutch manufacturers, importers, wholesalers and retailers of
stoves and heaters, not to seek judicial enforcement of certain clauses of the agreement
between its members, which agreement was found to infringe Article 85.3
t E-lt"t d".t.ions include those on ASPA (Association syndicale belge de la parfumerie) (First
Report, point l0); Dutch Cement Dealers'Association (Second Report, point 23); Dutch Sporting
Cartridges Agreement (fhird Report, point 55),2 Commission Decision of 21.11.1975.. Ol L 329 of 23.12,1975, p. 30.3 Commission Decision of 3.6.1975:. OJ L 159 of 21.6.1975, p.22.
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The agteement imposed a collective and reciprocal obligation of exclusivity and resale
price maintenance. It extended to over 90o/o of the Dutch market and made a major
contribution to consolidating existing distribution structures and market shares in the
trade in heating appliances, of which a large proportion was imported from other
Member States.
The members dissolved their association on I January 1973. However, legal procee-
dings in two cases were still pending. These had been instituted by the Haarden- en
Kachelhandelbtrreau in 1969 and 1971against a wholesaler and a retailer who had not
complied with certain clauses of the agreement, particularly by selling to unauthorized
firms or to firms excluded from the distribtrtion network. The defendants relused to
pay the fines provided for by the agreement. After proceedings had commenced in the
Dutch courts, each defendant made an application to the Commission. The court at
Haarlem decided to adjourn the proceedings pending a decision by the Commission.
The Commission Decision required the Haarden- en Kachelhandelbureau to refrain
from attempting, whether by legal action or other means, to collect fines imposed for
alleged infringements of the agreement committed while it was still being applied.
Apart from its prohibition of an agreement covering the entire territory of a Member
State and reinforcing the barriers between national markets, the Commission Decision
found that an arbitration clause in a restricted agreement may fall within Article 85
where it hinders undertakings from establishing a position in the market by competitive
effort.
92 
- 
Encouragement of permitted forms of cooperation
Nuclear fuel reprocessing agreements
44. Considering that cooperation at avital stage of the nuclear fuel cycle should be
promoted,l the Commission exempted two reprocessing agreements notified in this
field.2
(a) The first Decision authorizes an agreement between the two common markest
operators of large-scale plants for the reprocessing of nuclear oxide fuels 
- 
British
Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNF) and the French Commissariat il l'Energie Atomique
(CEA) 
- 
and an undertaking which has decided to build such a plant in the next
decade 
- 
Kernbrennstoff-Wiederaufarbeitungsgesellschaft mbH (KEWA). The main
I The purpose of reprocessing nuclear fuels is to recover the fissile materials (uranium-235 and
plutonium) which are still present after irradiation in a reactor and can be reused in nuclear fuel
fabrication,2 Commission Decisions of 23.12.1975, OJ L 5l of 26.2.1976, pp. 7 and 15. See also Fourth Report
on Competition Policy, point 84.
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object of the agreement is the coordination of investment by the three parties, each
party agreeing not to invest outside the programme prescribed by the agreement for
the first few years and subsequently to be extended. The agreement also created a
joint subsidiary, United Reprocessors Gesellschaft mbH (URG), for the joint market-
ing of the reprocessing services offered by the three parties and the distribution of the
reprocessing workload between their plants.
(b) The second Decision authorizes a related agreement between four German firms
- 
Bayer, Hoechst, Gelsenberg and Jukem 
- 
to establish KEWA as a joint subsidiary
with equal shareholdings, through which they are to take a joint shareholding in
URG. Under the first agreement, the four firms agree that they will not at present
build the plant which they have planned for the future.
45. In adopting these Decisions the Commission considered the particular charac-
teristics of the nuclear oxide fuel reprocessing industry, which are that the industry is
new, that costs decrease sharply according to the size and load factor of the plant,
that the industry is at a critical stage ofthe nuclear fuel cycle and is therefore regarded
as economically vital by governments, and that there are numerous important un-
known factors involved in developing technical processes and in solving the ecological
problems arising from the storage of radioactive waste.
In this context the URG agreement, with its coordination of investment, c'enttaliza'
tion of the supply of services and pooling of research work, aims to organize the
reprocessing industry at a European level as rationally as possible in its economic
and technical aspects and to prepare for the establishment of effective competition'
In the absence of the agreement, users would most probably have suffered considerable
harm through the creation of unprofi.table capacities financed from public funds and
through dispersal of research work. It is for this reason that the agreement received
the support of the three Governments concerned. In particular, the agreement satisfied
the concern of the German Government that German firms be able to enter this
market without being obliged to build a domestic plant at short nofice. Likewise it
has been recognized that coordination ofinvestment is essential for a period enabling
each of the plants covered by the agreement to reach an economically satisfactory
load factor before a new plant comes on stream.
Although the Commission is aware that, during the transitional period, URG will hold
a strong position as supplier of reprocessing services in Western Europe, the Commis-
sion authorized the URG agreement under Article 85 (3) since the agreement does not
afford those concerned the means of eliminating competition: the certainty that the
parties will become effective competitors after a period fixed by the Decision (by 1968
at the latest) must affect their present conduct. In any event, their customers, primarily
electricity generating companies, have sufficient economic power to have a similar
effect on the parties' conduct since competition would be in their best interests.
No general precedent is hereby set as regards the interpretation of the words 'elimi-
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nating competition' in Article 85(3). The reprocessing industry is a new advanced-
technology industry posing safety and environmental problems and is likely to come
under total State control. These highly specific aspects, set out in detail in the reasoning
of the Decision, severely limit the scope of any precedent.
46. The KEWA agreement will enable the firms concerned to proceed as rapidly as
possible to the industrial stage of nuclear oxide fuel reprocessing by enabling them
to pool their activities in research and development and to transfer technology be-
tween them in a new industry which is of such a kind that isolated effort by one firm
alone is ineffective. The Commission recognized that the agreement restricts competi-
tion between four potential competitors who agree to operate exclusively through
their joint subsidiary. However, the Decision prescribes a term 
- 
the end of 1986 
-for the authorization. Furthermore, when the URG agreement expires (by the end of
1986 at the latest) BNF, CEA and KEWA will be in effective competition.
47. In view of the strong market position which URG will hold during this transi-
tional period, the Commission attached conditions and obligations to its Decision so
that it can monitor URG's commercial policy and ensure that users enjoy a fair share
of the benefit of the asreement.
Bayer/Gist-Brocades agreement
48. The Commission authorized long-term specialization agreements relating
penicillin production between two large European drug manufacturers, Bayer
Germany and Gist-Brocades in the Netherlands.l
In this industry distinctions must be made between different market levels for the
various manufacturing stages: that of raw penicillin, of 6 APA (6 aminopenicillanic
acid) an intermediate product (obtainedby biological or chemical process), ofprocess-
ing into ampicillins and other semisynthetic penicillins, and of the finished product
(the various branded preparations sold to hospitals and dispensing chemists). Before
they entered into the agreements, Bayer and Gist-Brocades were large manufacturers
operating independently at these various stages of manufacture. Since raw penicillin
can be processed into an intermediate product or into a branded preparation for direct
sale, and since the intermediate product is sold as such to outsiders while semisynthe-
tics are sold in bulk, the various manufacturing stages each constitute a separate
market.
In order to increase production, the two firms entered into a long-term agreement
under which raw penicillin manufacture was undertaken mainly by Gist-Brocades,
with its superior experience of fermentation techniques, while Bayer was made res-
t C""t-trrt* Decision of 15.12.1975: OJ L 30 of 5.2.1976, p. 13.
to
in
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ponsible for the production of intermediate products, partly by its own biological
process and partly by the chemical process developed by Gist-Brocades. Gist's raw
penicillin output is largely for processing into an intermediate product by Bayer,
the remainder being processed into traditional penicillin preparations by Gist itself.
Bayer uses part ofits 6 APA production for its own purposes and processes part under
subcontracting agreements with Gist-Brocades.
49. The firms have thus achieved a measure of specialization, supported by reci-
procal long-term supply contracts and arrangements for joint investment. In view of
their size and technical knowhow, each could have manufactured both products but
in fact have decided provisionally to abandon part of their business. Competition
between the parties in research is also restricted. The agreements are therefore within
Article 85(l). However, after amendments had been made, the Commission was able
to regard this specialization as deserving exemption.
Where a production specialization agreement is concluded between two large firms
both having good market knowledge and financial power, it cannot automatically
be assumed that each is incapable of acting alone, without help from a major competi-
tor, in bearing the costs and economic risks inherent in extending its production capa-
city so as to rationalize manufacture. In this case, however, the Commission concluded
that production could be more economic as a result of the specialization. Bayer, using
a low-quality and low-yield raw penicillin strain, needed the assistance of a firm
experienced in fermentation techniques in order to improve its product. For technical
reasons it was more rational to contribute to financing the extension of production
capacities at Gist-Brocades and to convert its own plants to the manufacture of the
intermediate product on a larger scale.
Most important, once amended, the agreements contained no restrictions which were
not indispensable to the attainment of their objectives. The two parties retain full
freedom to decide how to use and extend their production capacities and, apart from
their firm supply commitments, to decide how much to produce. Only should one of
the companies wish the other to supply it with quantities exceeding the capacity of the
jointly flnanced plant will the other have to make an appropriate contribution to
financing the extension.
50. Before amendment, the agreements contained no such provision for independent
action in the market outside the specialization arrangements. The plants were to be
transferred to joint subsidiaries in which the two parties were to own equal shares and
appoint an equal number of directors. The inevitable result would have been joint
control over production and investment. Such an extensive restriction of competition
between the two firms could not have been regarded as necessary to their speciali-
zation.
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This is the first case in which firms have of their own accord abandoned a plan to form
joint subsidiaries in response to objections by the Commission. In a market having
various levels it was important that, despite the long-term specialization, the firms
remain independent of each other in respect of the quantities to be manufactured and
the investments to be made.
In fixing the period of validity of the exemption at eight years, the Commission took
account both of the extensive investment required in order to operate the specializa-
tion scheme and of the oligopolistic structure of the market. Conditions were attached
to the Decision so that the Commission would be able to monitor the practical effects
of cooperation, particularly the position of other firms on the market, and to verify
that competition is not affected by financial connections or interlocking directorates
either between the two parties or between them and other persons in this market.
Expo Dental rules
51. In the field of fairs and exhibitions 1 the Commission, having caused the restric-
tion on participating in other exhibitions to be relaxed, authorized the rules governing
dental equipment exhibitions (Expo Dental) organized in Italy by UNIDI (Unione
nazionale industrie dentarie italiane), to which almost all the manufacturers of dental
equipment in Italy belong.2
The Commission had received complaints against the conditions governing admission
for exhibitors to an Expo Dental which was to take place in Genoa. The rules of the
exhibition stated that all manufacturers, representatives offoreign suppliers and dea-
lers who wished to exhibit were to refrain from exhibiting their products at other simi-
lar events in Italy during the twelve months preceding Expo Dental. As Expo Dental
had been an annual event since 1971, it was made virtually impossible to exhibit
dental equipment in Italy at both Expo Dental and other exhibitions.
The complainant exhibitors were in fact allowed to participate both in the Genoa
Expo Dental and in another exhibition held the same year in Italy. UNIDI then amen-
ded the rules so that the Expo Dental is now held every eighteen months and manu-
facturers and their agents are allowed to show their goods throughout Italy during
the nine months following an Expo Dental. A restriction on exhibiting during the
nine months before an Expo Dental still exists, but the Commission considered tltis
restriction could be exempted under Article 85(3) since the remaining restriction on
the freedom of exhibitors was no more extensive than was required for the ntionaliza-
tion of participation in fairs and exhibitions.
t S"" f.trrt R.port on Competition Policy, point 42.2 Commission Decision of 17.7.197 5: OJ L 228 of 29.8.197 5, p. 17.
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This ruling is consistent with previous decisions I on machine tools and textile machi-
nery in that it is intended to establish a balance between the period ofrestriction and
the period offreedom to exhibit.
This Decision is of importance not only to those concerned in this particular case but
also as a general guide on the terms for participation in dental equipment exhibitions
in other Member States, notably in the United Kingdom and Germany.
Intergroup Trading
52. Pursuing its policy on joint purchasing arrangements,2 the Commission issued
a Decision authorizing the national Spar chains in various countries of Europe to
form Intergroup Trading, Amsterdam, through which they may make purchases in
countries other than their own.3
The Spar chains are voluntary chains using the Spar trademarks and emblem, to
which 180 wholesalers and some 35 000 retailers in Europe are currently affiliated.
Their main business is in food products.
Intergroup, which acts primarily as an intermediary, was authorized by the founder
Spar chains and affiliated wholesalers to conclude supply contracts for products
bearing Spar trademarks. It can do business in these products for the Spar chains
only, since only they are entitled to market them. But in respect of other products it
may act for any customer it wishes. The Spar chains for their paft arc not obliged to
buy from abroad through Intergroup. There is no form of sales coordination between
Intergroup and its customers, who are free to determine their own resale prices.
Apart from the openness of the agreement, the Commission also took account, in
giving negative clearance, of the fact that Intergroup's business is only on a small
scale. It concluded that the agreement does not at present have any perceptible effect
on the position of suppliers of the relevant products and is unlikely to do so in the
foreseeable future; it therefore found that it had no grounds for action under Article
85(1) of the EEC Treaty.
The consumer benefits by the cooperation between Intergroup customers, and par-
ticularly tle Spar chains, in that retailers working together can enter foreign markets
more easily and import on better terms which can then be passed on to the consumer.
The Commission's action in approving this open cooperation agreement also shows
that, from the point of view of its competition policy in general, the Commission is
t C"-"tt*ir" Decisions of 13.3.1969 (European Machine Tool Exhibitions) and 24,g.lg7l(CEMATEX): OJ L 69 of 20.3.1969, p. 13, and L 227 of 8.10.1971, p.26.2 See First Report on Competition Policy, point 40.3 Commission Decision of 14.7.1975: OJ L 212 of 9.8.1975, p.23.
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paying attention to agreements between purchasers, which can be prohibited under
Article 85 if they entail appreciable restrictions of competition. But in this case the
Commission concluded that the scope for choice on the part of suppliers of the rele-
vant products was not appreciably restricted.
Soci6t6 frangaise iles minerais pr6r6duits
53. Under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty the Commission authorized r an agteement
between several French steel-producing companies concerning the joint buying of
prereduced iron ore through Soci6t6 frangaise des minerais pr6r6duits SA (SFMP).
The participating firms account for nearly all the crude steel manufactured in France.
Prereduced iron ore is a high-quality substitute for scrap, especially in electric steel
furnaces. The processes are relatively new, and the Federal Republic of Germany is
the only Community country where prereduction of iron ore has been used industrially
so far. The main aim of SFMP will be to negotiate supply contracts for prereduced
iron ore and possibly to set up and operate direct reduction plants. In its Decision
the Commission stated that it would be desirable for prereduced iron ore to be made
available in larger quantities, either by importing it from outside the Community
or by producing it in plants to be set up inside the Community, so as to make up part
of the serious shortage of scrap which is likely to occur in the medium term.
Scrutiny of the agreement revealed that, as regards joint buying, it satisfies the tests
of Article 65Q).ltwill enable the member firms to order greater tonnages and thereby
cut their supply costs. The medium-term contracts will enable them to stabilize
supplies and prices, particularly in times of shortfall. The Commission also took
account of the fact that the agreement does not give SFMP exclusive buying rights
and does not give the firms concerned the power to determine the general level of pri-
ces or production of prereduced iron ore, this being determined rather more by the
world supply and demand situation and by current actual and relative prices for scrap
and pig iron.
As regards the possibility of building and operating direct reduction plants, the
agreement is only an outline agreement and the details will have to be filled in before
the Commission can decide finally whether it is compatible with Article 65(2) or, as
the case may be, Article 66(2). Since the Commission needs to be in a position to
monitor developments in cooperation between steel firms regarding the joint buying
of prereduced iron ore, the following conditions were applied to its authorization:
- 
the firms concerned must notify the Commission of any plan to set up or operate
a direct reduction plant, any change in the number of shareholders in SFMP and
any change in the agteement or in the memorandum and articles of association of
SFMP;
t C"."ttr-t"" Decision of 3.7.197 5: OJ L 24g of 25,9.197 5, p. 22.
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- 
any such plans or changes may not take effect until the Commission is satisfied
that they are within the terms of the existing authorization or until the Commission
has separately authorized them.
g3 
- 
Article 85 applied to distribution
SABA
54. The Commission gave exemption for the various agreements forming the selec-
tive distribution system operated in the EEC by SABA, Villingen-Schwenningen,
after it had been brought into line with the requirements of Article 85 at Commission
instigation.1
SABA, a subsidiary of General Telephone & Electronics Corp., New York, manu-
factures radios, television sets and tape recorders. It markets them through a network
of selected dealers in all the Community countrjes. In Germany SABA equipment is
sold through wholesalers and retailers, and in the other EEC countries through sole
distributors and retailers.
To organize its common market sales along uniform lines, SABA has entered into
standard contracts with its dealers at the separate levels of distribution. These con-
tracts govern matters such as the conditions for approval as a SABA dealer and the
distribution channels to be followed.
There are two aspects to the approval process:
- 
Any deater wishing to retail SABA equipment must keep a specialized shop or,
in the case of a department store, have a department specializing in the sale of
radios, television sets and tape recorders; he must have suitable premises, employ
trained staf and be capable of providing the after-sales and guarantee services
prescribed by SABA.
- 
Of firms meeting these requirements, SABA appoints only those which firrther
undertake to engage in certain sales promotion activities and to meet certain sales
targets. All SABA dealers must attain an 'adequate' turnover on SABA equip-
ment, and SABA decides what is meant by adequate in line with the size, local
importance and reasonable sales possibilities of the relevant firm. Account is also
taken of SABA's current market share and of foreseeable developments. SABA
dealers must further undertake to stock the SABA range as fully as possible in
quantities reflecting this turnover level. Those SABA dealers (sole distributors,
wholesalers and a few large retailers) who obtain their supplies direct from the
manufacturer are obliged to enter into six-month supply contracts for fixed
quantities determined by agreement and to take delivery of the goods ordered at
the appropriate dates.
t C""rrttsi." Decision of 15.12.1975: OJ L 28 of 3,2,1976, p. 19, An interested third company has
brought a case before the Court ofJustice for the annullment ofthis decision.
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The standard contracts also ensure that SABA equipment can be resold only by
appointed SABA dealers. SABA undertakes not to supply outsiders, and its dealers
are prohibited from supplying other dealers outside the SABA system.
There are no restrictions on sales between members of the SABA network. All dealers
are free to set their own resale prices and SABA wholesalers and retailers may also
distribute competing products.
J5. The Commission's view is that SABA's distribution system is anticompetitive
because by reason of the contractual obligations by SABA and its dealers a large
number of dealers satisfying all the general technical and professional requirements
for the sale of home electronics equipment are excluded from becoming SABA
dealers and dealing in SABA equipment. The contracts go beyond straightforward
specialist trade arrangements operating on objective criteria without discrimination
(Fachhandelsbindung), which would be irreproachable from the competition view-
point. Their ultimate effect is qualitative selection of suitable dealers, with those who
are unable or unwilling to engage in special sales promotion activities being excluded.
In this case, however, the Commission was able to give the exemption requested
since the distribution system as a whole helps to rationalize production and distribu-
tion, with the consumer reaping the ultimate benefit. The SABA distribution system
is based on close two-way cooperation between the manufacturer and his wholesalers
and sole distributors. The result is cost savings through improved production and
sales planning; at the same time the consumer is assured of the ready availability of
high-quality equipment meeting market demand and his own specific requirements.
Furthermore, the consumer can be sure of obtaining satisfactory after-sales service
for these technically complex goods.
So that it can keep a close watch on the practical implications of this selective distri-
bution system and act against any abuse, the Commission attached a condition to its
Decision: SABA must report to the Commission each year those cases where it refuses
to appoint a firm as a SABA dealer or terminates such an appointement, refuses to
conclude a supply contract or withholds supplies from such a dealer.
56. The main importance of this Decision for competition policy in general lies in
the fact that it gives the radio and television industry guidelines so that they can adjust
their distribution systems to conform to the rules of competition in the EEC Treaty.
The Decision also sets basic criteria for establishing the circumstances in which the
selection of dealers, which is common to so many distribution systems, is to be regar-
ded as anticompetitive for the purpose of Article 85(l).
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Perfume industry
57. In two test cases the Commission had previously set out its views on the selective
distribution systems applied in the perfume industry. In view of the characteristics of
the market for perfumes and beauty and toiletry products in the EEC (many competing
firms of similar size, each holding a fairly modest market share), the Commission felt
that it.peed not intervene against the restrictive selection of sales points provided
that all restrictions tending to partition the market were abandoned. The Commission
indicated that this solution could be adopted for the industry as a whole if individual
firms would follow the guidelines suggested.l
J8. The matter is now rvell on the way to being settled. Having stated its position in
these terms, the Commission immediately began considering alarge number of notifi-
cations received from firms in the industry. More than 120 cases involving forty or so
firms have been examined. The firms have been invited to delete those restrictive
clauses to which the Commission has taken exception in general terms and also to
delete any other clause with like effects in the contracts governing their sales organiza'
tions. All the firms contacted have stated that they are willing to make the changes
called for by the Commission and have submitted drafts of the contracts which they
propose operating with their distributors. These draft contracts can all be regarded as
satisfactory from the competition angle. As each of these firms informs the Commis-
sion that it is now operating the new contract, it will be informed that the Commission
no longer has any grounds for action and is closing its file in the case'
New sales organizations have so far been put into operation by Guerlain, Chanel,
Barbara Gould, Orlane (formerly Jean d'Albret), Parfums Caron and Bourjois.
59. Here, then, for the first time, the Commission will be in a position to apply a
uniform general arrangement throughout an entire industry, the perfume industry,
without having to issue formal decisions.
Motor industry
60. In its Decision on the distribution system operated by BMW in Germany,
the Commission had suggested limits within which certain clauses in restraint of
competition in distribution agreements in the motor industry might be acceptable.2
61. The last year has seen progress in bringing such agreements into line with
Article 35(3). A number of car manufacturers, in laying down their sales policy, not
t F"*th R.p"rt on Competition Policy, point 35.2 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 86.
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only determine what type of contract they will themselves use on their home and
export markets but also influence the distribution contracts operated in other Member
States by independent importers and by their own associated or subsidiary companies.
This influence can be seen in the wording of anticompetitive clauses in these agree-
ments. At the Commission's instigation a series of sales systems operating throughout
the common market have now been adjusted.
The Commission has also taken action in fourteen cases where parallel importers
were having difficulty in dealings from one Member State to another.r The barriers
to parallel imports which were found to exist have all been removed at the Commis-
sion's insistence.
94 
- 
Article 85 applied to agreements concerning industrial
and commercial property rights
62. In line with principles enunciated by the Court of Justice and with its own prac-
tice, the Commission has continued to oppose any attempt to keep national markets
separate through manipulation of industrial and commercial property rights, espe-
cially trademarks. There have also been developments in the assessment under
Article 85 of clauses frequently found in patent licensing and knowhow agreements.
In particular, a decision has been issued for the first time against an export ban im-
posed on a licensee.
Admissibility of clauses in patent licensing agreements
AOIP/Beyrard
63. The Commission issued its first 'cease and desist' decision relating to a patent
licensing agreement.2 This prohibits, as incompatible with Article 85, a number of
clauses frequently found in patent licensing agreements. Four of the restrictions
(no-challenge clause, non-competition clause, automatic extension of the duration of
the agreement, payment of royalities even if the patent is not exploited) were held not
to be capable of exemption, whereas two others (exclusivity and export ban) might
have been exempted in different circumstances.
The Decision concerns a licensing agreement between the Association des Ouvriers en
Instruments de Pr6cision (AIOP), the licensee, and an inventor 
- 
Mr Beyrard3 
-relating to existing and future patents for a number of liquid variable resistor electrical
devices used principally in automatic starters for electric motors.
is""liJlolt zs.2 Commission Decision of 2.12.1975; OJ L 6 of 13.1.1976, p. 8.3 The Decision establishes that a privat€ inventor is an undertaking for the purpose of Article 85
if by licensing his patents he has commercially exploited his invention.
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64. The agreement contained the following clauses which were regarded as within
the prohibition and unable to qualify for exemption because of their harmful effects
on technical progress.
- 
Every newly lodged improvement patent extended the duration of the agreement.
The Commission could not accept an extension of a patent licensing agreement
beyond the duration of the most recent patent held at the time of the agreement,
if the extension was automatic or was imposed unilaterally. The parties remained
free, however, to enter into a subsequent agreement to extend the term of the
original licence.
- 
The licensee was obliged to pay full royalties even after the expiry of the original
patent and even if he was not exploiting any of the improvement patents. Litiga-
tion was initiated in the French courts on the subject of this clause, for on the
expiry of the original patent the licensee decided to cease paying royalties whereas
the licensor demanded payment until the expiry of the latest improvement patent.
This clause could not be authorized, for its effect was to increase production costs
with no economic justification and to weaken the licensee's competitive position.
If subsequent improvement patents are exploited after expiry of the original
patent, Community law does not prevent national law from recognizing the right
to a royalty reflecting the economic value of these patents as compared with that
of the patents existing at the date of the agreement.
- 
The licensee was prohibited from challenging the validity of the licensor's patents.
The Decision prohibits the no-challenge clause because it deprives the licensee
of a means of removing an obstacle to his freedom of action. In any case it is
not in the general interest that anyone concerned, including tle licensee, be
denied the opportunity to challenge patents wrongfully issued.
- 
The two sides were to refrain from competing with each other in the relevant
markets. The Commission regarded this as a brake on technical progress, because
the development of new and possibly better manufacturing processes in related
areas was thereby made unprofitable.
65. The agreement contained two more clauses to which the Commission took
exception:
- 
the licensee could not export to countries where the licensor had granted licences
or assigned his patents to other firms (export ban);
- 
the licensor could not issue a manufacturins or sales licence to anv other licensee
in France (exclusivity).
The Commission considered that the licensor's obligations resulting from the grant
of exclusive manufacturing and sales rights to the licensee were not of the essence of
the patents and that the exclusive grant was caught by the prohibition in Article
85(l). However, the Commission has already stated that in certain circumstances this
coMP. REP.1975
54 POLTCY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES
restriction may be granted an exemption under Article 85(3). In two earlier cases,l
exclusive manufacturing licences were exempted because they assured the licensees
of an adequate return on their investment.
In more general terms, an exclusive manufacturing and sales licence of limited dura-
tion qualifies for exemption if, for instance, it provides the licensee with an incentive
to penetrate a geographic or product market not yet worked by the licensor.
With the regard to the export ban, the Commission has reinforced its stand against
a growing tendency by declaring that the protection of one licensee against competi-
tion from another licensee is not necessary to guarantee the existence of the patent
right. Such bans are therefore caught by Article 85(l) and can be letthroughonlyif
the tests of Article 85(3) are satisfied, as where a licensee is to be temporarily protected
against the licensor or against other licensees and this is necessary in order to reduce
the risk inirerent in initial investments on a new market.
In this case the exclusivity clause and export ban were not allowed through the net
because they formed an indivisible part of a set of restrictions which could not be
exempted as a whole.
Kabelmetal/Luchaire
66. In pursuance of its policy of encouraging the grant of patent and knowhow
licences where they provide for the transfer of technology under suitable conditions
and where the parties remain free to sell throughout the common market, the Com-
mission gave exemption to an exclusive patent and knowhow licensing agreement
between the German firm Kabel- und Metallwerke Gutehoffnungshiitte AG (Kabel-
metal) and the French firm Ets Luchaire SA.2
The agreement covers the use of Kabelmetal's cold extrusion processes, the main
principles of which were covered by secret patents registered in Germany before the
war; these have since expired. Under the agreement Kabelmetal gave Luchaire an
exclusive licence for the manufactl.rre in France of extruded steel components (pistons,
shock-absorbers, tubes) for the electrical engineering industry in general and the
motor industry in particular, coupled with a non-exclusive licence for the sale of these
goods in all common market countries.
The Commission exempted the agreement from the prohibition in Article 85 on the
grounds that the exclusivity it granted would help to promote technical and economic
progress by providing the licensee with an incentive to work on the development of
t Or"A*, nrtber: OJ L 143 of 23,6.1972; see Second Report on Competition Policy, point 46.
Kabelmetal: OJ L 222 of 22,8,1975; see point 66.2 Commission Decision of 18.7.1975: OJ L 222 of 22'8'1975, p. 34'
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the licensed techniques although this required new investment. The Commission also
took account of the fact that the firms concerned had deleted all the other restrictive
clauses in the agreement-concerning the licensee's obligation to refrain from export-
ing to other EEC countries, to assign to the licensoS property rights in any improve-
ments to the processes and to refrain from challenging the patents.
The Commission drew particular attention to two provisions of the agreement: the
most-favoured-licensee clause (whereby the licensor undertakes not to grant other
licensees better terms than those granted to the first licensee) and the grantback clause
(whereby the licensee undertakes to grant the licensor or other licensees licenses in
respect of improvements it may make to the basic processes). In certain circumstances,
particularly on an oligopolistic market, these clauses might be anticompetitive, but
this was not the case here since the clauses could not be regarded as having perceptible
effects on market conditions in the EEC.
Dutch drainage equipment manufacturers (Bronbemaling/Heidemaatschappij)
67. In a provisional Decision under Article 15(6) of Regulation No 17, the Commis-
sion stated that in its opinion a clause in a patent licensing agreement relating to
drainage ofthe water table, wherby the patentholder undertook not to grant additional
licences without the prior consent of the majority of the parties 
- 
himself and the
existing licensees 
- 
was caught by the prohibition in Article 85(l) and could not be
exempted under Article 85(3).t
The Decision was addressed to five Dutch firms in the drainage industry, one of them
being the patentholder in question 
- 
Heidemaatschappij Beheer NV. The facts were
as follows.
In 1965 and 1967 Heidemaatschapprj applied to the Dutch Patent Office for the grant
of a patent in respect of a process for the installation of a well-point drainage system
consisting of filter tubes connected to pumps and of a well-point drainage system
installed in this way. The process is designed to lower the water table and is of
considerable economic importance, especially in the Netherlands, where both public
authorities and private firms awarding contracts often specify that it must be used for
major projects. The process is also used for construction projects extending beyond
Dutch frontiers, such as long-distance oil and gas pipelines.
The four other firms had opposed the grant of the patent to Heidemaatschappij on the
ground that the process was already in general use. However, Heidemaatschappij
reached an agreement with these firms, granting a licence to each of them and also
undertaking to issue no further licence to other firms without first obtaining the
consent of at least two of the four.
t Co-"tir.ior Decision of 25.'l .1975: OJ L 24g of 25.9,1975, p. 27,
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When another Dutch firm applied for a licence in 1971, the licensees withheld consent.
The same occurred when a second firm, Zuid-Nederlandsche Bronbemaling, also
applied for a licence in 1973.
The Commission's provisional Decision was issued in response to a complaint filed
by Bronbemaling.
Market fragmentation through exploitation of industrial
and commercial property rights
Agreement between two knitting-yarn manufacturers
68 . In a provisional Decision under Article I 5 (6) of Regulation No 17, the Commis-
sion stated that in its opinion a market-sharing agreement between two knitting-yarn
manufacturers, wherby each undertook not to use its own trademark on the other's
home market, could not be authorized even if the two trademarks (Sirdar and Phildar)
could be regarded as being so similar as to be capable of confusion.l
ln1964 Sirdar Ltd, Wakefield, Yorkshire, and Les Fils de Louis Mulliez SA, Roubaix,
agreed that the former would not market its knitting yarn in France under its Sirdar
trademark while the latter would refrain from marketing its Phildar yarn in the
United Kingdom. The agreement was notified to the Commission in 1973.
Following United Kingdom accession to the European Communities, the French
firm decided that the agreement was void as infringing the rules of competition in the
EEC Treaty and began selling yarn on the British market under its Phildar trademark.
Sirdar thereupon brought an action in the High Court in London, based inter alia
on the 1964 agreement.
Shortly after the adoption of the provisional Decision by the Commission, the High
Court dismissed Sirdar's application for an interim injunction restraining the French
firm from using its Phildar trademark in the United Kingdom.
Standard agreement for the protection of designs and models
69. In response to representations by the Commission a standard agreement drawn
up by the Stichting Instituut voor Industridle Vormgeving (an Amsterdam industrial
design institute) has been terminated by the thirty or so Dutch firms party to it.2
This was an agreement between competing firms relating to a number of products 
-
t C""t-ttri* Decision of 5.3.1975: OJ L 125 of 15.5.1975, p. 2?. Sirdar Ltd has applied to the
Court of Justice for annulment of this Decision on grounds of a procedural defect.2 Bull. EC 3-1975, point 2112,
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including furniture, lighting equipment, tableware and heaters 
- 
which could be
protected by registered designs. Under the agreement an ofrce was to be set up where
each of the firms could register its designs and models. The firms undertook not to
manufacture, sell or import products similar to the designs and models they had
registered with the institute.
Some of the clauses of the agreement were clearly market-sharing clauses, since they
protected products which would not normally be protected under Dutch law. They
therefore ran counter to the economic integration aimed at by the EEC Treaty.
The agreement also extended the protection ofthe registered design for products which
were legally protected to cover cases which would have constituted disguised restric-
tions on trade between Member States and thereby distorted the free play of compe-
tition in the common market.
As a consequence of the termination of this standard agreement, there is once again
freedom of movement for goods covered by designs and free competition between
their manufacturers on the Dutch market; the protection of designs and models is
currently provided by the Benelux uniform law.
Abandonment of an action for trademark infringement
70. The Commission was able to terminate proceedings which it had initiated in
response to another complaint; here, too, the point was to decide whether the exer-
cise of trademark rights was being used in order to fragment the market.l
The case began with a complaint filed by Ets L6opold, Paris, against AFS, Strasbourg,
and Kamei, Wolfsburg, L6opold were distributing in France Porotherm and Avus-
Porotherm branded steering-wheel covers purchased in Germany from one of Kamei's
wholesalers, Kamei holding the trademarks there. AFS, which held the trademarks in
France, brought proceedings for infringement in the French courts in order to stop
these imports. L6opold contended that the registration and use of the marks in France
by AFS, despite the allegations of AFS and Kamei, constituted the object, means or
consequence of a restrictive agreement between those companies.
The Commission considered that the existence of an agreement, or at least a concerted
practice, falling within Article 85 was quite possible in view of the following facts:
- 
Kamei had not opposed registration of identical trademarks applied for subse-
quently by AFS in France to designate the same products;
- 
it could be presumed from the name Avus (a motor-racing track in Berlin) that
the mark was of German origin;
1 Bull. EC ll-l975,point?l22,
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- 
AFS and Kamei used virtually identical packaging and presentation for the
product;
- 
before it began making steering-wheel covers in France, AFS bought them from
Kamei, and since then it had stocked up with materials from Kamei and used
its patented manufacturing processes.
However, while proceedings were still in progress, the two firms reached a settlement
to the effect that the sale in France of products imported by L6opold would no longer
be opposed in view of the Court of Justice's rulings concerning the free movement of
trademarked goods.l
55 
- 
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty and Article 66(7) of
the ECSC Treaty applied to abuse of dominant positions
Chiquita
71. The Commission adopted an important Decision finding that United Brands Co.
(UBC) had been abusing its dominant position in respect of sales of Chiquita bananas
in the common market, in violation of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty.2
UBC is a conglomerate, born of the merger between United Fruit Co. and AMK
Corp., a major US meat producer, which derives only some 20o/o of its total turnover
from the sale of bananas. As the world's largest seller of bananas, it holds, in the
Commission's opinion, a dominant position on the banana market in a substantial
part of the Community. Apart from the fact that it handles 40o/o of the trade in
bananas within the EEC, it wields overwhelming economic power, due largely to the
vertical integration ofits banana business, and holds other advantages resulting from
its multinational and conglomerate character. It owns numerous plantations in tropi-
cal banana-growing countries and a fleet ofrefrigerated banana boats. It also controls
banana ripening in consumer countries and takes direct charge of the advertising
campaigns and sales promotion activities related to its brand of bananas. It is the
only firm on the banana market to have all these advantages and is in a position to use
them to place major obstacles in the way of effective competition by its present busi-
ness rivals, while potential competitors find themselves confronted with major barriers
to market entry.
Investigation showed that the market shares held by this company in the northem
area of the EEC 
- 
Germany, Denmark, Ireland and the Benelux countries 
- 
backed
up by the marketing policy it pursues, give it a dominant position in these countries.
Although UBC also has sizeable market shares in the United Kingdom, France and
t F",r.th R.p"rt on Competition Policy, point 60.2 Commission Decision of 17.12.1975: OJ L 95 of 9.4.1976. The company intends to bring an action
for the annullment of this Decision of the Commission.
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Italy, the Commission did not consider them in its Decision since different marketing
and importing arrangements obtain there.
72. The Commission took the view that UBC had been abusing its dominant posi-
tion in the following ways:
- 
it prohibited its distributors and ripeners from reselling green bananas, which
meant there was market fragmentation;'
- 
it charged its customers prices which differed according to the Member State
in which they were located, although there were no objective reasons for such
discrimination; for equivalent transactions, prices were found to have differed
between the ports of Bremerhaven and Rotterdam in some cases by as much as,
or more than. 100%:
- 
it charged unfair prices for sales to its customers in Germany, Denmark and the
Benelux countries;
- 
finally, for no objectively valid reason, it refused, for nearly two years, to supply
one of its main Danish customers.
Because of the seriousness of these violations of Article 86, the Commission imposed a
fine of one million u.a. It also ordered UBC to put an end to its infringements of the
Treaty (except the refusal to supply, which had already ceased). So that the Commis-
sion could check on compliance, UBC was ordered to notify the Commission once it
had withdrawn the ban on resale of green bananas by its distributors and ripeners in
Germany, Denmark, Ireland and the Benelux countries and to keep the Commission
informed of the prices actually charged in those countries over the next two years'
Penalty payments amounting to one thousand u.a. per day of delay from the dates
stipulated in the Decision were imposed.
73. The importance of the Decision lies in the fact that the Commission investigated
a firm's entire marketing policy in the light of Article 86, not so as to attack its com-
mercial dynamism and economic performance, since this is not the purpose of Article
86. but because a dominant firm has an obligation not to indulge in business practices
which are at variance with the goals of integrated markets and undistorted competition
in the common market.
74. The Decision is also significant in that it finds abuse within the meaning of
Article 86 on two counts: customers were charged different prices for identical trans-
actions, and unfair prices were imposed.
75 . In an attempt to justify the considerable differences in the prices which it charged
its customers in different Member States, UBC asserted that it had adjusted its prices
to the maximum the market would bear. The Commission took the view that for a
1 As bananas are perishable, only green bananas can be sold to medium- or long-distance customers'
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dominant firm systematically to charge the highest price it could get, entailing sub-
stantial price differences, was not an objective justification for discriminatory prices.l
particularly if the firm used its dominance to keep markets separated.
76. In reaching the conclusion that the prices imposed by UBC on its customers were
unfair, the Commission relied essentially on the following facts.r
In the first place, UBC by its own admission was making a profit on the lowest price
quoted for bananas, the price at which it sold to its Irish customers.
Also, UBC was selling bananas without the Chiquita trademark 30 to 4oo/o cheaper
than those with, although they were only slightly inferior to Chiquita bananas;
furthermore, UBC's main competitors, selling their own brands of bananas of com-
parable quality, generally sell them at prices below those of Chiquita bananas.
These facts brought the Commission to the view that the prices of this brand of bana-
nas were excessive in relation to the economic value of the commodity supplied.2
As a guide, it suggested that UBC's prices in Germany, Denmark and the Benelux
countries would be acceptable if they came down to not less than 15% below the
prices currently charged in Germany.
In taking this action, the Commission had no wish to set itself up as a price-control
authority or to interfere in internal price setting by examining cost components or
the like. On the other hand, it did wish to make it clear that the provisions of Article
86 which prohibit discriminatory and unfair prices must be enforceable.
National Carbonizing Co. Ltd.
77. The Commission issued a Decision adopting interim measures aimed at enabling
the National Carbonizing Co. Ltd (NCC) to continue operating its coking plants until
the outcome of proceedings now before the Court of Justice.3 The issue revolves
around a conflict of interest between NCC and the National Coal Board (NCB) over
the price structure of coking coal and domestic hard coke.
These interim measures specify that NCB is temporarily to reduce by f.2.79 per tonne
the effective price of coal supplied to NCC for the production of domestic hard coke
1 The Court of Justice had already ruled that a price disparity, if it is big enough and objectivejustification is lacking, may be an indication of abuse within the meaning of Article 86 (Judgment
of 8.6.1971 in Case 78170 (DcG a Metro); [971] Recueil 487).2 See also the judgment given by the Court of Justice on 13.11.1975 in Case 26175 (General Motors
Continental o Commission)i see point 25.3 Decision 76|185/ECSC of 29.10.1975: OJ L 35 of 10.2.1976, p. 6.
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for sale in the Community, provided that, to ensure fairness to NCB, NCC provides
adequate financial guarantees. This Decision is, of course, without prejudice to the
final judgment of the Court of Justice.
NCC is a private-sector limited company producing inter alia industrial and domestic
hard coke. It accounts for approximately 7oh of the total hard coke market in the
United Kingdom, including 9oh of the domestic coke market. NCB is a publicly
owned undertaking with a virtual monopoly of coal production in the United King-
dom and about 95oh of the market for coal. Its wholly owned subsidiary, National
Smokeless Fuels Ltd (NSF), produces inter alia industrial and domestic hard coke,
holding some 84% of the industrial coke market and 88% of the domestic coke market
in the United Kingdom.
NCC buys all the coal it needs for coke production from NCB. As NSF is the price
leader for industrial and domestic coke in the United Kingdom, NCC is unable to sell
its identical products above NSF's prices. NCC complained to the Commission that it
was having difficulty in covering its production costs for domestic coke. It claimed
that its losses resulted from the narrowness of the margin between too high coking
coal prices and too low domestic coke prices. It charged that NCB's behaviour
amounted to an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 66(7)
of the ECSC Treaty.
After examining the facts and information available to it, the Cornmission notified
NCC that it regarded as unfounded its complaint that NCB had abused its
dominant position. NCC then applied to the Court of Justice under Article 35 of the
ECSC Treaty, alleging that the Commission had failed in its duty by not taking
action to end NCB's infringement of the Treaty. At the same time, NCC called on the
Court to take interim measures that would enable it to produce domestic coke on an
economic basis.
The President of the Court made an order ruling that the Commission should take
such interim measures as it deemed strictly necessary for the survival of NCC until
proceedings in the main action had been completed and should determine adequate
guarantees for the repayment by NCC of the costs of the interim measures, should the
Court ultimately find against it.
The Decision adopted by the Commission thus imposes reciprocal obligations on the
parties to maintain the status quo during the proceedings before the Court and to
share out equitably the obligations and risks which the interim measures entail for
them both.
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g 6 
- 
Merger control under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty
Main mergers authorized
78. The three main mergers authorized in 1975 by the Commission 
- 
exercising its
power of prior control under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty 
- 
were CLIF/Marine,
Krupp/Siidwestfalen and Fiat/Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz. I
CLIF/Marine
79. Taking the view that the transaction would help to strengthen and diversify
the Lorraine steel industry while satisfying the tests of Article 66, the Commission
authorized Compagnie lorraine industrielle et financidre (CLIF), the holding company
of the Wendel Group, to take over Marine-Firminy SA.2
Under the terms of the agreement between CLIF, which held 19.4"h of Marine's
capital, and Schneider, which held 32o/o, CLIF was to transfer its total assets to Marine.
CLIF then took a controlling interest in the new holding company (Marine-Wendel)
combining its assets and those of Marine, Schneider's participation being reduced to
about l5%.
By the same Decision the Commission repealed the interim measures taken with
regard to Schneider and Marine on 5 April 1974 and with regard to CLIF on 2l
December 1974. A further Commission Decision revoked the interim measures taken
on 2l December 1974 in respect of Denain Nord-Est Longwy.3 The aim of these
measures had been to maintain the status quo between the companies pending the
Commission's final Decision under Article 66.
80. The CLIF-Marine merger was authorized for the following reasons.
CLIF and Marine already jointly controlled the Sacilor Group, which accounts for
most of their steel production. Marine and Schneider jointly controlled Creusot-Loire,
a company producing special steels which has a majority holding in Framatome,
Franceos largest nuclear power station constructor.
The only effects on competition were thus those arising from the combination of
companies controlled separately by CLIF and Marine, whether alone or with other
parties.
The companies controlled separately by CLIF at the time produce scarcely any steel:
they are rerollers, particularly of sheet and tinplate. The companies in the Marine
Group produce special steels at the Creusot-Loire works and heavy 6nd medium plate
at the Dillingen works.
t Th.-th.t Decisions taken under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty are listed in an Annex to this
Report.2 Commission Decision of 5.3.1975: OJ L 196 of 26.7.1915, p.21.3 See Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 142.
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The CLIF/Marine merger therefore brought together complementary production
lines, which for the most part do not compete with each other.
8l . To maintain effective competition on the oligopolistic steel market, the Commis-
sion attached to the merger authorization the following conditions, aimed at ensuring
the independence of the major steel-manufacturing groups:
- 
Schneider had to dispose of its holding in excess of l0o/o in the new Marine-Wendel
holding company by 3l December 1976 (but has in fact since then chosen to give
up all its holdings in Marine-Wendel);
- 
apart from joint Marine-Wendel and Schneider control of Creusot-Loire no
representative of either Marine-Wendel or Schneider may carry out similar duties
in companies belonging to the other group;
- 
no director of the Marine-Wendel Group may hold a similar position in any other
steel company;
- 
Commission authorization must be obtained before the Marine-Wendel Group
can acquire holdings of 10o/o or more in firms which are producers, distributors or
large-scale users of steel.
While authorizing the CLIF/Marine merger, the Commission reserved its position on
any resulting concentration in industries other than steel, notably in metal containers.
The Marine-Wendel Group undertook to put forward a reorgaoization plan which
will guarantee effective competition on the French market.
Krupp/Siidwestfalen
82. The Commission authorized the acquisition by Fried. Krupp Hiittenwerke AG
(FKH) of a majority shareholding in Stahlwerke Siidwestfalen AG (SSW).l
FKH is the steel-producing subsidiary of Fried. Krupp GmbH, Essen (Krupp), the
latter being engaged mainly in plant and mechanical engineering, shipbuilding and
steel stockholding. FKH had concluded agreements to buy the shares of the three
major SSW shareholders 
- 
Agricola Verwaltungsgesellschaft KG (Merck, Fink &
Co.), Allianz Versicherungs-AG and the steel-producing company Hoesch Werke AG.
The transaction is of particular significance for special steels, since both FKH and
SSW are among the biggest producers in this field (jointly controlling about l0% of
Community production); it will have no significant effect on the market for ordinary
steels.
The Commission took the view that the merger could be authorized because, thanks
to other Comrnunity producers and the importance of imports from outside the
Comrnunity, there would still be effective competition in steel products, even for those
t C.--ir"irt Decision of 2.4.1975: OJ L 130 of 21.5.1975, p. 13.
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special steel products in respect of which Krupp and SSW are in a very strong market
position. However, to guarantee the new group's independence of its competitors and
to maintain genuine competition on the oligopolistic markets for alloy bars, alloy hot-
rolled strip and alloy cold-rolled sheets, certain conditions were imposed.
No member of a management organ of any of the companies of the Krupp/SSW
Group may be a member of a management organ of any similar Community com-
pany not in that Group; and prior authorization is required for acquisition of a
holding of l|oh or more in the capital of companies manufacturing, marketing or (if
they use more than 10 000 tonnes a year) processing the products in question.
Fiat/Kliickner-Humboldt-Deutz
83. The Commission also adopted a Decision under Article 66 authorizing Fiat SpA
and Klcickner-Humboldt-Deutz (KHD) to form a holding company in the Nether-
lands to be known as Industrial Vehicle Corporation (IVECO) and to transfer to it
all their industrial and commercial assets relating to the production of commercial
vehicles, buses and articulator tractors.t
With an 80% shareholding in MCO, Fiat acquired control of the company. The
transaction was thus a merger between Fiat, which as a steel producer is an under-
taking subject to the ECSC Treaty, and the companies transferred by KHD to IVECO.
As regards its steel industry aspects, the transaction satisfied the tests of Article 66.
The effects of the merger on the market for commercial vehicles, buses and articulator
tractors were examined in the light of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, and this
revealed that KHD's production, while strengthening Fiat's position, did not change
the ranking of the major Community manufacturers in this field.
For lorries and vehicles of more than six tonnes, Fiat, with a Community market share
of l9.}lYo, ranks second behind the German Daimler-BenzfHanomag-Henschel
Group (24.74%). The transaction gives the IVECO Group an aggregate of 22.29o/o of
the Community market (an increase of 3.28%) without changing its ranking.
The same applies to articulator tractors, where the IVECO Group, with 18.10% of the
Community market, continues to hold second place behind the Daimler-Benz
Group (23.56%). As for buses, the available figures for companies show that IVECO
controls 9]7% of the market. after Daimler-Benz's 20.L7o/o,
Consideration was also given to the fact that Fiat and KHD deleted from IVECO's
Memorandum of Association two clauses, concerning limitations on the use of indus-
trial property rights not included in the transfer made by the two companies, which
had constituted restraints on competition.
t C"-.tni* Decision of 7.4.1915: OJ L 196 of 26.7.1975, p. 41.
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Chapter I
State aids'
51 
- 
General
84. The new principles for coordinating regional aid laid down by the Commission
in 1975 for the Community as a whole are designed both to prevent regional aid from
causing undue distortion of competition and to make regional policies more effective.
As regards specific industries, the Council adopted a third Directive on aids to ship-
building, which takes account of the need to preserve a competitive shipbuilding in-
dustry in the Community and marks a new step towards eliminating distortions of
competition caused by national aid schemes in that industry. Several Member States
have taken action to help the motor industry, which is facing serious economic and
structural difficulties. The Commission has tried to ensure that the schemes help to
bring about improvements in the industry without affecting the terms of trade to an
extent contrary to the common interest.
Faced with a serious economic recession and resulting employment difficulties, Mem-
ber States have extended the scope of their general regional aid schemes and taken
temporary measures to boost the economy. While the Commission did not object to
these schemes, it kept a close watch on how they were applied to ensure that they did
not simply preserve obsolete industrial structures or transfer difficulties from one
Member State to another.
92 
- 
General regional aid sYstems
Principles of coordination of national regional aid sYstems
8i. On 26 February 1975 the Commission adopted and informed the Council of
the new principles of coordination for regional aids which it had undertaken to define
in its Communication to the Council of 27 Jane 1973.2
t F* St"t" 
"ids 
in the agricultural sector, see points 226 to 268 of the Ninth General Report on tho
Activities of the Communities.2 Third Report on Competition Policy, points 82 and 83.
coMP. REP.1975
                                                                 67
68 COMPETITION POLICY AND GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE
These new principles are valid for three years with effect from I January 1975 and
apply to all regions of the enlarged Community.r They supersede the coordination
principles laid down by the Commission in 19712 and supplemented in 1973,3 which
applied only to the most heavily industrialized ('central') regions of the Community.
The new coordination machinery has five aspects which form one whole 
- 
differen-
tiated ceilings ofaid intensify, transparency, regional specificity, the sectoral repercus-
sions ofregional aids and a system ofsupervision. As regards the last three aspects the
new principles maintain the arrangements laid down in the coordination principles
adopted in l97l and supplemented in 1973.
86. As regards the transparency ofaids, an essential prerequisite to the coordination
and assessment of general regional aid systems, the new coordination principles,
which now apply to all regions of the Community, had to take account of new diffi-
culties involved in evaluating certain forms of aid.
In the first set of principles a regional aid was considered transparent if it could be
expressed as a percentage of investment by reference to the common method for
evaluating regional aids worked out jointly by the Commission and the Member
States. Any aid which was not transparent in accordance with this method had to be
made transparent or, if this could not be done, terminated by the Member State
concerned within a given period. The adoption of this concept of transparency was
made easier at the time by the fact that the coordination principles applied only to
the central regions, where the most important regional aids were already transparent.
However, difficulties arose when the principles were to be extended to all parts of the
Community 
- 
including the former peripheral regions, where opaque aids, particu-
larly those relating directly or indirectly to the creation or maintenance of jobs, are
much more prevalent. The need to consider these aids in the light of the coordination
principles and as part of the general assessment of whether the national aid schemes
are compatible with the common market made the problem of evaluating them
particularly acute.
Italy and the United Kingdom, which are particularly interested in the measurability
of aids in respect of employment, suggested modifying the existing common method
of evaluation in such a way as to relate these aids to factors other than investment.
These proposals have been given an initial examination at multilateral meetings of
experts. Further more detailed examinations must still be made. The new coordination
principles therefore specify that the technical work must be continued with a view to
establishing possible measurement criteria which could make comparison possible
between all forms of regional aid being granted in the Community.
t Th" ."*dl"ation principles do not, however, apply to aids provided by these systems in so far
as they concern products listed in Annex II to the Treaty.2 First Report on Competition Policy, points 143 to 153.3 Third Report on Competition Policy, points 82 and 83.
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87. As regards the ceilings of intensity of aids, the extension of the coordination
principles to the entire Community meant that the regions had to be classified in
several categories relating to the different ceilings to take account of their different
levels of development and their particular problems. There are four categories of
regions. All the ceilings are fixed in terms of percentages representing the relative size
of the aid (expressed as a net grant-equivalent after taxation) in relation to the invest-
ment. They apply to all regional aids granted in respect of a single investment. How-
ever, there is at present no ceiling fixed for Greenland because ofits special situation.
In the first category are Ireland, the Mezzogiorno, Northern Ireland and West Berlin.
It was decided to freeze the ceilings for these regions at the maximum level of intensity
attainable by the measurable aids being granted there at I January 1975. The Commis-
sion did, however, reserve the right-except in the case of West Berlin-to carry
out a prior examination of individual cases of application where tlere are specific
sectoral problems or where it is necessary to do so for reasons relating to the function-
ing of the common market. The Commission may therefore ask to be informed of
investment projects involving more than 25 million u.a., where the proposed aid
exceeds 25oh in net grant equivalent.
The Commission and the Member States concerned have already worked together
this year (see below) on fixing these ceilings of intensity.
The following areas are in the second category: in France 
- 
the assisted areas known
as PDI (industrial development premium) areas; in the United Kingdom 
- 
those
parts of the country which on I January 1975 were assisted areas (except the areas
known as 'intermediate areasn and Northern Ireland); in Italy 
- 
the assisted areas in
the regions Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, Trentino-AJto-Adige, Val d'Aosta, Latium, Mar-
ches, Tuscany, Umbria and Veneto. The intensity ceiling for these areas is fixed at
30%. h is provided that this ceiling will be observed as soon as possible and in any
case no later than I January 1978.
In the third category are: The Zonenrandgebiet in the Federal Republic of Germany,
and Nortl Jutland and the islands of Bornholm, Ero, Samso and Langeland in
Denmark. The intensity ceiling for this category is fixed at 25Yo.
For all the other regions theceilingremains at 20o/o, as laid down in the first coordina-
tion principles, on the understanding that the trend should, as far as possible, be
towards a reduction in the level of aids.
These ceilings will re-examined at the end of the three-year period in the light of
the socio-economic development of the various regions and otler factors. In addition,
and as provided in the l97l principles, derogations from these ceilings may be allowed
by the Commission in exceptional cases if the Member State concerned provided the
Commission in advance with the necessary justification in accordance with the proce-
dure laid down in Article 93(3) of the EEC Treaty.
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Specific statements of view on certain national regional aid systems
In its application of Articleg} et seq of the EEC Treaty the Commission has continued
its examination of whether certain regional aid systems introduced in the Member
States are compatible with the common market.
France
88. In June 1972 the Commission initiated the procedure provided for in Article
93Q) in respect of the French system of regional development premiums (PDR'
primes de ddueloppement rdgional) and premiums for the location of certain service
industries @L, primes de localisation). This procedure was extended in April 1973 to
the tax concessions arrangements (AF, alldgements fiscaux) following changes in the
scope of their geographical applicability in December 1972.r
The French system was subsequently amended on a number of occasions from the
point of view of the geogxaphical applicability of certain aids, the variations in the
levels of tlese aids and the conditions for eligibility.
In particular, in July 1974, the French Government reclassified some PDR areas as
AD areas, in which areas the assistance granted is the lowest under the regional aid
system concerned.
In 1975 tlere were several exchanges between the Commission and the French author-
ities, who provided evidence and supporting statistical data injustification ofthe sys-
tem. Progress was made towards solving the problems involved. However, since the
aid system expired on 31 December 1975, a number of the outstanding issues, such as
the tax concessions will have to be considered in the context of the examination of
the new French regional development system.
Federal Republic of Germany
89. The Federal Government and Land authorities decided a number of years ago to
work together to improve tle economic structure of the regions in Germany. This
common approach is translated into practice each year, on the basis of laws passed in
l969,by a general plan which includes a series of action programmes for the assisted
regions. The German legislation defines these regions as follows: the Zonenrandgebiet;
the Saar mining region; regions whose economic potential is, or is in danger of falling,
well below the federal average; and regions where the main economic sectors are
faced with reorganization problems on such a scale that adverse socio-economic
effects are already being felt or can be expected to occur in the future.
t S*""d R"p"rt on Competition Policy, point 9l; Tbird Report on Competition Policy, point 86.
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The main form of regional aid provided for in these general plans is an investment
grant up to l5o/o,20o/o or 25Yo of the investment, depending on the category of the
growth points designated within the assisted areas.
At the same time as the first regional action programmes were being prepared,
systematic studies were carried out at the suggestion of the Federal Government with
a view to providing a single system of indicators 
- 
income, employment deficit and
infrastructure levels in each region 
- 
to help to determine, at the federal level, the
regions which were economically weak or threatened with structural decline.
90. lnthe 1975-78 general plan the German authorities introduced a new approach
to regional problems and a new method of designating development regions based on
these studies.
The new approach basically involves anticipating 
- 
by means of forecasts prepared
by economic research institutes 
- 
the socio-economic problems which could arise in
the country and taking the necessary preventive regional measures in time'
The new method of designating development regions draws on the geographical and
economic concept of labour markets, which supersede administrative divisions as the
reference unit for such designation. One hundred and seventy-eight labour markets
were delineated on the basis of statistics on commuter patterns, employment density
and population. The three criteria referred to above 
- 
regional income, employment
deficit and infrastructure level of the region 
- 
were then applied to each of the labour
markets, thus giving three statistical assessments for each of them. These were then
added together to give an index for each labour market, the highest index correspon-
ding to the most economically depressed labour market. A threshold index was tlen
fixed, regions with indices higher than this being classified as development regions.
Within these development regions a total of 327 towns and cities were declared growth
points by the Land authorities in accordance with guidelines agreed with the Federal
Government.
The general plan also provided for systematic supervision at the end of which the aids
granted for a given growth point or region could be adjusted or withdrawn depending
on the socio-economic results obtained.
91. Following notification by the German Government of the draft general plan
for 1975-78, a multilateral meeting of national experts on aids was held for dis-
cussion and information purposes. The Commission embarked on a study of the aid
scheme and has asked the German authorities for certain further information,
particularly as regards the social and economicjustification for granting regional aids
in certain areas.
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92. For the purpose ofapplying the new coordination principles, bilateral contacts
took place between Commission and German ofrcials to fix, for West Berlin, the
maximum intensity ceiling for measurable aids being granted at 1 January 1975.
Italy
93. The Commission went on with its examination of two Italian aid systems 
- 
one
for small- and medium-sized business introduced by Law No 623 of 30 July 1959,
the other being the provisions being prepared to promote industrialization in the
Mezzogiorno.
94. As part of the general effort undertaken in respect of the main general regional
aid systems in the original Member States aimed at obtaining prior notification of the
most significant cases of application of those systems,l the Commission, in 1968,
initiated the procedure provided for in Article 93(2) in respect of Italian Law No 623.
This law provides for assistance in the form of low-interest loans for investment by
small- and medium-sized industrial firms, which are defined very broadly. In practice,
priority has always been given to certain regions: the loans are granted on different
conditions, particularly as regards the rates of interest, depending on whether the
investment is in the Mezzogiorno or in the Centre-North of Italy, and most of the aid
has gone to the Mezzogiorno and the depressed areas of the Centre-North. There was
also some uncertainty as to the conditions in which assistance under Law No 623 was
granted in other areas of the Centre-North.
To boost the economy and industrial investment, the Italian Government decided in
1975 to refinance the aid system in question (Lit 305 000 million for 1975-83) which
had been virtually inoperative for a few years because ofa lack offinance. Although
the conditions for granting the loans remained almost unchanged and the regional
specificity of the system is still, at present, inadequate, the Italian Government in-
formed the Commission that, as regards individual cases of application of Law No 623
in areas outside the Mezzogiornon it would respect tle control procedure which the
Commission exercises on the implementation of general aid systems. It undertook to
give prior notification of actual cases where:
(i) the investment is 3 million EUA or more;2(ii) the aid amounts to l5o/o or more of the investment in net grant equivalent.
The Commission therefore informed the Italian Government that in view of this
undertaking it was terminating the Article 93(2) procedure; it pointed out, however,
that the Law should be applied in the Mezzogiorno in accordance with the new coor-
dination principles.
First Report on Competition Policy, point 143.
Point 136.
I
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95. TheMezzogiorno which is a typical peripheral area as defined in the 1971 coor-
dination principles, has always been recognized by the Commission as a region with
particularly acute socio-economic problems. An appropriate solution therefore had
to be found which would take account both of the region's socio-economic situation
and of the requirements of the Treaty in the matter of aids. After bilateral consul-
tations, the Italian authorities decided to base themselves to a certain extent on the
Commission's guidelines on regional aids when preparing legislation (the preliminary
draft of which was notified to the Commission in 1974) to reframe the aid system in
the Mezzogtrorno for the period 1976-80. These guidelines involve increased trans-
parency and regional specificity of aids and better coordination between measures
taken at the national level and at the level of the autonomous regions of the North
and South of Italy to safeguard the preferential treatment which must be accorded the
Mezzogiorno because of its special situation.
This preliminary draft law is still being studied by the Italian Government, which
agreed, when asked by the Commission, to take account of the Community guidelines
when drafting the final bill.
As part of the technical work being done with a view to implementing the coordina-
tion principles adopted this year, discussions were held with the Italian Government
to set intensity ceilings for measurable aids being granted in the Mezzogiorno at I
January 1975. Different ceilings are to be set according to the area involved, the type of
project (for example, setting up, expanding, converting or modernizing business)
and the size of the recipient firms.
Belgium
96. The Belgian Government adopted two measures for the purposes of applying
some of the provisions of the Law on Economic Expansion of 30 December 1970.1
One concerns the employment premium for small- and medium-sized firms while the
other involves complementary regional aid. The small-business employment premium
(Bfrs I 5 000 a year for three years for each job created) is intended to encourage firms
employing fewer than ten workers to create jobs in development areas and thus pre-
vent a rise in unemployment. The complementary regional aid is designed to en-
courage firms to go ahead with investment schemes they would otherwise tend to
postpone because of the economic situation.
The Commission did not object to the introduction of the employment premiums.2
The principle of such premiums which were intended to involve small firms in the
regional expansion effort was contained in the Law on Economic Expansion, which
t S.*.d R.p"rt on Competition Policy, point 90.2 Royal Decree of 23.1.1975 (Moniteur Belge, 5.1.1975).
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the Commission had studied at the time. In view of the sums involved and the size
of the eligible firms, the premiums seem unlikely to have more than a limited effect on
competition and trade between Member States.
In theory, the complementary regional aid introduced by the Decree of 25 May 1975
for a period limited to 31 December of the same year, could raise the aggregate of
Belgian regional aids to more than 20Yo of investment in net grant equivalent. Since
the coordination principles for general regional aid systems set a 20o/o ceiling for the
Belgian regions, the Commission asked the Belgian Government to ensure that the
ceiling is respected in practice and was given the necessary assurances.
With reference to the abovementioned Law on Economic Expansion of 30 December
1970 the Commission reminded the Belgian Government of the importance it attached
to the Government's carrying out its obligations under Decision 72l173lEEC of
26 April 1972 as regards the designation of development areas. Pursuant to Article 2
of that Decision of the Commission, the Belgian Government must send the Com-
mission a new plan of the designation of these areas. The Belgian Government in-
formed the Commission that it had not lost sight of this and would be contacting the
Commission by the end of the year with a new plan. Initial contact was in fact made in
November.
Netherlands
97. The Dutch Government has modified its general regional aid system. Basically,
this involves extending the assisted regions by setting up growth points outside the
assisted areas in the North and South of the country. Aid was already being granted
to some of these growth points between 1967 andI97l. A number of changes were
also made to the aids themselves and to the terms on which assistance is granted.
The Commission is currently studying the changes. On the other hand the Commission
decided on a Dutch measure involving a Soh reduction on the industrial tariff for
natural gas supplied to firms situated in the three northern provinces of Groningen,
Friesland and Drenthe (close to the Groningen natural gas field). lnl974 the Commis-
sion, acting on the information it had at the time, initiated the Article 93(2) procedure
in respect of this measure on the grounds that it was a regional operating aid which
could not be considered compatible with the common market because its character
was purely protective.
However, information supplied by the Dutch authorities, within the abovementioned
procedure showed that the tariff reduction was in fact an entirely commercial opera-
tion: the natural gas distribution company had decided quite independently to give
the reduction to consumers in the vicinity of the Groningen field because its own trans-
port costs were lower there. The Dutch authorities also pointed out that this was
confirmed by the fact that the cheaper rates did not apply throughout the regional
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development area in the north of the country. In the light of this supplementary infor-
mation the Commission decided to terminate the procedure'
Denmark,Ireland and the United Kingdom
gB. Although it has not yet stated whether it considers the general regional aid
systems of the three new Member States compatible with the common market, the
Commission has nevertheless had to deal with certain aspects'
In accordance with the coordination principles the Commission has decided to agree
to the United Kingdom Government's application for a derogation from the intensity
ceiling for regional aids specified in the coordination principles in respect ofa Scottish
region for which the Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB) is res-
ponsible.
Although the intensity ceiling for this region was fixed at3}oh in net grant equivalent
in the frinciples of coordination, the Commission took account of the fact that the
region is unileniably lagging behind in development, that the HIDB provides assis'
taice for small projects only, and that there are strict limits on allocating aid' How-
ever, the Commission asked the United Kingdom authorities to report annually on
the HIDB,s activities in the fleld of regional aids, since the region's socio-economic
situation is likely to improve as a result of the benefits of exploiting the oil fields in
the North Sea.
gg. As in the case of the Mezzogtrorno and West Berlin, the Commission was con-
cerned to set maximum intensity ceilings for measurable aids being granted in Ireland,
and Northern Ireland at I January 1975. Contact has been made with the Irish author-
ities with a view to fixing eight ceilings covering the whole country which will be
divided for these pu.po*.i inio the following four categories of regions: designated
areas (mainly the west, which faces the most acute socio-economic problems), non-
designated areas (the rest of the country apart from the areas which follow), the
Shannon area and the Gaeltach. Each of these four categories would have two ceilings
- 
one for the setting-up of firms, the other for the modernization or conversion
of firms.
100. Denmark expressed concern about the different maximum rates for regional aids
obtaining on either side of the frontier with Germany. The regional aid granted in a
growth foint near the German-Danish frontier can go up to about 190lo, whereas on
itr" nuol.h side in South Jutland the limit is about 13% (in net grant equivalent of
the investment). The Danish authorities feel that this situation has harmful socio-
economic consequences for their border area. The German and Danish authorities
have begun tak; to try to find a solution to this problem. The Commission, for its
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part, will follow developments closely and take any necessary action in the context
of its study of the German general regional plan.l
53 
- 
Aid systems for specific industries or sectors
Shipbuilding
lOL The proposal for a third Directive on aids to shipbuilding,2 which the commis-
sion sent to the Council at the end of 1973, met with difficulties which prevented the
Council from reaching agreement by 31 December 1973, the time set in the second
Directive. The second Directive had therefore to be extended on three occasions,
the latest date set being 30 June 1975,3 so as to avoid the absence of specific commu-
nity rules in this area.
In view of the difficulties in the Council, developments in the industry and a slight
reduction of production aids granted by Member States since the drafting of ine
initial proposal, the Commission re-examined its proposal and presented an amended
version to the Council on7 May 1975.
102. The original proposal for a third Directive was part of a series of measures
including proposals to develop a coordinated restructuring and investment policy
at the community level. with the aim of restoring the balance between the supply
of and demand for ships, the Commission would first of all have examinea the nadonat
financial assistance granted to major shipbuilding investment projects and ruled on
the compatibility of such assistance witl the aids and provisions of the Treaty in the
light of the guidelines for the sector worked out in collaboration with the Member
States.
However, some Member States questioned the usefulness and feasibility of working
out industrial policy guidelines of this kind, preferring initially to confine Community
action to aids. Others were reluctant to agree to a more restrictive framework in this
field, since this would have deprived tlem of some of their means of intervention
or at least limited their scope.
The Commission's amended proposal for a third Directive was consequently less
ambitious with respect to the control of investments, but it retained the initial guide-
lines on aids as such.
rpot[Iilo so.2 Third-Report on Competition Poticy, points 90 to 97; Fourth Report onCompetition policy,point 150.3 oJ L 349 of 28.12.1974, p. 62.
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103. Nevertheless, serious problems arose in connection with some forms of direct
aid when tie amended proposal was discussed in the Council. The schemes in question
were those for insuring against exceptional cost increases, under which shipyards in
some Member States receive assistance to offset cost increases above a specified level
occurring during tle construction of ships. Although premiums are paid by the buil-
ders, these schemes are during a period of rapid inflation largely financed by govern-
ment contributions. They are of considerable advantage to the yards concerned,
which can in consequence ofer tleir customers firm prices. A compromise laying
down certain conditions for the operation of these schemes was finally reached.
On l0 Julyr the Council adopted the third Directive, the text of which corresponds in
substance to the Commission's proposal. This third Directive specifies ttre conditions
on which national aids to and intervention in shipbuilding may be considered com-
patible with the common market. It represents a further step towards eliminating tle
distortions of competition on the shipbuilding market caused by national aids, and
at the same time takes account of the need to preserve a sound and competitive ship
building industry in the Community.
104. The basic provisions of this Directive, which will be in force until 31 December
1977, are as follows:
(i) aids for the building of ships may not be granted after 31 December 1975.
Such aids may however be granted beyond this date in Ireland, Italy and France
(in France in the form ofinsurance against cost increases) provided that they are
gradually reduced; the Member States must send the Commission at regular
intervals a table containing the individual cases in which assistance has been
granted;(ii) aids for the sale of ships, which will be granted in the form of credit facilities
(low-interest loans or interest-relief grants), must satisfy the conditions laid down
in the Resolution of the OECD Council of 18 July 1974, or in any agreement
replacing it;
(iii) the Commission must be notified at regular intervals of assistance granted in
respect of important investment projects in shipyards;
(iv) the Commission must be given prior notification of individual aids and interven-
tion of a conservatory nature intended to ensure the temporary rescue of ship-
building firms pending a final solution to their problems;(v) finally, as in the previous Directive, Member States are to refrain from any other
measures to promote shipbuilding, ship conversion or the manufacture of com-
ponents to be incorporated in ships on their national territory.2
:-r Directive 75l432lEEC: OJ L 192 of 24.7.1975, p.27.2 Third Report on Competition Policy, point 99.
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Textiles
105. The Community's textile industry has for many years and for a variety of reasons
suffered from structural difficulties.l The progressive opening-up of the Community
market and the development of traditional textile industries in non-member countries,
in many of which labour costs are low, have played a particularly important role by
giving rise in some cases to a massive increase in imports at prices much lower than
those which Community firms are in a position to charge. The slowdown in both
internal and external demand during the present economic recession has highlighted
still further the structural problems.
In view of this situation, a number of Member States have felt obliged to intervene
to assist their own firms, usually with the aim of safeguarding employment or pre-
venting excessive redundancies in an industry which is still an important source of
employment. Initially, these interventions were often of a disparate nature and, at tle
same time, too rigidly geared to national requirements, whether they were new mea-
sures designed specifically for the textile industry as a whole or for certain parts of it,
or measures taken under existing general aid systems to assist certain firms in a critical
situation.
106. ln each case the Commission tried to ensure that these national measures were
in line with Community objectives, in particular those set out in its Communication
to Member States in 1971,2 in which it laid down the conditions and limits for any
national aids which the Member States might wish to introduce to assist the textile
industry. The principles then established remain valid:(i) aids of a conservatory nature must be excluded; however, assistance may be
given to facilitate joint research and development activities, eliminate excess
production capacity, convert firms to activities outside the textile industry, or
promotehorizontal merger and vertical integration between firms;(ii) aids to investment must be warranted by particularly acute employment pro-
blems; they must be confined to those areas of t}te textile industry facing serious
adjustment problems and must in no circumstances lead to an increase in pro-
duction capacity.
To the extent that any of the proposed national aids did not meet these criteria, the
Commission took steps to ensure that the Member State concerned amended them.
1 First Report on Competition Policy, point 171.2 First Report on Competition Policy, point 172.
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United Kingdom: Clothing inrlustry
107. The Community clothing industry is one of the branches of the textile industry
which has been most seriously affected by massive imports from non-member coun-
tries. Because of structural inadequacies, due mainly to their small size, the existence
of many firms in this sector was threatened by the reduction in demand coupled with
the pressure of imports.
This was especially the case in the United Kingdom, where the industry employs more
than 300 000 people in over 6 000 firms, many of which are small and not really
capable either technically or financially of carrying out the necessary structural re-
forms. The productivity of the firms is generally inadequate, mainly because their
level of investment is low in relation to their turnover (annual investment is f,20
million as against an annual turnover in excess of f I 000 million).
108. The United Kingdom Government informed the Commission that, in view of
the need to remedy these structural weaknesses, it intended to introduce a f,20 million
scheme of aids for the industry. The main features of the scheme were a20Yo grant for
the purchase of new plant and machinery, a 50o/o grant for the use of consultants to
investigate modernization and reorganization problems and a Productivity Centre
for the industry.
While the Commission did not object to the last two measures (provided the aids
intended to cover consultants' fees was confined to small- and medium-sized firms),
it did not approve of the 20o/o grant for the purchase of new plant and machinery
since firms receiving grants were not required to introduce restructuring or reorgani-
zation programmes or to give an undertaking that they would not increase their pro-
duction capacity. In the difficult situation faced by this industry throughout the Com-
munity, the proposed assistance was liable to affect trading conditions to an extent
contrary to the common interest, by causing further difficulties for firms in the other
Member States, and was unlikely to promote real structural adjustments among
United Kingdom firms.
In the light of the Commission's comments, which took account of the views expressed
by the other Member States during consultations, the United Kingdom Government
presented a new scheme to the Commission containing amendments designed to
meet the objections to the original scheme.
109. The aims of the scheme were now clearly defined as the rationalization and
reorganization of the industry within the limits of existing production capaaty.
Consequently, the investment subsidies would only be granted to firms which had
supplied specific prografirmes involving the concentration or specialization of their
activities, restructuring and reorganization. The implementation of these programmes
would be required to bring about a genuine improvement in their competitive strength
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and provide sound guarantees as to their future viability. Priority would be given to
cases where, if the proposed investment were not carried out, the firms concerned
might have to lay offworkers and thereby create acute employment problems. Provi-
sion was made for a new form of aid to be financed from the total funds originally
set aside: low-interest loans or interest-relief grants would be provided to encourage
firms to merge or to close down unprofitable establishments.
Since the United Kingdom aid scheme was now consistent witl the principles and
conditions contained in its Communication, the Commission withdrew its objections.
Netherlands: Textile industry
110. As part of its general efforts to enable declining industries to adapt to the
changed conditions of international competition, the Netherlands Government
informed the Commission of the action it intended to take to assist several sectors
of the textile industry.
The sectors concerned are wool, cotton, textile printing and clothing, whose markets,
in spite of some attempts at reorganization, have continued to shrink, particularly
as regards exports. A sudden acceleration of this decline could provoke serious
employment problems in the country. The aim of the scheme was to reorganize these
sectors around the most viable firms so as to enable the latter, by seeking new markets
for more advanced products and using the most modern production techniques, to
stay competitive or to regain their competitiveness. At the same time the transfer
of some of their former activities to the developing countries would continue.
Recovery programmes for each of the branches concerned had been or would be
prepared by the Nederlandse Herstructureringsmaatschappij (NEHEM) and by
ad hoc bodies set up for this purpose by the industry on which the government will
be represented. These programmes would be financed largely by the industry, the
State providing less than one third of the funds. They would be based on a series of
operations, which, depending on the individual sector would involve contraction or
closure of firms or plants, amalgamation of the remaining firms, modernization by
investment in new plant and machinery embodying more modern techniques, joint
action in the field of marketing, productivity or research and development, and impro-
vement of working conditions in the firms themselves.
The State's financial contribution would be made in return for an explicit undertaking
by the firms to carry out tlese operations in accordance with the guidelines and, in
some cases, under the supervision ofthe bodies referred to above.
The assistance, which would be provided over a period of years, would be in the form
of grants for up to 20o/o of the cost of operations begun in 1975 and 1976, witl a
ceiling of 7.5o/o for those started at a later date. State guarantees might be given in
addition to these grants.
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After the completion of these programmes only sound frms with a strong probability
of remaining competitive would survive. The overall result would be a reduction of
production capacity and employment in each sector.
111. This Dutch measure is in many respects in line with the views expressed on
several occasions by the Commission on the subject of assistance for specific industries,
especially the textile industry. The aids would be conditional upon an express under-
taking by the sectors and individual firms concerned that they would carry out radical
structural reforms, they would complement the efforts made by the sectors and firms
themselves and would be granted for operations which the firms, because of a lack of
adequate funds, could not otherwise have carried out and which would not entail
an increase in production capacity.
The Commission therefore informed the Dutch authorities that it did not object to
the implementation of the proposed measures provided that the detailed reorganiza-
tion programmes for each branch were transmitted to it for approval.
112. The Commission took a similar view with regard to measures of the same kind
taken by the Dutch Government to assist other industries which are also in decline
because of the gradual changes taking place in the international distribution of
industry. These measures concerned the footwear, graphics, paper and board and
wood panelling industries. All the measures taken have similar objectives and terms
to those for tle textile industry: the encouragement of mergers and cooperation
between firms in order to create economic units better adapted to market conditions,
specialization in products of higher quality or of greater sophistication (footwear,
wood panelling), abandonment of current product lines facing keener competition
from non-rnember countries, provision of aids which require existing firms to make
an effort and take action on tleir own behalf rather than the gxant of large-scale
financial support, re-use or better use of raw materials available in the Community
(eather, waste paper, wood), and, in some cases, maintenance of an improved national
capacity (in order to avoid total dependence on non-member countries for supplies
(newsprint).
Aircraft industry: ltaly
113. The Italian Government informed the Commission of a bill providing for
financial assistance to Italian aircraft manufacturers who have combined to form
Aeritalia and have begun developing a medium-haul aircraft in collaboration with the
American firm Boeing. The aids granted would assist tle financing of studies, research
and development and the construction of prototypes required to develop this aircraft,
which is scheduled to enter service in the 1980s. A total of Lit 150 000 million would
be allocated for this purpose in the budget and would be granted to Aeritalia in stages
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between 1975 and 1980. As in most European countries which manufacture aircraft
equipment, the aids would take the form of grants repayable when the aircraft came
onto the market.
114.lt its assessment of these proposed aids the Commission took account of the
following factors:
The type of aircraft planned has different technical specifications from the aircraft
currently being manufactured or developed in the Community, though when brought
into service it may compete to some extent with other medium-haul aircraft.
This is the fust assistance to be granted in Italy for commercial aircraft construction,
an activity which has been on a relatively small scale in this country hitherto. It will
assist the industry to become technologically and industrially more competitive by
enabling it to take a20oh share in a large international project. It will also create about
4 000 new jobs, mainly in research and production establishments in the Mezzogiorno,
and thereby contribute to the improvement of the employment situation in this region.
Before deciding to participate in this programme, thrc Italian authorities and the firms
concerned tried without success to persuade other Member States to cooperate in
developing a medium-haul aircraft to meet market requirements after 1980. This
kind of cooperation would not exclude non-member countries, which in the case of
certain programmes might facilitate the development of new technologies, ensure a
better spread of financial risks and give European firms access to those external mar-
kets which are essential for commercial success. Some Member States have already
cooperated successfully with the United States in the development of new jet engines
and it is planned to instal one of these engines in the aircraft which Aeritalia will help
to build.
I l5 . In these circumstances the Commission decided not to oppose the aids proposed
by the Italian Government. However, it stressed that its position applied only to the
aids currently planned for the development of the aircraft concerned, and it asked the
Italian Government to keep it informed of further developments in the programme
since all the technical details had not yet been worked out. This would enable it, when
the time came to assess whether the aircraft in its final form would be likely to compete
with other aircraft which might be built in the Community. There is an obvious need
to avoid wasteful duplication of projects supported by different Member States.
Motor industry: Federal Republic of Germany, France
and the United Kingdom
116. Dunng the period t970-73 the outlook for the motor industry became less
favourable because of various factors, both external and internal, rvhich were to
increase in importance. Among the external factors were environmental and safety
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requirements, the pressure on infrastructures, particularly in urban areas, and the
long-term depletion of the relevant energy sources. Internal factors included the gra-
dual saturation of the market by 1985 in countries with a high standard of living, or
the growth of competition from third countries, a result mainly of the establishment
of assembly lines outside Europe. There were already signs that radical changes in the
industry's structures and activities would inevitably take place in the medium and
long term.
The motor industry was among those most seriously affected by the sharp increase
in energy prices during the crisis of 1973, which increased the cost of running vehicles
and led to the introduction of speed limits. The need for structural changes therefore
became more urgent. The economic recession which followed resulted in a serious
drop in sales, which in turn led to a reduction in the industry's liquidity at a time when
their financial costs were increasing (particularly because of their increased stocks of
unsold vehicles).
Faced with the fall in demand, mainly within the Community, manufacturers had to
reduce production. In the Community as a whole production fell by 14% 1n 1974
and further in 1975 (despite a recovery at the end of the year). This had significant
repercussions on employment in the industry and in ancillary industries, in the form
either of short-time working or of redundancies. This in turn had a considerable
impact on the general employment situation, because of the numbers employed in the
industry (over a million in the Community as a whole) or in ancillary industries.
The effects on employment and the general level of industrial activity explain the
concern of Member States about the difficulties faced by certain firms'
However, in a generally difficult period, the situation of the individual firms differed,
depending in particular on their financial soundness and competitive strength before
the crisis, on their range of models and dn their ability to adapt to the changes which
had taken place or were to take place. The national measures with which the Commis-
sion had to deal reflect these disparities.
Il7. Citroln's large-scale investment in earlier financial years had resulted in the
replacement of virtually all its productive assets. However, because of the market
situation, gaps in its model range and an insufficiently dynamic sales policy, it was
unable to exploit this advantage and absorb the resulting financial costs. Its losses
had been estimated at almost FF 800 million for 1974 when the French Government
decided to encourage the association of its car manufacturing activities with those of
Peugeot, under the latter's management, and at the same time to arrange areorganiza-
tion of the heavy vehicles industry by enabling Renault, which was already represented
in this sector by its subsidiary Saviem, to purchase Berliet, then controlled by Citro€n.
For this purpose the French Government granted a loan of FF I 000 million to
Citro€n to fund its short-term liabilities, and a loan of FF 450 million to Renault for
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the purchase ofBerliet. These loans were granted for a fifteen-year period at an interest
rate of 9.75%; in the case of Citro€n there was a condition that the State should
receive a share of the firm's profits if these are satisfactory.
The United Kingdom Government indicated its intention to make available a total
of f,900 million to assist British Leyland to undertake a major restructuring pro-
gramme between now and 1982. This programme is intended to restore the company's
competitiveness and enable it to maintain its position on the UK market and increase
its exports, thus halting the decline of the group, whose models have not always been
well adapted to market requirements and whose level of productivity is inadequate
owing to the age of its plant and machinery and difficult labour relations.
The financial support to be provided by the United Kingdom Government up to
1978 will include:
(i) a guarantee of up to f 200 million;(ii) subscription of a f.200 million increase in share capital, which will give the
government a majority holding in British Leyland;
(iii) 9500 million in long-term loans, which will be made available depending on the
stage reached in the restructuring programme, the investment required for the
various stages and the increases in productivity achieved during each stage.
The United Kingdom Government was also faced with the problem of rescuing
Chrysler (UK) Ltd when the American parent company, Chrysler Corp., announced
that it intended to cease production in the United Kingdom because of the heavy losses
it had been incurring.
In view of the general situation outlined above and the serious employment problems
which would have been caused by the closure of certain factories, particularly in
Scotland, the United Kingdom Government decided to grant Chrysler UK aids
amounting to f"162.5 million made up as follows:
(i) f,72.5 million in the form of a grant to meet part of the firm's possible losses
between 1976 and 1979;(ii) a guarantee of €35 million to enable the firm to convert short-term liabilities
into longer-term bank loans;(iii) a low-interest loan of f 55 million to finance the development and construction
of a new model.
Chrysler, for its part, undertook to make the investment required for the assembly
and, perhaps, the construction of. another new model in the United Kingdom.
This rescue programme is intended to improve its competitive position and thus to
secure the long-term viability of the firm by reducing its labour force by almost a
third and renewing its range of models.
The German Government tried to solve the employment problems arising from
the redundancies made necessary at Volkswagen by a fall in its sales and by certain
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reorganization measures. These redundancies affected several regions, some of which
were already experiencing difficulties. A three-year programme, involving the expen-
diture of DM 210 million will encourage the creation of new activities in these regions
with the objective of creating l8 000 new jobs and thus ensuring the re-employment of
the redundant workers.
118. The Commission studied the objectives pursued and means used in each of these
cases.
The Commission has hitherto always held the view that aids granted by public authori
ties to individual firms may be justified in so far as it is likely that the recipients, after
reorganization, will be commercially viable and able to compete successfully, and if
the measures taken do not aggravate existing problems at Community level or merely
transfer these problems to other Member States.
Since this was in fact the case for Citrodn, British Leyland and Chrysler, the Commission
decided not to object to the general terms of the proposed aids in France and the
United Kingdom. The merger of Citrodn and Peugeot should create a group which is
sufficiently competitive for its future development to be based on its own resources.
This will also be true of British Leyland, whose rationalization is necessary in view of
the essential role which the motor industry plays in the United Kingdom economy as
an employer and its contribution to the trade balance, For similar reasons, and
because of the employment problems which would have been caused by plant closures
in Scotland, the Commission did not oppose the aids granted to Chrysler UK.
However, since the terms and scope of the various stages of the proposed restructuring
plans for Citro6n and British Leyland can be worked out only gradually, the Commis-
sion asked the French and United Kingdom Governments to inform it of each of the
stages in sufficient time.
The Commission noted with satisfaction that the German authorities planned to
promote regional development as the sole means of resolving the socio-economic
difficulties which had arisen or been accentuated in certain parts of Germany because
of Volkswagen's decision to dismiss workers 
- 
State aids will not be given to Volks-
wagen itself. The Commission therefore informed the German authorities that it had
no objection to the proposed measures.
Electronic components industry: Federal Republic of Germany
/19. This is one of the key advanced-technology industries. The use of electronic
components is rapidly becoming more widespread in the fields of data processing,
telecommunications, electronic consumer goods, industrial equipment (such as
precision instruments and automation processes), public health and transport.
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According to some forecasts, total annual world sales should double by 1980.
The rapid rate oftechnical development and obsolescence ofthese products accounts
for the importance of research and development activities, involving considerable
expenditure by manufacturers, and the need to sell rapidly on a large scale in order to
recover this initial ouflay. Another feature of this industry is the support provided by
the authorities in certain third countries, whether in the form of research and develop-
ment contracts, large government orders for military or other purposes, or even trade
protection measures or direct aids to the industry. These countries' firms have in
consequence achieved a degree of technical superiority and reaped the benefits of
larger-scale production in the manufacture of the most advanced components (semi-
conductors and integrated circuits).
Community firms must overcome these handicaps in an industry which have an impor-
tant effect, which will increase in the future, on the competitiveness of many other
industries. The widespread use of integrated circuits will make many of these industries
dependent on component manufactures, whon by vertical expansion into the manu-
facture of the equipment using these components, are already beginning to compete
with their customers. Security of supplies is also an important consideration since
periods of peak demand for certain types of components could pose problems for
firms (particularly for small- or medium-sized firms) who are totally dependent for
their supplies of components on manufacturers situated at great distances.
120. Some government assistance has already been granted to the electronic compo-
nents industry in Germany under research and development programmes for certain
industries. In 1972 the Commission commented on the second German programmel
for the data-processing industry, which included aids for components used in com-
puters.
The aim of the new German measure is to make the industry's structure competitive
by granting State aids for research and development. The German Government plans
to make grants equal to 50 or 100% of research and development expenditure,
depending on whether this expenditure is borne by industrial firms. A total of DM280
million will be allocated from the budget for the five-year period 1974-78 covered by
the programme.
The aids should permanently increase the international competitiveness of German
components manufacturers. In some cases they will be conditional upon cooperation
between firms, particularly at the European level in view of the restricted size of
national markets. Aid will no longer be granted if it is found that a firm is not capable
of maintaining or achieving a sufficient competitiveness in certain areas.
t Sr.""d R.p"rt on Competition Policy, point 106.
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121. The Commission considered that this German measure was justified in view
of the industry's growth prospects and the need to strengthen Community structures
in the face of competition from the firms of certain non-member countries. The form
of aid chosen should provide an effective stimulus, since success in this field depends
upon research and development expenditure, on a scale which most European firms
would not be able to afford.
However, in adopting this position, the Commission stressed the necessity of devel-
oping cooperation between Member States. It intends to study the various national
programmes with a view to establishing a framework for coordination or Community
action in the field of components.
Oil and gas industry: Federal Republic of Germany
122. The Commission raised no objection to the German programme of aid to launch
a domestic oil industry being extended to cover the period 1975-78.
When introducing this aid scheme in 1969 for an initial period of six years, the German
Government was pursuing the following objectives:
(i) to secure and diversify the Federal Republic's sources of supply of oil and gas by
promoting the development of its own resources;(ii) to strengthen non-integrated oil companies, which were a potential instrument
of this policy but whose share of refining and distribution in Germany was
shrinking;
(iii) to overcome the handicaps suffered by these firms, either because their financial
resources were not commensurate with the risks involved in oil exploration,
because their operations were not integrated from the production to the final
distribution stage, or because they did not benefit from the tax concessions given
to the major international groups.
The German programme provided for launching aids in the form of loans for explora-
tion projects (trp to 75yo of the expenditure involved, at 5o/o interest, repayable if the
ventures were successful) and grants to cover 30oh of the cost of acquiring crude oil
concessions or holdings in companies exploiting these deposits.
This assistance would be granted only in respect of operations outside the Community.
A total of DM 575 million was set aside for this purpose for the period 1969-74.
Believing that this injection of public funds would encourage recipient firms to invest
their own resources, the German authorities hoped that an own crude oil output
potential of about 10 million tonnes per annum could be developed.
123. Atthe time the Commission had no grounds for raising objection to the German
programme.
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On the one hand, the objectives of the programme were in line with the policy set out
in the First Guidelines for a Community Energy Policy it had presented to the Council,
which stressed three requirements.
(i) maintaining a sufficient number of healthy firms competing on an equal footing
in the Community;(ii) facilitating the acquisition of crude oil resources by Community firms which
were not sufficiently integrated;
(iii) improving the security and diversity of Community supply sources and promoting
exploration and development ofnew oil and gas deposits.
On the ottrer hand, this form of assistance was not likely to raise serious problems,
since it provided recipient firms with only short-term support to improve their com-
petitive position within a reasonable time; nor was its intensity, if the amount of aid
provided by the German Government was seen in tle context of the requirements of
the oil industry, where exploration for and production of crude oil required large-
scale capital investment.
On the basis of tle Community rules on tlre right of establishment, however, tle
Commission asked the German Government, which agreed with this request, not to
gxant the proposed assistance for operations by German firms on parts of the Conti-
nental Shelf under the sovereignty of other Member States. These rules specify that
the conditions of establishment in the Community must not be distorted by State
aids, and this applies to the Continental Shelf as much as to any other part of Member
States' territory.
124. In 1975 the German Government informed the Commission that it intended to
allocate DM 800 million for tlese launching aids for a furttrer four years (1975-78),
the objectives and terms of the second programme being the same as those of the first.
When submitting the second programme to the Commission, the German Govern-
ment stressed that in tle present energy situation any oil and gas resources to be
found in 'safe' areas, particularly in the Community, should be developed rapidly
so as to reduce tle Community's dependenc€ on outside sourc,es. In view of the high
cost of exploration in the North Sea, non-integrated oil firms cannot engage in such
activities without government support. The German Government tlerefore asked the
Commission to reconsider its ruling that assistance should not be gf,anted for projects
in areas of the Continental Shelf on the territory of other Member States.
125. The Commission felt that this second progtamme was consistent with the energy
policy guidelines it had presented to the Council (Communication to the Council of
5 June 1974 on a new energy policy strategy for the Community), which stressed the
need for the Community to reduce as far as possible its dependence on tle rest of the
world for its energy supplies, to promote the development of new sources which offer
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the Community maximum security, and to develop as far as possible the relative
contribution of Community oil and gas to the Community's energy requirements.
The Commission also took the view that, in present circumstances, subject to later
checks, the German aid is not such as to distort the conditions on which oil companies
can start operating on the Continental Shelf. There were two reasons for this view:
first, the small amount of aid involved by comparison with the cost of exploration
and development on the Continental Shelf and, second, the fact that the German com-
panies concerned are competing against oil groups from other countries which may
well grant other incentives, notably tax concessions.
For tlese reasons, the Commission agfeed to the start-up programme being extended
for a further period and removed its initid restriction in respect of projects located
on parts of the Continental Shelf within the jurisdiction of other Member States.
Sale of hard wheat at reduced prices to pasta manufacturerc: ltaly
126. ln JuLy 1973, as part of its anti-inflation policy, the Italian Government decided
to freeze the producer and retail prices of certain major consumer products, including
pasta made from hard wheat, which account for a significant part of Italian house-
holds' spending on food. Simultaneously, it made provision for AIMA (the State
Intervention Agency for Agricultural Markets) to 'regularize' the Italian markets
in wheat and meat by means of purchasing operations on the domestic and foreign
markets backed up by resale operations on the domestic market in accordance with
conditions fixed by the administration.
Hence tle purchase by AIMA from late 1973 onwards of large quantities of hard
wheat (more than l0 million quintals), mostly from outside tle Community, to offset
the shortfall between national production and domestic requirements. Purchase terms
varied considerably depending on the particular time and country of origin, as the
period in question coincided with a sharp rise in international prices of hard wheat due
lo a period of intense speculation coming on top of a shortage. AIMA was then
authorized to sell the bulk of its hard wheat (more than 8 million quintals) in instal-
ments to Italian semolina and pasta manufacturers, generally at prices well below the
market rate.
The Italian Government, which was of the opinion that such action did not constitute
aid within the meaning of Article 92(l) of the EEC Treaty, did not give the Commis-
sion prior notification. The matter was first brought to the attention of the Commis-
sion via a series of complaints lodged by certain Member States and manufacturers
to the effect that Italian firms were benefiting from cut-price hard wheat to sell their
finished products at low prices on the markets of other Member States, thus placing
themselves in a more advantageous position than other Community manufacturers,
who were obliged to buy their hard wheat at world rates.
coMP, REP. 1975
90 COMPETITION POLICY AND GOYERNMENT ASSISTANCE
127. ln the course of the Commission's inquiry the Italian Government claimed that
from the time of its decision, which had been taken in the interest of Italian consumers,
to set a maximum price for pasta sold on the home market, it was clear that the
national industry could not satisfy consumer demand unless they had some means of
procuring their raw materials on terms compatible with this maximum price. During
the period following its decision, hard wheat prices rose sharply both on the Italian
market and on the world market with the result that, had there been no intervention
on the part of the public authorities in respect of purchase terms for the raw material,
either it would have been necessary to increase the maximum consumer price very
considerably and to accept the consequences in social and inflationary terms, or the
Italian manufacturers would have stopped supplying the home market or at the very
least cut back supplies.
In a situation of shortage and speculation AIMA had merely acted to ensure that the
manufacturers concerned were in a position to meet domestic demand through being
able to purchase their supphes of hard wheat at a reasonable price compatible with
the controlled price laid down for tleir pasta.
128. The Commission inquiry revealed that a series of administrative and tax controls
had in fact been introduced to ensure that the information provided by the Italian
manufacturers regarding the quantities of pasta sold on the home market at the
controlled price was accurate and that the aid granted by AIMA was used for these
quantities only and was neither less nor more than the loss of profits actually suffered
by each manufacturer in respect of these quantities.
It therefore followed that exports of Italian pasta, in particular to other Member
States, derived no financial benefit from the AIMA operations and that the hard
wheat used in the manufacture of such pasta was purchased at the market rate.
This was confirmed by the statistics for Italian exports to other Member States, from
which it was clear that there had in general been no significant increase and that what
slight increase there had been could be readily explained by the lira's weakness against
certain currencies and the fact that Italian exporters had been forced to concentrate
their eforts on the Community market, Community levies acting as a disincentive
to pasta exports to non-member countries. The Commission inquiry also revealed a
sharp increase in export prices which reflected the rise in market prices for hard wheat.
129. The commission consequently accepted the Italian Government's argument
that the sale of reduced-price hard wheat by AIMA to Italian pasta manufacturers
to cover quantities of pasta sold on the home market could not have distorted com-
petition or affected trade in the common market for the purposes of the EEC Treaty
provisions relating to State aids. Moreover, the Italian Government discontinued the
scheme with effect from August 1975 when the market in hard wheat began to sta-
bilize and informed the commission that it had no itention of reintroducing it.
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However, one French manufacturer, acting under Article 215 of the EEC Treaty'
instituted proceedings before the Court of Justice against the Community, as repre-
sented by the Commission, for damages suffered as a result of the Commission's
failure to require the Italian Government to stop assisting Italian pasta manufacturers,
thereby permitting distortion of competition on the markets on which the French
company did business.l Because of these abnormal conditions of competition the
French company claimed to have lost some of its traditional outlets and to have been
obliged, in an attempt to avoid further loss, to cut its profit margin excessively.
Giving judgment on 2l January 1976, the Court held that t}re action was admissible
but actepted the Commission's defence and found against the applicant on the merits.
s4 
- 
General aid schemes and economic recovery measures
General
130. The second half of 1974 marked tle opening stages of the worst recession to be
experienced by Community countries since the Second World War, and the situation
deteriorated still further in the first six months of 1975.It was characterized by a
sharp fall in demand and production, by under-utilization of existing production
capacity and a significant reduction in investment by companies.
The economic downturn was first evident in Germany and Italy; it then spread to the
Benelux countries and later to France. The United Kingdom, which had only just
recovered from the strikes of 1974, was also affected. By mid-1975 industrial produc-
tion in most of the Member States had dropped to its l972level and in the Community
as a whole it had fallen by approximately 12.5o/o in one year.
This was accompanied by an alarming deterioration in the situation on the labour
market, the number of wage and salary earners dropping sharply in all Member
States throughout the year. By August 1975 the number of unemployed in the Com-
munity as a whole had reached almost the 5 million mark-more than 4.5% of the
working population, an increase of nearly 2 million over the same period of 1974'
Short-time working and hidden unemployment (firms keeping on more workers than
was justified by their level of production) became more widespread in most Member
Statis. The number of situations vacant dwindled and schoolJeavers had difficulty
finding work.
The economic downturn aggravatedthe situation in certain industries or undertakings
with structural problems dating from the energy crisis or earlier and made their solu-
tion more difficult. Even in sectors free from such problems a number of relatively
t C^* 4)nj-
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thriving undertakings were caught unawares by the seriousness of the crisis and found
themselves in financial diftculties which put their existence at risk.
131. Fac.ed by this situation most of the Member States attempted to prevent a further
falling-off in economic activity and employment, and followed this-balance of pay-
ments and fight against inflation permitting-by measures to reactivate the economy.
Varying in scope depending on tle Member State but often far-reaching, these mea,
sures involved the granting of financial benefits to undertakings, subsequently
examined by the Commission within the framework of the Treaty provisions relating
to State aids.
such benefits, which varied in form, scope and method of operation, were all part of a
general effort to safeguard or improve employment in one of the following ways:
(D encouraging an upturn in investment, either in general terms or by favouring
projects which appeared most capable of restoring national trade balances
(investment in predominantly exporting gowth industries or investment promot-
ing energy conservation);(ii) alleviating the difficulties facing specific industries or undertakings with struc-
tural problems dating from the energy crisis or earlier by granting aid in respect
of rationalization operations carried out under restructuring programmes, irre-
spective of whether or not there is any investment involved;(iii) granting in certain cases purely financial aid to certain basically sound under-
takings to enable them to survive the economic downturn;(iv) encouraging recruitment and discouraging redundancies by offering employment
premiums (to cover part of the wage costs involved) for every job created or
maintained.
132. Member States have not necessarily set up new machinery for the implementation
of these measures. In some cases they have continued to apply the existing general aid
schemes I providing aid for general economic expansion, the modernization of national
industry or the restructuring of undertakings with adjustment problems. They have,
however, increased the funds available and extended their scope of application. In
some Member States such schemes have been used not only to encourage new invest-
ment by undertakings but also to grant them the necessary respite pending economic
recovery or the successful outcome ofrestructuring operations.
In other cases Member States have introduced economic recovery measures valid for
a limited period only, this period being determined on the basis of the estimated
duration ofthe crisis, or the determination to encourage the undertakings concerned
to proceed promptly with the desired operations regardless of whether ttrese involved
additional investment or restructuring operations.
t !*Ihltd R"eort on Competition Policy, point ll2 et seq. and,Fourth Report otr Competition
Policy, point 166 et seg.
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1.33. Both in the case of general aid schemes (in the form of industry programmes or
individual measures for specific undertakings) and in the case of new economic reco-
very measures, the Commission, bearing in mind the exceptional economic and social
situation confronting the Member States, has agreed to certain measures which, in
this particular phase of the Community's existence, it deemed eligible for the deroga-
tion provided for under Article 92(3)(b) of the Treaty, according to which aid 'to
r"*edy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State' may be considered
to be compatible with the common market.
The Commission thus concluded that Member States, in an attempt to protect
employment, were justified in boosting investment by granting firms financial benefits
(in thg' form of tax deductions or low-interest loans) on an automatic or quasi-general
basis for a limited period. Similarly, it agreed to financial aid being granted to ensure
the survival of firms which have run into difficulties, thereby avoiding redundancies.
It did insist, however, that such aid, which in itself is neither aimed at nor resulted in
structural improvement, would be allowed only in the case of two categories of under-
taking-those which are basically sound and whose problems will disappear as soon
as thJ economy picks up and tlose where rationalization is called for but which need
a respite while the necessary programmes are studied, formulated and initiated.
On the basis of the same considerations the Commission has also permitted Member
States, for the duration of the present economic situation, to reimburse a part of the
wage costs incurred by firms creating new jobs, for young people in particular, or
refiaining from staff cuts which would be justified by lower production figures' Aid
granted on the basis of investment only may well encourage firms to undertake labour-
saving operations or at least favour investment programmes involving the creation
of very few jobs.
134. lnline with previous practice in respect of general aid schemes, the Commission
has required Member States, with regard to certain such schemes, to notify it of the
more important specific cases where aid is granted. This is to enable the Commission
to check:
- 
that aid to promote investment, by undertakings' does not expand production
capacity in industries whose chances are already at risk, nor merely shift the
ptobl"- without finding a genuine solution to the social and industrial difficulties
iacing the Community, or even aggravate the situation still further in the imme-
diate or not so distant future;
- 
that the financial aid granted for rescue operations for certain undertakings satis-
fies certain requirements, namely that it is used to benefit firms which are basically
sound or, if this is not the case, that it is accompanied by the implementation of
restructuring operations, that it does not result in the recipients' undertakings
being kept in business at the expense of competitors in otler Member States who
have run into the same difficulties, and that it fulfils genuine and important re-
quirements with regard to employment.
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This control procedure has been applied effectively during 1975 in respect of a rela-
tively large number of applications of sectoral or individual cases of general aid sche-
mes and of certain economic recoverv measures.
General aid schemes
135. The characteristics of general aid schemes, the fundamental features of national
schemes falling under this heading and the Commission's reasons for considering it
necessary to insist on prior notification of cases of implementation of such schemes
(in respect both of sectoral programmes and of significant individual cases) have been
described in previous reports on competition policy.l This control procedure is now
applied in respect of all such aid schemes being implemented throughout tle nine
Member States of the Community.
By the beginning of 1975 only one scheme had not conformed. This was the Belgian
Law of 17 July 1959 introducing and coordinating measures to encourage economic
expansion and the creation of new industries. This law provides a number of benefits
(interest-relief grants, State guarantees, tax exemptions) for investments which contri-
bute to the creation, extension, conversion or modernization of industrial underta-
kings. The Commission had been unable to elicit compliance by the Belgian Govern-
ment with the control procedure which it had none the less had to accept in the case
of similar aids provided for in the Economic Expansion Law of 30 December 1970.2
Having initiated the procedure under Article 93(2), the Commission eventually
adopted a Decision requiring the Belgian Government to notify it of any future aids
granted under the law in question.3
136. The Belgian Government subsequently informed the Commission that it would
comply with this Decision but requested that the criteria used to define the cases of
application requiring prior notification be reviewed. The Commission had hitherto
requested notification of:
- 
programmes for a particular sector that could be undertaken within the framework
of each general aid scheme;
- 
or, failing this, significant individual cases where aids are granted to such given
undertakings, significant cases being defined as follows: cases where the value
of the investment is 2 million u.a. or more and cases where the value of the aid,
expressed as net subsidy equivalent, is l5yo or more of the value of the investment.
t S*."d R"port on Competition Policy, point 116 et seq.;Third Report or Competition Policy,
- 
point ll2 et seq,; Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point166 et seq.2 Second Report on Competition Policy, point 90.3 Decision 751397IEF,C, OJ L 177 of 8.7.19?5, p. 13.
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The Belgian Government, together with other Member States, pointed out that the
figure of 2 million u.a. had not been altered since 1972 and consequently did not take
account of the intervening rise in investment costs. Realizing that this comment was
justified, and also the need to apply tle new European unit of account (EUA) in this
sector, ttre Commission decided to raise the notification threshold to 3 million EUA.
Economic recovery measures
I 37 . It is not possible within the necessarily restricted confines of this report to analyse
in detail all the economic recovery measures which Member States have been obliged
to adopt in the past year to maintain or boost economic activity and employment and
on which the Commission has expressed its views. The measures described below are
therefore quoted only by way of example.
Federal Republic of Germany
138. The Heads of Government of tle nine Member States of the Community,
meeting in Paris on 10 September 1974, had expressed the view that'Member States
which have a balance of payments surplus must implement an economic policy of
stimulating domestic demand and maintaining a high level of employment, without
creating new inflationary conditions'. Several days later the German Government
notified the Commission of an economic programme to encourage employment and
stable economic growth. This was at a time when the unemployment level in Germany
was the highest in the Community after Italy.
The main objectives of the German programme, to which the Commission raised no
objections, included a significant increase in public investment, higher unemployment
benefi.ts and the granting of a number of financial benefits to undertakings, notably:
- 
a 7 .5o/o subsidy for investment operations carried out between 31 November 1974
and 1 July 1975;
- 
a grant to encourage the recruitment by 1 May 1975 of persons out of work;
firms recruiting on this basis were entitled to an allowance equivalent to 660/o of
gross wage costs, payable for a six month period. This subsidy was granted only
in those areas where the unemployment level was half a point higher than the
national average; budgetary credits of DM 500 million were allocated for this
subsidy, which was intended to provide jobs for about 90 000 unemployed;
- 
the allocation of considerable additional funds to encourase investment bv small
and medium-sized firms.
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France
139. ln May 1975 tle French Government adopted a series of important measures
aimed at boosting productive investment by both private and public undertakings,
in an attempt to safeguard employment and at the same time continue tlte programme
of industrial modernization and redeployment that was essential in the aftermath of
the energy crisis.
These measures involved primarily:
- 
a subsidy equal to l0o/o of the value of fum orders for capital goods and tools
placed by firms (whether agricultural or commercial, smallscale craft businesses or
industrial undertakings) between 30 April and 3l December 1975, such subsidies to
take the form of a deduction in the VAT payable by these firms in 1975. This
benefit was granted automatically, irrespective of the origin of the equipment
ordered (national or otherwise). Similar measures had been taken in France in
1966 and 1969 with the same aim;
- 
long-term financing assistance to help firms carry out their investment program-
mes. A number of credit institutions (Cr6dit national, Cr6dit htitelier et commer-
cial, Soci6t6 de d6veloppement rdgional, Caisse nationale des march6s de l'Etat)
floated a FF 5 000 million loan, on the proceeds of which they granted long-term
loans (15 years) to help finance company investment programmes to increase
production capacity, create new jobs or conserve energy. Such programmes
were to be started by 3l December 1975. The interest rate is the rate prevailing
on the bond market, reduced however for the first five years to 8.5% as the result
of a government interest-relief grant.
The same institutions were also able to gant long-term loans on the same terms
up to an overall ceiling of FF I 500 million, likewise eligible for the same
interest-relief grant, for investment programmes to increase production capacity
carried out by firms undertaking to increase tleir exports by 5% over tle next
three years. Examination of the applications and the selection of suitable appli-
cants lay with the credit institutions concerned; the public authorities did not
interfere to impose sectoral, regional or specific preferences.
The Commission found that the measures adopted by the French Government were
in keeping with the 'adjustments to ttre economic policy guidelines for 1975' which it
had suggested in a communication to the Council and to which the Council had agreed
on 18 March 1975. In view of the short-term economic problems (negative trend in ttre
employment level, drop in industrial output) facing the Government, and of the
conditions governing the aid planned (investment subsidies for a fimited period),
the Commission raised no objection to the application of these measures by the
French Government, on condition that prior notification was given of significant
cases where long-term subsidized-interest loans were granted.
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140. From June, grants payable for a six-month period have been given to firms
creating new jobs for young workers under 25 and for persons who have been unem-
ployed for more than six months. The grant was fixed at FF 500 per month for persons
recruited by 30 September 1975 and FF 300 per month for those recruited beiween I
October and 20 November 1975. In order to avoid redundancies it had previously
been decided that the State, acting within the framework of agreements concluded
with trade associations representing certain industries or with the firms themselves,
would bear part of the costs in respect of the additional allowances payable to wor-
kers on short time.
Attempts to promote economic recovery were intensifled in September as follows:
the payment dates for certain direct company taxes were deferred by six months;
the funds allocated to loans ganted by the Economic and Social Development Fund(a general aid scheme subject to commission control) I were increased by FF 3 000
million; and the abovementioned 10% subsidy in the form of a vAT deduction,
which was initially restricted to capital goods being paid of over a period of less than
eight years, was extended to all such goods paid off on a decreasing instalment basis,
Belgium
I4I. A scheme similar to this French and to the German schemes described above2
was introduced in Belgium on I July 1975 to encourage additional investment during
the period from I July to 3l December 1975. Under this scheme firms will be entitled
to deduct l1oh of the value of such investments from the profits on which they are
liable to income tax; this is the equivalent of a net subsidy of up to 6%.
Denmark
142. rn April 1975 the commission was advised of a draft Danish law setting up a
Fund for the assistance of companies which are structurally sound but have run into
difficulties as the result of the economic situation.
The Fund, whose initial resources are to consist of a State contribution of Dkr
100 million (approximately 12.5 million u.a.), was to operate for a temporary period
only, until such time as it was then expected economic activity would recover, i.e.,
I July 1976. Aid granted under the Fund is to take the form of loans at market rates
and guarantees on loans granted by third parties to the firms concerned. Commitments
in each particular case may not exceed Dk 2s million (approximately 3 million u.a.),
t thltd R"p*t on Competition Policy, point ll3.2 Points 138 to 140.
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with a maximum term of eight years. Aid will be restricted to firms which fulfil a key
function in terms of economic activity and employment and which, apart from the
problems due to the economic situation, are seen to be structurally viable.
The Commission originally decided not to raise objections to this scheme on condi-
tion that significant cases where it was used 
- 
defined as cases where aid was granted
to firms emlloying more than 300 persons, or, failing this, having an annual turnover
of more than 10 million u.a.l 
- 
be notified in advance.
On account of the Danish Government's failure to agree to this proviso and of the
extension of the period of application to 1 July 1977 without its being consulted, the
Commission was subsequently obliged to initiate the procedure under Article 93(2) of
the EEC Treaty. Having received satisfactory undertakings from the Danish Govern-
ment that such specific cases would be notified and that the Commission would be
informed, should the aid scheme be extended beyond the original expiry date of 1 July
1976, so inat it witt be able to give an opinion in the light of the prevailing social and
economic conditions, the Commission decided to terminate the procedure'
143. The Commission also decided to raise no objections to the implementation of a
second draft Danish law to stimulate activity and thereby reduce unemployment in
the building sector by encouraging property investment by Danish firms (industrial,
commercial and agricultural).
A total of Dkr 520 million has been set aside for the implementation of this aid
scheme, which will terminate on 3l March 1977,by which date investment projects
receiving assistance will have to be completed. The following operations will be eligible
for assisiance in the form of capital grants of up to 25oh: those permitting the conser-
vation of energy in buildings used for industrial, commercial or agricultural pruposes;
those aimed ai improving working conditions in such buildings; and those for the
construction of buildings to be used by small, industrial or commercial enterprises'
The Commission's decision was based on the consideration that this scheme could
help bring about a recovery in the economic and social situation in Denmark and
thai it wa--s particularly advantageous to small- and medium-sized firms by virtue of
the upper limit on aid granted in each specific case'
144. lnaddition, in Denmark as in France and Belgium, assistance in the form of tax
concessions has been introduced to encourage investment in fixed and movable assets
under two laws enacted in June and Septembet 1975. The aid granted will represent
the equivalent of a 3.6Yo or 7.2o/o subsidy depending on whether the investment is in
fixed or movable assets. Such investment operations must be completed by 31 Decem-
ber 1976.
ffi'dscaIeoftheinvestment,becauseofthetypeofaidschemeinvolved,couldnotbe
used as criteria for the determination of significant cases'
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United Kingdom
145. In August the United Kingdom Government informed the Commission of its
intention to amend the Employment and rraining Act 1973 with a view to improving
the employment situation by means of the following temporary aid measures:
- 
a temporary employment subsidy to be paid to employers at the rate of f l0 per
week per person to keep in employment groups of 50 or more workers who would
otherwise have been made redundant; the subsidy is to be paid for a period of
3 months, with a possibility of an extension for a further 3 months; the aid will be
available for a l2-month period and can be renewed for a further year;
- 
a recruitment subsidy scheme to help young people to find employment; apayment
of f,5 per week will be made over a 26-weekperiod for each newly recruited young
person who was registered as unemployed and who left school before the end of
July 1975.
The recipient firms must be structurally sound, thus providing an assurance that the
employees for whom these subsidies are paid will be able to stay with the firm on a
long-term basis.
The Commission informed the UK Government that it had no objection to these
measures as long as they were justified by the economic situation.
146. At the same time the British Government took steps to stimulate industrial
investment by authorizing the allocation of additional funds to the existing general
aid scheme provided by Section 8 of the Industry Act 1972. The sum of f, 180 million
has been made available to encourage firms to proceed at an early date with their
investment and industrial modernization programmes.
Section 8 of the Industry Act 1972 makes provision for various forms of financial
assistance (grants, loans, guarantees, temporary acquisition of share capital) to be
granted by the British Government to promote the development or modernization of
an industry, to promote its efficiency, to create, expand or sustain productive capacity
in an industry or in undertakings in an industry. This constitutes a general aid scheme,
and the UK Government for its part complies with the control procedure imposed by
the Commission in respect of the implementation of such schemes.r The Commission
therefore raised no objection to the allocation of additional funds, as the procedure
referred to above enabled it to comment on the purpose for which they are used to
finance industry programmes or assist individual firms.
1 Point 134.
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147, Thelrish Government also has introduced, with effect from June 1975' an aid
scheme to improve the employment situation. Under this scheme manufacturing
firms recruiting p"rsoos out of work are eligible for temporary premiums of €12 per
week per person up to 3l March 1976 and f,6 per wekk up to 30 June 1976, when
payment *itt 
"."r". 
A total of f,27 million has been set aide for these measures. As in
ini 
""r. 
of the British scheme referred to above, the Commission has raised no objec-
tion.
Italy
148. ln an attempt to combat the recession the Italian Government decided in May
to allocate further funds under certain existing laws creating general aid schemes for
manufacturing industry. These include:
- 
Law No 464 of 8 August 1972 for aid to firms which, having run into difficulties,
may have to dismiss workers or put them on short time; this aid basically consists
of grants reducing the rate of interest on loans contracted by firms to carry out
restructuring plans to prevent unemployment.
Additional funds totalling Lit. 16 000 million for 1975 and Lit. 28 000 million
per year for 1976-89 are to be allocated for the implementation of this law;
- 
Law No 1470 of 18 December 1961 for aid to firms which have run into difficulties
or have already discontinued operations and are unable therefore to obtain funds
through the uiual channels; under this law provision is made for the Istituto
Mobiiiare Italiano (IMI) to grant low-interest loans to ensure the survival of these
firms, on condition that the loans are used to finance reotganization or restruc-
turing operations.
An additional sum of Lit. 30 000 million has been allocated to IMI for this
purpose.
The Italian Government had previously agreed to give the Commission prior noti--
fication of significant specificiases where aid was granted under these two laws'r
In view of this undertaking and of the problems currently facing the Italian economy,
the Commission raised no objection to provision of additional funds for these two
laws.
1 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points 168 and 169'
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Adjustment of State monopolies
of a commercial character
149. The Commission continued the work it had been engaged in since the end of the
transitional period with respect to State monopolies of a commercial character.l
In Case 59fi5 the Commission restated before the Court of Justice its view that Article
37(1) of the EEC Treaty had been directly applicable since the end of the transitional
period and that this necessarily implied the extinction of a State monopoly's
exclusive rights to import and market goods which the monopoly itself manufactured.2
/50. As regards the French potash monopoly, the obligation to give prior notification
of imports of straight fertilizers containing potash or potassium salts was abolished
on 1 May 1975.3 The monopoly, therefore, has now been fully adjusted in accordance
with Article 37(1). The Commission consequently decided on 25 July 1975 not to
continue with the infringement procedure initiated in this case.
/51. The Commission felt obliged to review its position on the French and German
alcohol monopolies following the judgment given by the Court of Justice on 10 Decem-
ber 1974 in Case 48174.4 The Court had rejected the Commission's view that barriers
to trade forming an integral part of a national market organization for agricultural
products may be maintained until the national market organization is replaced by a
common organization. As regards trade between Member States the provisions of the
EEC Treaty on the abottion of quantitative restrictions and measures having equi-
valent effect, which have been directly applicable since the end of the transitional
period, have therefore applied in full since then both to agricultural and to industrial
t Ftr" R.p.rt on Competition Policy, point 195 et seq,i Second Report on Competition Policy,
point 150 et seq,t Third Report on Competition Policy, point 125 et seq.i Fourth Report on
Competition Policy, point 184 et seq.2 Giving judgment ot 3.2.1976, the Court ruled that Article 37(l) required the exclusive right of a
State monopoly of a commercial character to import from other Member States to be abolished
by 31.12.1969, and that the provisions ofthis Article had been directly applicable since that date.3 Arr€td of 28.11,1974,1 
,19741 ECR 1383 er sec.
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products. The Commission had found that France and Germany, each having an
alcohol monopoly with rules designed to make it easier to dispose of agricultural
products or obtain for them the best return, did not allow imports of alcohol of
eitler agricultural or non-agricultural origin. For this reason the Commission on 31
July 1975 urged the French and German Governments to abolish these restrictions
on the free movement of goods from other Member States. So far they have taken no
step to comply. However, the Commission has not initiated infringement procedures
against these two Member States, since two requests have been made to the Court
of Justice for a preliminary ruling on whether the German alcohol monopoly could be
considered compatible with the provisions of the EEC Treaty, in particular Article
37 , after the end of the transitional period. l
/J2. Following complaints by foreign manufacturers concerning excessively long
delays on the part of the Italian manufactured tobacco monopoly in paying for im-
ports, the Commission had again initiated an infringement procedure against the
Italian Government in accordance with Article 169 of the EEC Treaty.2 Having been
informed by the manufacturers concerned that the payments situation had returned to
normal, the Commission decided on 26 July 1975 not to continue with the above
procedure.
Apart from this, the Commission continued its examination of adjustments to the
Italian manufactured tobacco monopoly. In response to numerous complaints by
exporters it made representations to the Italian authorities on several occasions,
urgrng that certain adjustments should be put into effect, and that the undertaking
given when the Council Resolution of 21 April 1970 was adopted 
- 
to the effect that
free movement of manufactured tobacco would be secured bv 31 December 1975 
-should be respected.
A law adjusting the monopoly arrangements for the importation and marketing of
manufactured tobacco at wholesale level was enacted on 10 December 1975.3 The
Commission informed the Italian Government that certain aspects of the law did not
conform to the provisions of the EEC Treaty on the free movement of goods. It also
asked the Italian Government to give an assurance that these provisions would be
respected during the interim period following the entry into force of the new arrange-
ments, and until importers, with full knowledge of the facts, had time to take any steps
they considered necessary.
/53. The Italian authorities informed the Commission that, under the Decree issued
by the Minister of Finance on 25 June 1973 the State monopoly's exclusive whole-
saling right for matches would cease at the same time as its exclusive right for mark-
t C"*" 451?5 (Rewe) and 91175 (Miritz).The Court is expected to give a ruling early in 1976.2 Commission Decision of 20.12.1974; Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 188.3 Law No. 724i Gazzetta Ufrciale,7.l.1976.
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eting manufactured tobacco at wholesale level, namely by 31 December 1975' The
Commission asked the Italian Government to provide assurances regarding the tax
arrangements to be applied once the new provisions took effect. The necessary assur-
ances were given.
154. The Commission urged the French Government on several occasions to ensure
that the undertaking giveiwhen the Council Resolution of 21 April 1970 was adopted
to the effect that free movement of manufactured tobacco would be established by
31 December 1975, was respected. It also asked the French Government for assurances
that the principle of free movement of goods would be upheld during the interim
period fottowing the entry into force of ihe new arrangements, until importers had
time to take any steps thiy considered necessary having full knowledge of the facts'
155. Inthe light of the comments made by the Italian Government under the infrin-
gement pro""-dor., the commission re-examined the arrangements concerning the
f,"rgunlot oil consortium and compulsory storage of begamot_oil introduced by the
Law of 28 November 1973.1 The Iiatian Government informed the Commission that
any community national may purchase an unlimited quantity of bergamot oil from
the consortium on the same tirms as its members. Furthermore, the consortium does
not have the exclusive right, in law or in fact, to authorize exports of bergamot oil to
other Member States, uid buyrr. are therefore free to sell the oil not only on the
Italian market but also on other Community markets'
Bearing this information in mind, the Commission is now considering whether the
Italian-bergamot oil arrangements can in fact be said to be a State monopoly of a
commercial character within the meaning of Article 37(1)'
156. The Commission continued its efforts to ensure that the adjustment of mono-
polies in the original Member States in relation to the new Member states was pro-
gressing in accordance with Article 44 of the Act concerning the conditions of Acces-
sion.2
In its Recommendation of 2 August 19743 concerning the French manufactured tobac-
co monopoly, the Commission had asked the monopoly to open import quotas fol the
new Member States and to increase them gradually each year up to the end of the
transitional period (31 December 1977), in accordance with Article 44.The French
Governmeni informed the Commission of its reactions to this Recommendation,
siating that for administrative reasons new brands of manufactured tobacco from the
new Member States could not be introduced until the beginning of 1976. The com-
mission informed the French Government that this was not in line with Article 44:' the
t et"*r* WcialeNo 333,28.12.1973'2 Fourth Roport on Competition Policy, point 190'3 OJ L 237 of 29.8.1974, P.35.
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adjustment of the monopoly, and hence the gradual opening-up of the market, should
have been started as soon as the Act concerning the ConAitions of Accession came into
force on I January 1973.The Danish Government has also lodged a complaint in this
connection.
157. FollowingtheRecommendationl of 19July 1974theFrenchGovernmentstated
that it was prepared to start importing matches from the new Member States in 1975
in accordance with the arrangements laid down in the Recommendation.
Since the Commission was not informed of the measures taken by the authorities
regarding the Italian manufactured tobacco monopoly following the Recommenda-
tion of 25 November 1974,1 it reminded the Italiin Gou.to.rit of its obligations
under Article 44 of the Act concerning the conditions of Accession.
/58. Adjustment of the French and German alcohol monopolies uis-d-ais the new
Member States is closely bound up with the question whether a nafional organization
of the market in alcohol is compatible with the Treaty, and the matter had been
referred to the Court of Justice. If it proves to be necessary, the Commission will send
a further Recommendation to the French Government and a Recommendation to the
German Government, asking them chiefly to open up the French and German markets
to imports of ethyl alcohol from the new Member States.
ffir29.8.1974.p.2.2 oJ L 326 of 6.12.1974,-p.29.
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Chapter lll
Public undertakings
159. Atthe beginning of Chapter I of this part of the Report, dealing with government
assistance to undertakings, mention was made of the fact that Member States had
been stepping up measures to help cope with the difficulties facing them in the present
economic crisis.
These measures neither necessarily nor exclusively take the form ofregional or sectoral
aids but also include the injection of additional funds into individual firms, notably
in the form ofloans or the acquisition ofholdings. Clearly, such assistance is granted
mainly to firms which would find it difficult to survive without this support.
But although the Commission is given the opportunity, at least in significant cases,
to rule on whether assistance of this type is compatible with the EEC Treaty before it
is granted, the business conduct of public undertakings, which may be supported
by public funds for fairly long periods, could lead to distortions of competition.
Public undertakings are not always bound by the same considerations of profitability
as private firms in the same sector; in many cases, indeed, they could not be so bound
given the operating conditions imposed on them by the State. Complaints on this
score have been lodged with the Commission departments concerned by firms or
groups of firms which feel they have a grievance, and three Written Questions on the
suUject have been put to the Commission by Members of the European Parliamentr.
Some of the points raised are still being examined. However, the work of the Commis-
sion departments in this field is often hampered by the lack of transparency in the
financial links between governments and undertakings as referred to in Article 90(1)
of the EEC Treaty, whose conduct may be influenced by governments.
Consequently, the Commission departments concerned are preparing a directive
based on Article 90(3) of the EEC Treaty with the three-fold aim of clarifying for
Member States their responsibilities under Article 90 introducing rules which will
put the Commission in a better position to check on compliance with the Treaty by
Member States operating through public undertakings and by the undertakings
themselves, and finally making the financial links between governments and public
undertakings more transparent.
t fttr,"" a*stion No. 699174by Mr. Spdnale: OJ C 86 of 17.4.1975, p. 66; Written Question
No. 63/7iby Mr. Schworer: OJ C 209 of 11.9.1975, p.2; Written Question No. 108/75 by Mr.
Giraud: OJ C 192 of 22.8.1975, p. lO.
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Part three
The development of concentration
in the Community
                                                             106-8
Introductory remarks
160. Thrs part of the report reviews the results of the Commission's research pro-
gramme on concentration in the Community.
The first section deals with national and international mergers, share acquisitions andjoint ventures in 1973 and 1974.
The second section deals with the development of concentration in a number of
Community industries and countries; it gives figures summarizing the results obtained
so far and a comparative analysis of the various aspects of concentration based on
selected illustrations.
The accent is on concentration in product markets, and, for the first time, industrial
and commercial structures in the United Kingdom are the centrepiece.
A number of general remarks and conclusions complete Part three.
91 
- 
National and international mergers, share acquisitions
and joint ventures in the Community in 1973 and 1974
Comparison between national and intemational operations
161. The figures given in this Fifth Report on Competition Policy for the number
and type of mergers and similar operations in the Community in 1974 are directly
comparable with those for 1973 given in the Fourth Report (points 194 to 200).
The figures for l974,like those for 1973, were obtained from the specialist press.
Not only international operations but also purely domestic operations are covered.
Figures are given exclusively for the number of operations which took place.
Since there is no indication of the economic scale of each operation, it is not possible
to tell whether there is a correlation between tle frequency of such operations and
changes in tle degree of concentration.
162. Table I sets out tle total number of national and international operations in
the Community for 1973 and 1974; separate figures are given for takeovers and
coMF. REP.1975
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TIIE DEVELOPMENT OF CONCENTRATION I11
mergers, share acquisitions and joint ventures in each of the two years. The number
of firms involved in each type of operation is also given. There is a further breakdown,
on the basis of the number of firms involved, into bilateral (two-firm) and multilateral
three-or-more firm operations. while the figures show the number of firms taking
part in these operations, it should not be forgotten that in any given year one firm
may have been involved in several share acquisitions or joint ventures and may have
merged with one or more other firms.
Finally, Table I relates purely national operations in percentage terms to the total
number of operations for each of the two years.
163. Comparison of the 1973 and 1974 figures shows that there was a sharp increase(20%) in the number of takeovers and mergers, whereas the increase in share acquisi-
tions was slight (7%) and there was virtually no increase in the number of joint
ventures (barely 1%). As for the number of firms involved, the figures are more
emphatic: there is a 27Yo increase as regards takeovers and mergers, 130% for share
acquisitions and 9o/o for joint ventures. There was a bigger increase from 1973 to
1974 in the number of firms involved in operations of this kind (13%) than in the
number of operations themselves (6%).
164. As for the relative importance of the various types of operation, it will be seen
that acquisitions rank first with 59Yo of all operations ; joint ventures account for just
under a third (32%).It also emerges from Table I that two-firm operations (79% of
the total) were considerably more frequent than operations involving three firms or
more.
165. ln 1973 international operations (61% of the total, 57oh of those taking part)
were rather more numerous tlan purely national operations, but the situation was
reversed in 1974, when national operations accounted for 53o/o of the total and for
52% of the firms taking part.
However, the period of observation is too short to warrant ttre conclusion that there
is a trend for purely national operations to grow in statistical importance at the
expense of international operations.
Geographical breakdown of international operations
166. A little more than half (54%) of all international operations in 1974 concerned
exclusively community fums (Table 2). The percentage had been laryer in 1973.
But the percentage of community firms in the total number of firms taking paft in
these operations rose sharply from73Yo in 1973 to 83o/o in 1974.
coMP. REP. 1975
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TABLE 2
Breakdown of intemadonal olnrations
(a) Number of operations
Yoar
Sharo acquisition Joint vcnturcs Total
t/. EQ % NMC Vo EC % NMC o/o EC % NMC
1973
1974
60
57
N
43
54
52
46
48
57
54
43
46
EC = 6peratiom involving exclusively €ommgnily countries'NMC: orpratiom also involving fimg frcm non-mcmber mutrrs'
(b) Number of firms intsoloed
Year
Share acquisition Joint ventures Total
Yorc % NMC o/o F-C % NMC oEc % NMC
t9't3
1974
78
9r
))
9
66
72
34
28
IJ
83
27
t7
EC o fums from Comunity coutrid.
NMC = frms from tron-memb€r comri$.
167. Inthe enlarged Community, German and French firms were the most frequent
participants in international operations in 1974 (Table 3), Germany now having
caugnf up with France, the leader since 1971. With a one-third increase in its share
from tgZ3 to 1974, the United Kingdom has joined Belgium in third place' The Bene-
lux countries taken together still lead the field despite a notable drop from 1973 to
1974. These tlree countries alone accounted for 44o/o of international operations in
1973,3loA in 1974.
TABLE 3
Geographical-breakilown of international operations in the Community
Year D F NL B L UK IRL DK Total
1973
r974
l4
22
22
22
6 11
8
19
t6
t4
7
t2
t6
I
I
I
I
100
100
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168. From information available on tlre nationality of firms taking part in interna-
tional operations in the Community, it is possible to determine ttre-share of the total
number of firms involved in 1973 and 1974 accounted for by non-member countries(Table a)' Ac was the case when the community had only six members, Americanfirms head the list, followed by swiss firms. But, in line with a trend which began
some years ago, their share in 1974 was one sixth lower than in 1973 while the Swissinfluence fell of by a third. Indeed, the number of non-member-country firms inglneral was nearly 20o/o down on 1973: at that time Community firms represented less
than three-quarters ofthose taking part in international op"rutionr, but this rose to
nearly four-fifths in 1974.
TABLE 4
Share of Community and non-Communlty frms involved
in lnternadonal operations ln the Communlty
THE DBVELOPMENT OF CONCENTRATION I13
Year EC USA Switzcrland Japan Scandinavia Othcrs Total
1973
1974
73
79
l2
l0
6
4
t
I
2
J
)
3
100
100
Breakdown by industry of national and international operations
169- Ftom 1973 to 1974 the share of a number of industries in total national andinternational operations in the EEC declined (Table 5): the main examples are the
metal-using industries (down ftom 27%o to 2l%) and tire food industry (down from
9o/o to 4%). On the other hand the services sector confrmed a trend which had beengathering momentum for some years with an upsurge from 39%o to 5l%o. Future
reports may well take this into account by giving separate figures for individual
service industries.
TABLE 5
Natlonal and lntemadonal operaffons in the Community, by lndustry
Ycar
Mctal-using
industrie Easgy Chcmiels Tcxtils
Othcr
mmufactuiag
indutrie
Food
industry Scrviccs Total
t973
r974
27
2l
.,
3
8
9
4
4
n
9
9
4
39
5l
100
100
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52 
- 
The development of concentration in selected industries
The methods used
170. withfive years of research into concentration behind it, the commission is now
in a position to give a statistical summary of progress and- rezults so far, though this
will inevitably be concise. The analysis incorporates the findings of all the industry
studies carried out for the commission since 1970 and will be confined to the most
widely used measure of concentration-the concentration ratio, which is the percen-
tage of an industry's total sales accounted for by the four largest firms in that industry'
NJvertheless, in certain tables tle concentration ratio will be corrected and refined by
the coefficient of disparity, designed to show whether these four firms are of more or
less the same size (at least as rigards the variable selected) or whether one or more
of them wields superior economic power.
The coefficient of disparity is expressed as a percentage' like the concentration ratio
the maximum concentration ratio (100%) being at the same time the minimum coeffi-
cient of disparity. This minimum corresponds to the situation where the four leading
firms are of exactlY the same size.
Hence the concentration ratio and coefficient of disparity will both be 100% in an
industry where there are only four firms and each accounts for exactly tle same share
of sales. Where, on the other hand, the size distribution of the four leading flrms is
sharply asymmetric, the coefficient of disparity will be closer to 400oh, and the
presumptioo of a partial and imperfect monopoly situation will become stronger as
ihe coehcient reaches or exceeds 1 000%.1
use of the coefficient of disparity together with the concentration ratio not only
enables international comparisons to be made on relatively homogeneous and simple
t f"rh"lrrl *rz. The coefrcient of disparity (4L) is derived from the ratio -between the index of
disparity (L+) and the'"""ip"iiti* -"?if ; (gir4l *fti"tt in the present case is 0'250' In this situation
4L=4L+.as r"gurCs itre-J"".-it"t"ioithe ratio, it witf be bo-rne in mind that' if the four
firms (n* - 4) account ioi tt 
" 
."*" share in the vaiiable or are of the same size (hvpothesis of
absolute equalitg, 
"o 
: 1* : I: o'"0,i'e', the CM'
See y. Morvan, La concentration de I'industrie en France (Collection U, Colin, Paris 1972)'
page 190.
If- on the other hand, the L index is taken in relation to only thfee or two firms, the competitive
model--+orresponding to the hypothesis of absolute equality-would be La : 1- = | : o'llt
and L2 = 
*- 
:; : 0.500 respectively.
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bases but also (where it approaches or exceeds 4oo%) allows the amber or the red
light to be activated without actually revealing figures for individual firms.
The economist and the lawyer will then be able to say whether or not this disparity
of size reflects a situation of dominance or of leadership. An analysis of concentration
on product markets will highlight, through the figures and their interpretation, the
way these two measures of concentration complement each other.
171 . Table 6 gives a summary of what studies have so far been carried out under the
Commission's concentration research programme.
Some of tle industries have been reported on twice, the first report covering the periodfrom 1962 to 1970 (the reference period for the first round ofieports) uod the Jecond
bringing the picture up to date for subsequent years.
172. The new reports incorporated in Table 6 this year were prepared by the following
national research institutes and experts:
Germany:
France:
Italy:
Ireland:
Netherlands: Prof, H, w. de Jong, stichting Nijenrode, Breukelen (pharma-
ceuticals).
Belgium: STUDIA vzwd, Brussels (wool, cotton, knitted and crocheted
goods, pharmaceuticals).
united Kingdom: cranfield School of Management, cranfield, Bedford (wool,
cotton, knitted and crocheted goods)
IFO-Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung, Munich, (manufacture of
non-electrical machinery, electrical engineering)
Kienbaum Unternehmensberatung, Gummersbach, (cycles and
motorcycles).
DAFSA Analyse SA, Paris (wool, cotton, pharmaceuticals).
FIS-ATOR Consulenza Aziendale, Milan (pharmaceuticals,
electrical engineering, cycles and motorcycles)
SORIS SpA Studi e ricerche di economia e marketing, Turin(cotton, textile machinery).
Prof. J. B. Heath, London School of Business, London (pharma-
ceuticals, photographic products, non-electrical machinery)
Development Analysts Ltd, Croydon (food industry).
Louis Smith Res. Ltd, Dublin (food industry).
COMP. REP. 197
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TABLE 6
Studies used for analysls of concenfratlon(situatlon at 31 December 195)
IndusW(NICE trommclatur€)
23 Manufacture of textiles
232 Wool
233 Cottoo
237 Knitted and crocheted goods
27 Paper indusW and rnanufacture
of paper productsizi - t"tanufacture ofpulp paper and
paperboard
272 Processing ofpaper and paperboard
3I Chemical industrY
313,1 Manufacture of pharmaceutical
products
3 I 3.2 Manufacture of photographic products
313.5 Manufacture of cleaning and
maintenance products (waxes, polishes'
metal Polishes, etc.)
36 Manufacture of machinerY
other than electic machines
361 Manufacture of agricultural machinery
, and tractors
362
3g.l
366.3
366.4
366.5 Manufacture of hoisting and
handling equiPmeat
37 Electrical engineering
375 Manuiacture of electronic equipment,
audio equiPmeot, radio and
tolevision receive$
376 Manufacture of electrical appliances
38 Manufacture of transport equipment
385.1' Manufacture of motorcycles, cycles
and Powcr'assisted cYcles
N-B Food manufactwing indwtries
Manufacture of Offce machinerY
Manufacture of textile machinery
I Manufacturc of equiPment for
lcivil engineering and of machinery for
[the mcchanical working of
I building materials
I
x
o
+
In Gcrnany tbc industry was suHivided into-(i).cyctce md (ii) motor cyclcs and mopcds'
ci"Jio tli ro"ttb Rciort on Compctition Policv'
Ncw studicr.
Updrting of cxisting studi6.
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Main results as regards concentration by industry
173. Of all the studies used in the concentration analysis, forty-two contain data,
whereby levels of concentration in 1969 aid 1972 can be compared. These data,
giving the share of the top four firms in total industry sales (C4=concentration ratio)
have been put in ascending order for each of the two years. The juxtaposition of these
two series in Figure I shows that the level of conmtration did not change sub-
stantially between 1969 and 1972.r
Both in the low-concentration area (the first two cases in thesc series) and in the high-
concentration area (the three cases at the right of the scale), it can be seen that the
level of concentration was higher in 1969 than in 1972.ln the bulk of the survey,
excluding these two extremes, the trend generally seems to be for concentration to
have intensifiedby 1972, but the gap was a small one, if indeed there was one, and in
certain cases 1972 figures are lower. Even more can be learned from this summary if
the statistical base, i.e., tle various national industries making up the graph, is speci-
fied. Table 7 lists these forty-two industries in descending order of concentration ratio
(Ca) in l972,the 1969 figures being given for comparison.
In interpreting this table, it must be borne in mind that:
(i) eses wcre selected awording tg what information was available, and a number of
industries in certain countries have not yet been studied (such as electrical engi-
neering in the United Kingdom and tle Nethcrlands);
(ii) when the units to be analysed were selected (firms and economic activity units),
account had to be taken of the differing statistical nomenclatures and usages in
the various countries, grving consideration to the United Kingdom con@t of
'group of enterprises' and leaving out firms below a certain size.
This being said, it can nevertheless be seen that throughout the Community, electrical
engineering (both the electronics, radio and TV area and the domestic electrical appli-
ances area) and office machinery are tlre most highly concentrated industries, whercas
the food industry is the least concentrated.
171. Table E aims to give an up.to'date picture (in somc industries flgures for as
reently as 1973) of changes in concentration, comparing the situation of a given
indurtry in different countries in terms of a set of two msar[rc$ (corcentratitm ratio
and wfrcient of disparity) catculatcd o'tr nct sales.
It should be recalled here that when the coefficient of disparity is between 30O% and
MoA, the leading firm possesscs greater economic power than the others in the group
of the four largest. This was the case in 1972 and/or 1973 for cotton in Belgium, for
t F"" 
"."*p"rison of 1969 
with 1962, see Figure I in thc Third Report on Competition Policy.
I
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TABLE 7
Irvd of concnlrrtloo lr verlol €onnunls ltrdustrits end counfilcr
(Ranking and concentration ratio (Cr))
b t972
I[dwtry lnd country
In 1969
Renting Ca Ra*irg Ca
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
I
9
IO
ll
t2
l3
L4
l5
16
t7
It
19
20
2l
at
2t
21
25
26
n
28
29
30
3l
32
33
31
35
36
37
38
39&
4l
42
49.0
14.2
43.5
43.2
92.9
79.O
76.8
76.+
74.6
74.O
68.7
68J
67.8
65.5
64.4
61.4
51.0
58-9
56.6
54.5
54.0
40.0
39.2
37.4
37.2
35.8
312
28.9
28.6
26'4
25.1
25.r
24.E
22.0
2t.2
20.3
19.6
19.0
l8.E
t2,4
l0.l
7.5
Domestic €lectrical applianc€s
Agricultural machinery and tractors
Office machinery
Electronic and audb Gquiprnent" radio and television
rcccivcf,s
Domestic electrical applianc€s
Tcxtil'c rnac'hinqy md rcccssorics
Pharmaccutical products
Etectronb and audio e4uiparent, radio and tel€visiion
receiverc
Motorcycles, cycles and power-assisted cycles
Pharmaceutical products
Office arachinery
Domestic electrical appliances
Pharrnaceutical products
Motorcycles, cycles and power-assistcd cycles
Cotton
Electroric snd audio eguiprrent, radio and television
receivers
Equipncnt for civil engincering end machinery for
the mechanical working of building materials
Paper hdustry
Pharnreceutical produets
Wool
Elecuonic and audio equipmenq radio and television
rcceivers
Paper indurtry
Food manufacturing industries
Hoistilg and handling cquipment
Agricultural mrchinery 8nd tractors
Wool
Pbarmaccutical products
Wool
Paper indurtry
Equipment for civil engineering and machinery for
the mechanical rorking of buildbg materials
Textile machincry and accessorics
Hoisting and handling equiFrment
Cotton
Food manufacttrring iadustries
Cotton
Cotton
Tcxtile nachinuy and accessoiri€s
Food manufac{uring industries
Food manufacturing industries
Pharmaceutical products
Food manufacturing industries
Food nanufacturing iadustries
DK
UK
UK
DK
D
UK
NL
F
I
DK
D
I
UK
D
UK
D
UK
UK
B
UK
I
D
UK
UK
D
B
I
F
NL
D
D
D
F
B
I
B
I
NL
TR,L
F
I
F
I
3
4
2
9
J
6
8
l0
7
2t
t6
l2
ll
t4
13
at
20
l9
26
24
25
36
28
34
3l
32
30
35
38
29
37
39
33
.rc
4l
42
l5
l7
l8
2l
n
94.1
8 1.3
73.6
84.1
65.0
71.8
71.6
65.8
64.5
66.5
34.7
51.4r
6r.4
6L7
55.0
59.1
52.1
49.7
42.8
41.0
30-81
39.6
4l.l
4r.9
3r.4
34.0
3Lr
20.8
29.7
22.O
26.3
74.6
28.3
20.9
14.5
29.1
t7.9
l4.l
23.9
13.5
10.3
8.2
r Economic rctiyity unitr nthor than 6m3'
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agricultural machinery and tractors and office machinery in the United Kingdom,
electrical engineering-both radios and TVs and domestic electrical appliances-
in Denmark, motorcycles and cycles in Italy. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that
whatever the level of concentration and disparity in production terms, these are the
industries which in general are relatively open to world competition.
TABLE 8
Changes in concentration in various Community industries and countries(Concentration ratio (Ca) and coefficient of disparity (4L))
Industry (NICE nomcnclature) Coutry t969 t972 1973
crl4L c4 4L c4 4L
232 Wool F
B
UK
2t 28234 17341 193
29 30836 19543 2tO
34230 12742 222
233 Cotton FI
B
UK
28
14
29
197l4
546
l7l
25 19221 tl720 49557 256
;
18
56
194
107
431
235
27 Paper industry D
NL
UK
40 27630 14050 200
40 27829 17249 200
40 29431 288
13.1 Pharmaceutical products F
I
NL
B
UK
DK
13 15232 16072 t5243 27261 35866 140
13 13831 15569 r5444 24361 35465 198
20 t47
73 162
42 2N
66 22r
361 Agricultural machinery and
tractors
F
UK
31 13481 554 37 10379 450
362 Office machinery D
UK
35 195
74 216 64 13877 382
364.1 Textile machinery and accessories D
I
UK
26 t8218 11572 145
25 14220 11674 353 22 120
366.3-366.4 Equipment for civil
engineering and machinery
' for the mechanical working
of building materials
D
UK
22 20052 2lO 26 2r954 230
366.5 Hoisting and handling equipment D
UK
25 2U
a t84
2s 26137 200
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TABLE 6 (continaed)
Industry (NICE nomcacleturc) Country
1969 tn2 1913
c.l 4L ;T; c. l4L
375 Electronicequipment
audio equipment, radio and
television receivers
D
F
I
DK
59
66
3l
84
140
132
183
567
54 13068 236
43 l9l
76 550
51 134
45 178
75 /103
376 Domestic electrical appliances D
I
DK
65 25651 18294 562
7s 2706t 22293 315
73 26062 26894 400
385.1 Motorcycles cYcles and
power-assisted cYcles
D
I
63 t4l64 592
59 15068 536
20-B Food manufacturiag industries F
I
NL
B
UK
IRL
8 116l0 t2814 2452t 2484t 25224 140
7 130
l0 11519 296
22 22939 24719 t59
Table 8 confirms that, despite a slight upward tendency, the level of industry con-
centration remained fairly stable between 1969 and 1972. Of the forty-two industries
considered, tle concentration ratio remained virtually unchanged in eight cases
(variation ofless than2oh), increased in nineteen and fell in fifteen.
The coefficient of disparity was almost perfectly stable over tle same period: the figure
was virtually unchanged (variation ofless than 20 percentage points) in twenty-three
cases out of forty-two, went up in ten cases and went down in nine. In other words,
the power relationships between the four leading firms in the industries selected under-
went no change.
Is this the efect of a reasonably well-balanced competitive situation or simply of the
big firms' preference for peaceful coexistence? The absence of competitive dynamism
might at first sight seem to be a source of concern, even if the analysis is based on
aggregated data such as those relating to complete industries. Analysis of product
markets will provide more detailed pointers in a number of specific cases.
As regards the diferences in concentration and disparity levels between the various
countries considered, Figure 2 provides useful information'
To judge from the selected cases, and with due regard for the remarks already made,
Italy and France would seem to have been the least concentrated countries in 1972
and Denmark the most concentrated.
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FIGURE 2
Changes in concentration ln the Community
A. Average concentration ratios (C4) in industries studied in the various Community countries
C. = Percentage share of sales accounted
for by the four largest firms
in each of the industries studied
(%l
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B. Average coefrcients of disparity (4L) in industries studied in the various Community countries
4L = Coefficient of disparity between
the four largest firms in each of
the industries studied (sales)
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As regards coefficients of disparity, a distinction can be made between two groups of
countries: first there are those where the size distribution between the four leading
firms is reasonably symmetric (Germany first of all, followed by the Netherlands,
France and Italy) and then there are those where the largest firm stands out as a clear
leader and can therefore exert greater influence on how the market operates (Denmark,
followed by Belgium and the United Kingdom).
Analysis of various aspects of concentration
175. lf the full complexity of this problem is to be grasped, the foregoing general
picture must be supplemented by specific analysis of a number of aspects of concen-
tration.
The analysis below, working from a number of selected cases, will aim to give:
(t) a general horizontal section through each industry, throwing up the disparities
in index values revealed when different variables are used;(ii) a differentiated vertical section through each industry, highlighting the situation
as regards concentration on a number of product markets forming part of or
related to the industry.
176, For practical reasons, concentration in production is generally measured in
terms of sales or employment. However, the methods used by the Commission since
1970 have enabled other important variables to be referred to 
- 
particularly the
'financial'variables such as net profits, cash flow and own capital.
For technical reasons it has been possible to obtain and process these figures only (a)
for a sample of major firms in (b) certain industries in (c) certain countries.
177. Figares are given here for 1969 to 1972 inclusive in three industries 
- 
cotton,
pharmaceuticals and food. The countries used for this intervariable comparative
analysis are France, Italy, Belgium and the united Kingdom (which makes forty-eight
cases, i.e. three industries in four countries for four years) with the addition, for the
food manufacturing industries only, of the Netherlands (four cases).
This gives a total of fifty-two cases; a number of assumptions have been made to
simplify matters, and some of the figures are estimates.
178. For the purposes of the comparison use was made of Linda indices, weighted for
the number and size of the largest firms forming the sample for the industry selected;
the same indices were used in previous Competition Reports.
It is now, however, impossible to use the concentration ratio (Ca) since the difficulty in
obtaining financial information on small firms meant that the entire industry could
not be covered and, as we have seen, the sample of the major firms in each industry
was alone taken.
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179. Therelative degrees of concentration in terms of each of the five variables which
emerge from analysis of these fifty-two cases are shown in the following table:
Variable
Ranking of the variablc
Total cas€s
II III IV
Sales
Employment
Net profits
Cash flow
Own capital
4351822
t772017
2913244
8211463
1082446
52
52
5t
52
\)
A number of points will be noted:
(a) Concentration in terms of net profits is far higher than that in terms of the other
variables, followed by cash flow and own capital.
(b) Concentration in terms of sales and employment is considerably lower than that
in terms of any of the financial variables (and not only net profit).
(d) Hence the measures of concentration most commonly used, applied either to
sales or to employment, tend to understate the degree of concentration and the
real and latent economic and financial power of big companies.
(d) Furthermore, the fact that the financial variables (especially net profits) give
much higher degrees of concentration than the other variables points to a marked
asymmetry of structures, which comprise firms with widely divergent technolo-
gical bases and performance levels.
(e) The results of the analysis in overall terms are remarkably consistent whatever
industry is taken, for the net profits variable gives the highest degree of concen-
tration of the five variables:
- 
in eight cases out of sixteen in the cotton industry,
- 
in ten cases out of sixteen in the pharmaceutical industry,
- 
in eleven cases out of twenty in the food industry.
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The development of concentration
on selected product rnarkets
Aims and methods
/80. The structure of an industry is defined by reference to the number of units or
firms manufacturing certain products, the industry link being established either on
technological lines (production aspect) or on commercial lines (market aspect).
Analysis of an industry inevitably leads to analysis of the main product markets and
the firms doing business on them as a means of assessing the effects of the concen-
tration process on competition.
This part of the report offers a series of tables showing a differentiated vertical section
through selected industries, in each case beginning with an industry as a whole
(considered from the production angle) and then working down towards a series of
subindustries and product markets.
/8/. The methods and objectives of the tables on concentration in individual indus-
tries and product markets can be illustrated briefly as follows:
I. By working on three distinct levels of concentration (industry, subindustry and
product market), each table aims to give a meaningful picture of the structure being
analysed, using three units of measurement:
(r) C+ : the aggregate share of the four largest firms;(ii) 4L : the coefficient of disparity, indicating the size distribution among these
four firms, where the hypothesis of absolute equality (all four firms having
exactly the same market share) gives 4L 
- 
l{JJ:o/o;(iii) the ranking of each of the four leading firms within each subindustry or product
market.
II. It should be remembered that:
(a) figures relating to subindustries and product markets are based on sales on the
domestic market (thus excluding exports but including imports), whereas those
for the industry as a whole are based on domestic output and aggregate sales;
(b) where possible, the table gives figures for at least two or three years.
III. This means that a picture can be given of:
(a) the position and importance of each of the four leaders and their aggregate
quantitative impact on industrial structure;
(b) their degree of specialization and diversification;
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changes over time in the ranking of each of these firms on each market in response
to competitive forces;
the effects of imports on market structure, for it may be that one or more of the
leading firms on a product market is an importer or a foreign manufacturer (as
in the case of butter in the United Kingdom: see Table 14).
182. For practical reasons these new methods are applied below to the United King-
dom only; but they are to be extended to other countries and new industries in the
next few years.
The following industries are covered: textiles (wool, cotton, knitting), paper, pharma-
ceuticals, photographic goods, mechanical engineering and food processing.
This is the first time that the Commission has published such an extensive range of
figures on concentration in the United Kingdom.
lndustry and ma*et structure in the United Kingdom
/83. The following series of Tables (9 to 14) on industrial and market structure in
the United Kingdom must be qualified by a number of specific remarks if they are
to be interpreted correctly.
184. To give a better idea of concentration inthe textiles industries (Table 9), it should
be noted that ICI has a majority shareholding in Carrington-Viyella Ltd, while
Courtaulds and ICI have large shareholdings in Tootal and one other major textile
manufacturer. However, control over sales of textiles manufactured in the United
Kingdom does not necessarily entail control of the market, since roughly 40o/o of the
market is supplied by imports.
185. As regards the paper indtstry (Table 10), particularly the conversion side, it is
nec€ssary to bear in mind not only the high level of imports (43% of UK consumption)
but also the importance of competition from substitute products (plastics, timber,
textiles, etc.).
/86. As regards the pharmaceuticals indusffy (Table l l), the concentration figures
relate to thirty broad therapeutic classes in 1964 and 1973.
On twelve of these thirty product markets, the first-ranking firm in 1964 was still
the market leader in 1973. These are the markets in 'other hypertensives', non-nar-
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TABLE 9
Market concentration in the textiles inducties in the Unitod Kingdom
Concentration ratios (C+) and coefficients of disparity (4L)
r Cz (not Cr).
NB: Tootal is linked fnancially both to Courtaulds and to ICI and ICI ontrols the Carrington-Viyclla group.
Cur..Viy = Canington-Viyclla. Woolcmbn = Woolcombss.
Coats P. = Coats PatoDs. Wst Rding = West Riding.
Ill. Moris 
- 
Illingworth Moris.
cotic analgesics, tranquillizers, cough remedies, antinauseants, penicillins, laxatives,
ACT-systemic hormones, oral diabetic preparations, antispasmodics, antihistamines
and oral cold preparations.
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Industry or mskct Ycar
Measue of
concentration
I-cading firms and thcir rank
c4 l4L
T II III Iv
(%,
All three
subindustries: wool,
cottoil and knitting
1968
1970
1973
50 23248 22049 256
Courtaulds Tootal Coats P. Viyella
Courtaulds Coats P. Viyella Tootal
Courtaulds Carr-Viy. Coats P. Tootal
Wool and worsted
Spinningand weav-
ing of wool and man-
made fibres on the
same systems
1968
t970
1973
36 12039 21641 220
Coats P. Lister Wst Rding lll. Morris
Coats P, Lister lll. Morris Woolcmbrs
Ill. Morris Coats P. Bulmer Lister
Cotton
Spinning andweav-
ing ofcotton and
man-madefibres on
the same systems
Cotton etc. spinning
Allwovencloth
Wovenfilament
Sewing threadr
1968
1970
t973
1968
1968
1968
r972
56 16053 18056 236
47 56433 18860 34475 2W
Courtaulds Viyella Tootal Carrington
Courtaulds Viyella Tootal Carrington
Courtaulds Car.-Viy. Tootal Vantona
Courtaulds Tootal Viyella Carrington
Courtaulds Canington Tootal Viyella
Carrington Courtaulds Viyella Tootal
Coats P. Tootal
Hosiery and knitting
Warp-knitted fabrics
Women's hoscr
1968
1970
r973
1968
1974
53 33253 35252 284
64 43660 560
Courtaulds Coats P. Tootal Carrington
Courtaulds Coats P. Nottingham Tootal
Courtaulds Nottingham Coats P. Carr.-Viy.
Courtaulds Viyella Carrington Tootal
Courtaulds Tillings
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TABLE IO
Market concenhafion in the paper tndustry in the United Kingilom
Concentration ratios (Cr) and coeftcients of disparity (4L)
lndustry or mukct Ycar
Measure of
concentrgtion
kading fims and their rank
;T; I II III IV
(%)
Paper manufactwe
Printing and writing
papers
Paper boardr
1968
1970
t972
1968
r972
1968
r972
50 16450 20049 200
7t 23265 336
78 3207r 248
Wiggins T. Bowater Reed Unilever
WiEgins T. Bowater Reed DRG
WigEins f. Bowater Reed DRG
Bowater Recd Wiggins T. InvereskBowater Reed Wiggins T. Inveresk
Unilever Wiggins T. MardonUnilever Wiggins T. Mardon
Paper conoersion
Manufactured
stationery2
Packaging other
than board2
Board packaging
1968
1970
r972
1968
1972
1968
r972
1968
1972
55 24053 21653 216
84 46883 620
54 34457 376
58 23251 212
DRG Reed Bowater Mardon
DRG Reed Mardon BowaterDRG Reed Mardon Bowater
DRG Wiggins T.
DRG Wiggins T.
DRG Reed
DRG Reed
Bowater Mardon Unilever
Mardon Bowater UnileverReedReed
i,fiF, 
"il,l*u*t+'$: $r*,'liarv or BAr Ltd)
187. Asregards the photographic industry (Table 12), attention is drawn to the strong
position nela ty Kodak Uottr in thc industry as a whole and in tle two main markets
ior sensitized surfaces (still and cine). Kodak's approximate market shares are given
in brackets. It should be noted that competition between the other firms in this
industry is not tikely to affect Kodak's market shares, since Kodak also has the most
impressive profit margins of the whole industry.
coMP. REP.1975
I3O TIIE DEVELOPMENT OF CONCENTRATION
TABLE TI
Market concenhatlon in the phanaceuticals industry in the united Klngdom
Concentration ratios (C+) and coefficients of disparity (4L)
Industry or mtrkct Year
Measure of
concentration
Industry or mtrkct Yer
Mesurc of
concentration
c4 4L c4 4L
(%) (%,
Broad-spectrum
antibiotics
Systemic anti
inflammatories
Bronchodilators
Other hypertensives
Diuretics
Non-narcotic
analgesics
Antidepressants
Tranquilizers
Antiangina
Plain skin hormones
Cough remedies
Plain antacids
Contraceptives
Non-Barbiturate
sedatives
Peripheral
vasodilators
19&
1973
1964
1973
1964
1973
1964
1973
1964
t973
t964
1973
1964
1973
t964
1973
1964
1973
1964
1973
1964
r973
t964
1973
1964
1973
t964
99
80
98
88
63
82
98
91
75
80
68
70
89
6l
88
83
74
93
88
87
66
69
68
65
65
82
86
95
85
80
224
268
3M
244
256
516
496
782
466
310
228
290
224
2t5
241
657
246
562
464
592
452
656
204
155
290
218
856
242
1973
1964
1973
t964
1973
1964
t973
1964
t973
1964
t973
1964
t973
19&
1973
1964
t973
t964
1973
t964
1973
19&
1973
1964
1973
1964
t973
1964
t973
t973
1964
r973
Systemicantibiotics | 1964 86 2&90 188
51 23881 232
91 40682 24t
69 15874 156
64 ll059 202
77 t3294 479
72 191
70 274
76 18360 469
99 78093 2r3
87 48689 239
73 26054 128
83 17666 2r7
86 35895 182
92 24790 377
93 44192 229
Haematinics
Antinaus€ants
Penicillins
Corticosteroids
Anti-obesity
preparations
Laxatives
ACT-systemic
hormones
Oral diabetic
Parkinson
anticonvulsants
Antispasmodics
Systemic
antihistamines
TB preparations
Oral cold
preparations
Other vitamins
252
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TABLE 12
Concenhstlon ln the photographic inrlustuy tn the United Kingilom
Concentration ratios (Cr) and coefficients of disparity (4L)
Leading firms atrd thcir rank
Itrdustry or martct
'llhole industry
Still (sensitized
surfaces for cameras)
Cine (8, Super 8, etc.)
Kodak (63%)
Kodak (64%)
Kodak (65%)
Kodak (73%)
Kodak (71%)
Kodak (71%)
Kodak(72Yo)
Ilford
Ilford
Agfa-Gev.
Ilford
Ilford
Gratispool
Agf,a-Gev.
Ilford
Agfa-Gev,
Agfa-Gev.
smith
Boots
Boots
Gratispool
Boots
92
100
95
98
90
I 490
665
599
679
828
Kodak = subsidiary of Estmm Kodak (USA).
Ilford : subsidiary ofCiba-Gciry sincc 1969'
.A.gfa-Gev. : Agfa-Gevaert (Germmy/Belgium).
GratisDool = wholcaler.
Smith-= Smith & Nephcw Plastics 
- 
platic film mmufacturer.
Boots : own-label retailer'
The following figures for net pre-tax profits as a percentage of turnover in the last
few years speak for themselves:
1968
1969
1970
t97l
t972
R6t of the industry
5%
7%
6%
30
5%
188. As regards mechanical engineering in the United Kingdom, Table 13 simply gives
a brief view of the average concentration on selected agricultural-machinery and
mechanical-handling-equipment markets.
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26%
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TABLE 13
Market concentratlon ln the mechanlcal englneerlng lndustry ln the United Kingdom
Concentration ratios (C+) and coefficients of disparity (4L)
Lceding fms and tbeir rmk
Industry or mrrkel
Massey F. Ford D. Brown Int. Har,Ford Massey F. D. Brown Int. Har.Ford Massey F. D. Brown Int. Har.
New Holl. Claas Massey F. J. Deere
New Holl. Claas Massey F, J. DeereClaas New Holl. Marsey F. J. Deere
81 239
74 1707l 150
90 19690 t9682 195
Cranes, hoists,
lifting and winding
deviccs
Lifts and
escalators
Powered industrial
trucks
C. Crancs = Col€s Crmes Ltd.Cl4lnP 
- 
Clarke ChaPnu Ltd.
Cov. Clinax = Coventry Climil.D. Brown = David Brown.
Exp. Lift = Exprs Lift Company.H & C = Hanmond md CbmDne3s.
H. Monis 
- 
Hcrbert Ivtonis Ltd.
72 t6l68 l8l
84 30785 297
59 17859 234
C. Cranes
C. Cranes
Otis Elev.
Otis Elev.
L. Bagnall
L. Bagnall
Cl-Chap.
Cl-Chap.
Exp. Lift
Marryot
Hyster
Lanc. Boss
H. Morris Matterson
H. Morris NCK Rapid
Marryot H & CExp.Lift H&C
Conveyance Cov. Climax
Cov. Climax Hyster
Int. Hil. 
- 
Internationd Htrvster,
J. Deere = John Dere.
Ianc. Boss : Lmcer Bos Group.
L. Bagnall = Laruing Bagnall.
Mrosey F. : Massey Ferguson,
New Holl. = New Holland.
Otis Elcv, = Otis Elevator Grouo.
189. ln the food industry, finally, although the concentration indices for the industry
as a whole are remarkably stable, it can be seen that on individual product markets
(Table 14) there have been changes in rank order, identity and above all in market
shares for the four most important groups between 1969 and 1972. }jlerc the food
industry differs from all the other selected industries in the competitive dynamism
which is a feature of flexible oligopolistic structures. Let it also be remembered that
the firms in control of the various markets are frequently powerful multinationals.
The most higttly concentrated product markets here include condensed milk, dried
milk, breakfast cereals, margarine, frozen foods, soups and preserved fish products.
1972
r973
1974
1972
1973
1974
r970
r972
1970
r972
1970
t972
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TABLE 14
Market concentratlon ln the food industry ln the Unlted Klngdom
Concentration ratios (Cr) and coefEcients of disparity (4L)
I*adin8 firms md thcir rank
lndustry or mukct
lAhole industrY
Butter
Condensed milkr
Milk powderr
Yoghurt
Infant foodsr
Ice cream2
Packet flour
Breakfast coreals
Biscuits
Margarinel
Sugarl
Frozpn foodsl
Soupsl
Canned fish
New Zealand
Danish
Nestl€
Nestl€
Sainsbury
SainsburY
Unigate
Unigate
Glaxo
Lyons
Unilevcr
Spillers
Spillers
Weetabix
Weetabix
ABM
ABM
Kraft
Kraft
BSC
BSC
Lyons
Nestl6
Nestl6
Campbell
RHM
Cavenham
Australian
Australian
Libby
Libby
Nest16
Nestl€
M&S
Unilever
Unigate
cws
Sainsbury
Nabisco
Nabisco
Cadbury
M&S
cws
cws
M&G
M&G
Nestl€
Imperial
Campbell
Nestl6
Unigate
RHM
Irish
Irish
Sainsbury
M&S
cPc
Sainsbury
Quaker
Quaker
M&S
Cadbury
1959
1972
41 25239 248
Unilever
Unilever
4l
62
93
89
196 | Danish
236 lNew Znaland
384 | Carnation
276 | Carnation
91 l2T2lCadburY90 2532lCadburY
77 384 | ExPress72 296 | ExPress
70 196 I Heinz
82 488 | Unilever84 420 | LYons
94 776 IRHM95 920 I RHM
95 484 I Kelloggs89 512 | Kelloggs
82 364 | UB74 392 I UB
89 l896 lUnilever82 l096 lUnilever
97 l488lT&L96 34olT&L
ABF
ABF
1969
t972
1970
1973
1970
1973
l97r
1974
t973
t97l
r973
1970
r973
1969
1973
1969
1973
t969
t973
1968
r973
1967
r973
1969
t973
l9?0
1973
73
d/
76 132 | Heinz80 700 | Heinz
I 2(X I Unilever
600 | Unilever
384 | Unilever
668 | Unilever6872
Bibbys LibbY Cucumber
Ind. 
-Buitoni Cucumber Guthrie
I Cr (not Ce).3 Cr (not Cr).
A-BF - 
- 
Asciatcd British Foods.
ABM = Alsociat€d Biscuit Menufrcturen.Bsc : British sugsr Corporation.CwS = Cooperative Wholccale Socicty.
M&G-Manbro&Gilton.
M&S =Muks&Spcncer.RHM = Rmk Hovis Macdougall.T&L : Tatc&Lylc.UB = Unitcd Bieuit.
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Main results as regards concentration on product markets
190. Tables 9 to 14 show the degree of concentration on sixty-five product markets.
They can be used as a basis for a summary of the most recent situation ascertainable(re12173).'
As,this is a summary, we must enter the necessary reservations called for both by the
differences in the extent to which the various industries were broken down into sub-
industries and by the differences between the size of each product market in relation
to the others.
t Ftg*". f- 1968 had to be used for certain textile product markets only.
TABLE 15
Average product market concentlation in selected industrles
in the United Kingdom in 1972173
Conc€ntration ratios (Ca) and coefficients of disparity (4L)
Av€rage merket
concentratioo I
Industry
c+ | qr-
(%)
Number of
product
mtrkets
selected
Leading fims involved I
Rank(number of cmes2)
First Second
Textiles | 0t 340 8 Courtaulds
Tootal
Coats-P.
Ill. Morris
Carrington-Viyella
Tillings
<l
It
l-
l3
a
Paper I os 332 6 Wiggins Teape Ltd(subsidiary of BAT)
Bowater
Unilever
Dickinson-Robinson
Group Ltd
Reed
a
ll
l-3-
l3
Pharmaceuticals | 79 353 30
Photographic I gZ 7t4goods I 2 KodakAgfa-Gevaert
Ilford
a
I
I
] P-roduct or-product group markets or subindustries used for Tables 9 to 14.
- Number ol cses in which the firm takes first or ssond Dlace.
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TABLE 15 (continned)
Industry
Average markqt
concentration'
Number of
product
markets
seleted
Leading firms involved r
Rank(number of cses')
Ca 4L First 
I 
,*"".
(%)
Mechanical
engineering
76 229 5 Massey Ferguson
Ford
New Holland
Claas
Otis elevator
I
I
.I
I
I
Food industry 88 656 l4 Unilever
Heinz
New Zealand
Carnation
Cadbury
Express
Lyons
Rank Hovis MacDougall
Kelloggs
United Biscuit
Tate & Lyle
Danish
Nestl€
Unigate
3l
t
l-
l-
1-
1-
l-
t-
1-
l-
1
a
I
Average concentra-
tion in the sample
and total number of
markets 43'l 65
1 Product or product group m&rkets or subi[dustri€8 for Tables 9 to 14.2 Nmber of iseo in which the 6rm taket fint or swond place'
The breakdown and selection of these markets to give the sixty-five cases for study
were governed by practical considerations concerning the collection and processing of
accessible information.
However, even if the sample is too small to be taken as a guide to the entire structure
of manufacturing industry, the results so far obtained do at least provide useful work-
ing hypotheses.
For each industry Table 15 gives average concentration figures, obtained by taking
the arithmetic mean of the figures for each of the two measures of concentration used
on the various product markets included in the industry.r The three right-hand
columns name the leading firms (where they rank fi.rst or second) on the individual
product markets.
t A nr"tb.r .f simplifying assumptions and estimates were made in calculating the concentration
measures for duopolies and triopolies.
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191. The average of the concentration ratios calculated for the selected product
markets is generally higher than the concentration ratio calculated for the industry as
a whole, and this is especially true of the paper industry $9% as against 49yo),
pharmaceuticals (790h as against 61Yo) and, the food industry (88% as against 39%).
The textile industry does not follow this trend, probably because the main corporate
groups are highly diversified.
192. The average of the coefficients of disparity calculated on product markets shows
that in a number of markets there are firms wielding substantial power.
193. The averages of the coefficients of disparity in the consolidated table appear to
be rather high in the following industries (concentration ratios are given in brackets
for comparison):
- 
pharmaceuticals: 353% (C+ : 79o/o\;
- 
photographic goods: 714% (C4:92o )i
- 
food: 656% (C4:88%).
All these are figures which in themselves should activate the amber or perhaps even
the red light, especially in the photographic and food industries, particularly ifthree
points are taken into consideration:
(D firstly, these figures are averages, which means that there must in fact be situations
where the coefficient of disparity is much higher;(ii) secondly, a market is frequently defined in a fairly broad sense, taking in products
which are not always necessarily in competition with each other, so that a stricter
definition of the relevant market could yield even higher concentration and
disparity figures;(iii) thirdly, the coefficients of disparity, like the concentration ratios, have not been
calculated by reference to production, astheyarein the industry analysis but by
reference to the markets themselves, so that they also take in the shares ac-
counted for by imports.
194. Another point can be made on the basis of the foregoing. Analysis of concen-
tration on product markets has shown that the fact of very high concentration ratios
is not in itself very informative. Interpretation from the point of view of the operation
of the relevant markets is ambiguous in such cases: it can be quite worthless for opera-
tional purposes. The concentration ratio alone gives no indication of the position of
the leading firm, which in practice is the most interesting point, since a co of 80% may
be a reflection of two diametrically opposed structures:
(D a symmetrical oligopoly of four firms with 20Yo each;(ii) or a partial monopoly where the first firm holdsTTo/o and the three others l7o
each. The coefficient of disparity is thus the natural extension and logical adjunct
of the concentration ratio in any analysis of a highly concentrated structure in
which a small number of large units vie with each other.
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195. The analysis of the rank order of the first four firms covers too short a period for
any useful general conclusions to be drawn.
With the exception of a few food product markets, the selected cases studied reveal a
degree of rigidity in market shares to the advantage of the leading firm, which gener-
ally maintains iis position; such rare changes as there are in market share and rank
order tend to involve the third and/or fourth firm(s). But this conclusion may be con-
firmed or modified by subsequent research.
A few comparisons and conclusions in international terms
196. The foregoing analysis raises two fundamental questions:(l) Can principles and conclusions valid throughout the Community be obtained
from tle analysis of the selected cases studied in the united Kingdom?(ii) To what extent can the UK sample results be applied to structures in other Com-
munity countries ?
While the analysis of product markets shows that in various countries, industries and
markets a widl rangi of differing situations can be found, it has also shown that:
(i) the new Member States of the Community generally have a higher level of con-
centration than those of the original Member States;(ii) there are industries and markets on which the concentration ratios and coeffi-
cients of disparity are fairly similar in the various countries;
(iii) the same large multinational firms are often in business on the same markets in
different oountries; they usually occupy a leading position, sometimes alongside
national firms.
These three statements can be illustrated with examples taken from the pharmaceuti-
cals, photographic and food industries.
197. Asregards the pharmaceuticals industry, it is interesting to compare the situation
in the Netherlands and Denmark, working from a number of product markets.
Using the same measures of concentration as in the United Kingdom, the average
concintration ratio for eleven product markets or medicinal categories in the Nether-
lands in 1973 was 63io and the average coefficient of disparity 397'h (fot further
details on the individual markets see Table 16).
The average concentration ratio for Denmark, calculated on seven product markets
or medicinal categories, was 8l% in 1972 and the coefficient of disparity 374%.
This shows that in both countries the structure of the industry, given the measure
selected, is similar to that in the United Kingdom, whereas in Italy conc,entration is
substantially lower, in terms of both concentration ratio and coefficient of disparity.
/98. An important factor in the pharmaceuticals industry is the relative stability of
concentration in the separate product markets.
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TABLE 16
Concentration in the pharmaceuticals industry in the Netherlsnds
Leading firns and their rank
II
Industry or mark€t
l4/hole industv
Antibiotics
Cardiovascular
drugs
Psychotropics
Antirheumatics
Dermatologicals
Gynaecologicals
Diuretics
Antidiabetics
Hormones
Sedatives and
hypnotics
Spasmolytics
Hotrmm : Hoffmmn-La Roche.
ICI : Imperial Chmical lndustries.
MSD : Merct Sharp Dohme.
AKZO-Pharma Gist-Brocades MSD Philips
AKZO-Pharma Gist-Brocades MSD Philips
AKZO-Pharma MSD Gist-Brocades Philips
MSD Sandoz ICIMSD Sandoz ICIMSD Sandoz ICI
Hofmann WyethHofmann WyethHofmann Wyeth
Mycofarm ScheringMycofarm HoffmannMycofarm Hoffmann
Hoechst
Astra
Astra
MSD Ciba-Geigy
Ciba-Geigy MSD
Ciba-Geigy MSD
Beecham
Beecham
Beecham
MSD
MSD
MSD
Schering
Schering
Schering
Organon
Organon
Organon
Hoechst
Hoechst
Hoechst
Hoechst
Hoechst
Hoechst
Organon
Organon
Organon
Pfizer
Pfizer
Pfizer
Schering
Schering
Schering
RIT
RIT
RIT
Novo
Novo
Novo
Philips
Schering
Philips
Wyeth
Wyeth
Wyeth
Schering
Philips
Schering
Noury Pharma
Noury Pharma
Noury Pharma
Labaz-Lederle
Ayerst
Ayerst
Ciba-Geigy Midy BykCiba-Geigy Boots MidyBoots Ciba-Geigy Midy
Ciba-Geigy Labaz-Lederle GlaxoCiba-Geigy Labaz-Lederle GlaxoCiba-Geigy Labaz-Lederle Glaxo
Ciba-Geigy SearleCiba-Geigy SearleCiba-Geigy Searle
Boehringer OrganonOrganon WinthropOrganon Winthrop
Hoffmann UCBHofmann UCBHofmann UCB
Gist-Brocades Boehringer
Gist-Brocades Hoffmann
Gist-Brocades Hoffmann
Kali-Chemie Ciba-Geigy
Kali-Chemie Ciba-Geigy
Kali-Chemie Ciba-Geigy
Hoffmann PhilipsPhilips BoehringerPhilips Boehringer
Philips = Philips-Duphar.RIT : Rcherche et Industrie Therapeutiquc,
UCB : Union Chimique Bclge.
1970
1972
1973
1970
1972
1973
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Average concentration ratios and coeffi.cients of disparity ran as follows:
- 
Netherlands: 62Yo and 4040h in 1970, 600/o and. 346% in 1972,63o/0 and 397oh in
1973:
- 
Denmark: 80% and 504%o in 1970,81o and 375o/o in 1972.
The 1964 and 1973 figures for the United Kingdom were:
- 
1964:79o/o and 3620/o
- 
1973:79o/o and353%.
It is curious to note the absolute stability of average concentration over a ten-year
period in the United Kingdom in an industry as dynamic as pharmaceuticals, where
innovation is the rule and new products are constantly being launched.
199. Finally,let us emphasize the fact that in virtually every Community country
three highly powerful groups of companies everywhere hold extremely strong posi
tions, ginJrally on the same markets or in the same therapeutic classes-MSD,
Hoffman-La Roche and Ciba-GeigY.
Other groups with extensive business at Community level are Glaxo, Hoechst,
Beecham, ifit"t, Sandoz, Schering, ICI, Bayer, Rhcine-Poulenc, Dow Chemical,
Boehringer, Roussel-Uclaf, Lederle, AKZO,Organon. Parke-Davis, Warner Lambert'
In addition, a large number of smaller groups (mostly under American control)
operate in two or more Community countries.
200. As regards the photographic industry, the latest figures show Kodak dominating
virtually several Community countries, with Afga-Gevaert in second place (generally
some way behind).
20L Thefood industry is so large that analysis here is rather more complex.
In the industry as a whole, the level of concentration is low in every Community
country except the United Kingdom. In this industry, therefore, it was the product
markets analysis which gave the most useful results.
Of the countries analysed so far, the United Kingdom appears to be highly concen-
trated even at the individual market level (Table l4), but on product markets in other
Member States too positions of economic power are beginning to emerge.
For example, the measures used for Table 14 were also applied to the French food
industry, wtrich (apart from the drinks side) appears to be the least concentrated of
the national food industries so far studied. The average concentration ratio in France
on thirteen product markets 1 in 1972 was 46oh and the average coefficient of disparity
t Th"r" *"* the markets for preserved foods, preserved vegetables, preserved fish, milk products,
products of the grain milling industry, fine bikers' wares, pasta, sugar,,,oils and fats, chocolato
ind confectionery, frozen products, spices and condiments and soups and brothS.
coMP. REP. 1975
I.+O THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONCENTRATION
2500 , though this is a good deal higher than the figures obtained for the industry
as a whole (7% and.1307o: see Table 8).
However, it should not be forgotten that these are always averages calculated for a set
of markets, whereas much higher figures are obtained if certain markets are analysed
individually for 1972. In France, for instance, where the food industry is least con-
centrated, 1972 concentration ratios and coefficients of disparity for certain amber- or
redJight markets were as follows:
- 
oils and fats 54%o and390Yo
- 
sugar 56Yo and,288Yo
- 
frozen foods, ice creams, etc. 65oh and,263oh
- 
meat broths, soups 84oh and,256o .r
54 
- 
Summary and future outlook of the research programmo
202. To sum up, the following conclusions can be drawn from the results so far
obtained:
ln 1973 and' 1974 the number of national and international operations in the Com-
munity continued to rise, the highest increase being in takeovers and mergers.
ln 1974, unlike 1973, the number of purely national megers, share acquisitions andjoint ventures was higher than the number of international operations. However, the
reference period is too short to draw up worthwhile conclusions as to a possible
change in the trend.
As regards international operations, more than half involved community firms
exclusively.
Concentration in the various industries studied rose only very slightly between 1969
and 1972173; the size distribution between each industry's four leading firms remained
virtually unchanged.
t Tha f.ll-trg remarks are called for on these four markets.I. Oils and fats: the margarine market is dominated by Unilever both in France (60% of thc
market) and in the United Kingdom (67Yo). Lesieur dominates the French iooking-oils
market.
II. S_ugar: in France, there are three groups each controtling some 25oh of the market (B€ghin-Say,
G6n6rale Sucridre, Sucre Union); in the Unit€d Kingdom the Tate and Lyle group tras-a
market share of 54%o and. in Italy the Monti gtroup has about 35%.III. Cold foods: Findus (subsidiary of Nestl6 and BSN.Gervais Danone) controls roughly 50%
of the French frozen-foods market; Unilever controls 6OYo in the United Kingiom and
about 70% in ltaly.
IV. Dricd soups: Nestl6 has a market share of about 40% in France, followed by Knorr with
about 30% ; in the United Kingdom, Heinz has a 6loh merket share, followed by Campbel
with2O%.
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Throughout the Community, the absolute level of concentration measured on the
sales v;riable is generally fairty high, and indeed the level would be even higher if
concentration were meaiured by reference to profits and other financial variables.
The level of concentration in a large number of industries and markets is higher in the
new Member States than in the founder Member States, and this is illustrated by a
particularly well-researched analysis of industrial structure in the United Kingdom.
The analysis of a number of product markets reYeals that there are very high levels of
concentration reflecting the Jxistence of extensive economic power held by the leading
firm on the same markets in different Member States; it also shows that economic
power or dominance is frequently in the hands of the major multinational firms'
On a number of these markets it has been found that market shares are very rigid,
in other words that the market leader tends to maintain its position of power through'
out the reference period.
203. Progress to date confirms the need to do more:
(i) research into concentration in the industries and markets already studied must
be brought up to date from time to time;(ii) this research must then be taken a stage further to cover all the multiple aspects
of the concentration process 
- 
particularly market performance, and the role
and impact of major firms in the working of competition on the main product
markets;
(iii) market analysis, especially in the food and drinks industries, must be extended
to the distribution stage so as to find out how distribution channels operate
and how prices are formed for some of these products and so as to obtain a few
small pointers to the main factors behind the spread of inflation;
(iv) finalli the research must be extended to other industries and markets of interest.
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List of individual decisions of the Commission and rulings of the Court of Justice made in 1975 concern-iri gt" 
"ppfi."tion 
oi erti"fo C5 and g6 of the EEC Tteaty and of Articles 65 and 616 of the ECSC
Treaty-
                                                       142-4
DECISIONS ON INDIVIDUAL CASES
1. Concerning Articles 65 ond 86 of the EEC Treaty
Decision of 8 January 1975 on a proceediog under Article
85 of the EEC Treaty'Preserved mushrooms'
Decision of 5 March 1975 on a proceeding under Article
85 of the EEC Treaty 'Sirdar/Phildar'
Decision of 3 June 1975 on a proceeding under Article 85
of the EEC Treaty 'Haarden- en Kachelhandel'
Decision of 14 July l9?5 on a proceeding under Article 85
of the EEC Treaty 'Intergroup'
Decision of 15 July 1975 on a proceeding under Article 85
of the EEC Treaty 'IFTRA Aluminium'
Decision of l7 July 1975 on a proceeding under Article 85
of the EEC Treaty'UNIDI'
Decision of l8 July 1975 on a proceeding under Article 85
of the EEC Treaty'Kabelmetal'
Decision of25 July l9?5 on a proceeding under Article 85
of the EEC Treaty 'Bronbemaling'
Decision of 23 October 1975 on a proceeding under
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty'Transocean'
Decision of 2l November 1975 on a proceeding under
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 'Bomee-Stichting'
Decision of 2 December 1975 on a proceeding uddcr
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty'AOIP/Beyrard'
Decision of 15 December 1975 on a proceeding under
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty'Bayer/Gist'
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IP (75) 87 of 7.5.75
Bull. EC 3-1975, point 2l I I
OJ L 159 of 21.6.75, p.22
IP (75) l15 of 13.6.75
Bull. EC 6-197 5, point 2ll7
OJ L 212 of 9.8.75, p. 23
IP (75) 128 of r8.7.75
Bull. EC 718-1975, point 2120
OJ L 228 of 29.8.75, p.3
IP (75) 148 of 3r.7.75
Bull. EC 7 | 8-197 5, point 2122
OJ L 228 of 29.8.75, p. 17
IP (75) 146 of 23.7.75
Bull. EC 718-1975, point 2l2l
OI L 222 of 22.8.75, p. 34
IP (75) l5l of 24.7.75
Bull. EC 7 18-1975, point 2123
OJ L 249 of 25.9.75, p.27
rP (75\ r72 of 3.10.75
Bull. EC 9-1975, point 2106
OJ L 286 of 5.11.75, p. I
OJ L 329 of 23.12.75, p.30
IP (75) 208 of 25.11.75
Bull. EC 11-1975, point 2l2l
OJ L 6 of 13.1.76, p. 8
IP (75) 219 of 18.12.75
Bull. EC ll-1975, point 2120
OJ L 30 of 5,2.76, p. 13
IP (75) 228 of 18.12.75
Bull. EC 12-1975, point 2127
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Decision of 15 December 1975 on a proceeding under
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 'SABA'
Decision of 17 December 1975 on a proceeding under
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty 'United Brands Co,'
Decisions of 23 December 1975 on a proceeding under
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 'United Reprocessors
GmbH'and'KEWA'
2. Concerning Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty
Decision of 8 January 1975 on a proceeding under
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing DEUMU
GmbH to acquire the majority of the capital of Ernst
Biskupek KG.
Decision 751157IF.CSC of 24 January 1975 on a proceed-
ing under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the
establishment of a joint control over Marcoke by Sollac,
Usinor and August Thyssen-Httte AG.
Decision of 24 January 1975 on a proceeding under
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty on the acquisition of the
entire share capital of Brennstoffhandel Hohendahl KG,
Wiesbaden, by Hugo Stinnes AG, M0lheim (Ruhr).
Decision of 7 February 1975 on a proceeding under
Article 66 of the ECSC treaty authorizing the acquisition
by Guest Keen & Nettlefolds Ltd of the entire share
capital of w. Brealey and Co. Ltd.
Decision of 5 March 1975 on a proceeding under Article
66 of the ECSC Treaty repealing the interim measures
relating to Denain Nord-Est Longwy.
Decision 75|448/ECSC of 5 March 1975 on a proceeding
under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the
concentration between Compagnie Lorraine Industrielle
et Financidre and Marine-Firminy.
Decision of 5 March 1975 on a proceeding under Article
66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing Marine-Firminy SA
to acquire a majority shareholding in Aktien-Gesellschaft
der Dillinger Hiittenwerke.
Decision 75l298lECSC of 2 April 1975 on a proceeding
under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty approving the
acquisition by Fried. Krupp Htttenwerke AG of a
majority shareholding in Stahlwerke Siidwestfalen AG.
Docision 75l452lECSC of 7 April 1975 on a procoeding
under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty, authorizing the
formation of a holding company in the commercial
vehicle, bus and articulator tractor industry.
OJ L 28 of 3.2.76,p. 19
lP (75) 234 of 18.12.75
Bull. EC 12-197 5, point 2125
OJ L 95 of 9.4.1976, p. r.
IP (75\ 232 of 18.12.75
Bull. EC 12-1975, point 2124
OJ L 5l of 26.2.76, p.7-15
lP (76) 4 of 14.1.76
Bull. EC 12-197 5, point 2126
Bull EC l-1975, point 2ll0
OJ L 65 of 12.3.15, p. 19
Bull. EC l-1975. point 2l l I
Bull. EC 3-1975, point 2ll6
Bull. EC 3-1975, point 2l l4
OJ L 196 of 26.7.75, p.27
Bull. EC 3-1975, point 2l14
Bull. EC 3-1975, point 2ll5
OJ L 130 of 21.5.75, p. 13
Bull. EC 4-1975, point 2lll
OJ L 196 of 26,7.75, p, 4l
Bull. EC 4-1975, point 2ll2
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Decision of4 June 1975 on a proceeding under Article 66
of the ECSC Treaty on the formation by Korf Stahl AG'
Von Moos Acier SA and Sacilor SA of a joint undertaking
to be known as Acidries et Laminoirs du Rhin SA'
Decision 75|569/ECSC of 3 July 1975 on a proceeding
under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing an
agreement between several steel industry undertakings
concerning the joint buying of prereduced iron ore.
Decision of 7 July 1975 on a proceeding under Article 66
of the ECSC Treaty on the formation by Usines Gustave
Bo€l SA and Helical Bar Ltd of Queensborough Steel
Company Ltd.
Decision of 7 July 1975 on a proceeding under Article 66
of the ECSC Treaty on the formation by Usinor SA' Ets
P. Experton Revollier SA and Best GmbH of Acidries et
Laminoirs du Rh6ne et de I'Isdre (Rh6nacier).
Decision of I I July 1975 on a proceeding under Article 66
of the ECSC Treaty on the acquisition by the EGAM
Group of the share capital of Vetrocoke Cokapuania'
Decision of l6 July 1975 on a proceeding under Article 66
of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition of the
entire share capital in N. Greening & Sons Ltd' by
Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd.
Decision of25 July 1975 on a proceeding under Article 65
of the ECSC Treaty authorizing an agreement on scrap
between Sicaworms SA and Ets L6on Giron SA.
Decision of 27 October 1975 on a proceeding under
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition
by Kldckner & Co. of the entire share capital of BV
demeenschappelijk Bezit Metaalmaatschappij van SA
Vles & Zonen.
Decision of 29 October 1975 on a proceeding under
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty adopting interim measures
concerning the National Coal Board, National Smokeless
Fuels Ltd and the National Carbonizing Company Ltd.
Decision of 24 November 1975 on a proceeding under
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing three excep-
tions from Article 3 (3) of the Commission's Decision
No 74I153/ECSC of 20 December 1973 authorizing
August Thyssen-Hiitte AG to acquire the majority of the
shares of Rheinstahl AG.
Decision of 24 November 1975 on a proceeding under
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing an exception
from Article 2 (1) of the Commission's Decision No
75l298lECSC of 2 April 1975 authorizing Fried. Krupp
Hiittenwerke AG to acquire the majority of the share
capital in Stahlwerke Siidwestfalen AG.
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Decision of 12 December 1975 on a proceeding under Buil. EC 12-1975, point 2130Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the British
Steel Corporation to acquire the stainless steel stock-
holding business carried on by Alfred Simpson Ltd.
Decision of 18 December 1975 on a proceeding under Bult. EC lz-lg7s, point2l29
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty on the acquisition by
C,omgagnie Frangaise des Ferrailles SA of a majority
shareholding in Ets F. Vernerey SA.
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in Joined Cases 19 and 2O174
'Kali und Salz v Commission of the European Com-
munities'
Ruling (15 May l97g
in Case 7ll74R and RR:
'Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Fruit en Groenten-
importhandel, Nederlandse Bond van Gelmporteerd
Fruit v Commission of the European Communities'
Ruling (l October 1975)
in Cwe 25175:
'Van Vliet v Dalle Crode'
Ruling (13 November 1975)
in Case 26175:
'General Motors v Commission of the European Com-
munities'
Ruling (26 November 1975)
in Case 73174:
'Papier peints v Commission of the European Com-
munities'
Ruling (15 December 1975)
in Joined Cases 4{l to 48, 50, 54 to 56, I I 1, 1 13 and I 14 lj 3:
'Gdn€rale Sucridre etc. v Commission of the Eurooean
Communities'
OJ C 159 of 16.7.75, p. 2
Bull. EC 5-197 5, point 2441
u9751 ECR 499
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